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Editorial on the Research Topic
Self and Memory: A Multidisciplinary Debate
BACKGROUND
There is no consensus about the definition of autobiographical memory and its contribution to our
sense of self. Along the lines of Hoerl (2007), we organized the research topic by distinguishing
three strands of theorizing which vary according to how they construe the relationship between
autobiographical memory and the notions of episodic memory and self.
Autobiographical memory can be defined in terms of episodic memory, where the latter includes
a reference to the self. As Tulving puts it, “episodic memory differs from other forms of memory in
that its operations require a self. It is the self that engages in the mental activity that is referred
to as mental time travel: there can be no travel without a traveler” (Tulving, 2005, pp. 14–15;
emphasis added). Once this reference to a traveling self is built into the notion of episodic memory,
a further step may be taken by construing such notion in terms of the phenomenological construct
of prereflective self-consciousness. This path is taken, for example, by Prebble et al. (2013) who
proposed a framework for the study of sense of self and autobiographical memory where an
immediate and automatic sense of being the subject of experience (pre-reflective self-experience) is
seen as the precondition for episodic autobiographical memory, which in turn—in virtue of its
features of autonoetic consciousness and mental time travel—is a prerequisite for experiencing
unity in our subjective experience of selfhood across time (phenomenological continuity). Thus
episodic remembering makes it possible the unification of the self as a single entity that persists
across time (diachronic unity) by conveying “the inherent ‘mineness’ of the original experience into
the present moment” (Prebble et al., 2013, pp. 818–819). In contrast, semantic continuity is a form
of continuity that is not experiential but knowledge-based (the knowledge that the self exists over
time), mediated by semantic autobiographical memory which enables us to construct life narratives.
Other models, however, view episodic memory as “only one possible aspect or instance” of
autobiographical memory (Hoerl, 2007 , p. 637, note 4). For example, Conway (2005) argues that
episodic memories are experience-near sensory-perceptual-conceptual-affective summary features
of short-time slices of experience, which are durably retained only if they have been embedded in
autobiographical knowledge structures; otherwise, they are rapidly forgotten. Within what Conway
terms “the self-memory system,” therefore, the notion of autobiographical memory is no longer
defined in terms of episodic memory; only conceptual organization of episodic memories within
the self-memory system transforms them into autobiographical memory and allows them to play
a role in constructing and maintaining a coherent, stable mental representation of the self (the
conceptual self) over time.
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In this perspective, in contrast to Tulving’s assumption
that remembering past events serves to establish the sense of
continuity of our self over time by virtue of a specific phenomenal
quality (i.e., the immediate feeling that “I” experienced the
remembered event), Conway proposes the opposite: it is the
conceptual self (the present Me) that selects and also distorts
personal memories so as to increase the sense of personal
continuity. As a consequence, self-continuity is not “provided by
the identity of the remembering I, but by the perceived similarity
of the present and past Me” (Habermas and Köber, 2015, p. 153)
A third approach, well represented by Katherine Nelson’s
work, takes autobiographical memory as a subclass of episodic
memories which involve a reference to the self, which is
viewed however from a social interactionist standpoint (see,
e.g., Nelson, 1996). The sense of self in time originates then
from social-communicative interactions, and especially from
sharing memory narrative which progressively lead children to
rationalize memories of their experiences in autobiographical
terms. Thus, Nelson meritoriously stresses more than other
authors the role of relationships in constituting a sense of self,
placing herself in the wake of an important and heterogeneous
tradition going back (with different accents) to Vygotsky and, in
the infant research and clinical domain, to the object relation and
attachment theories.
On the backdrop of these three theoretical perspectives,
the present research topic called interdisciplinary contributions
concerning the relationship between autobiographical memory
and the self, and notably their functional and dysfunctional
interactions. What follows is an overview of the contributions
that this research topic includes. It is divided into four sections
with headers that describe the subthemes of the issue.
MODELING THE LINK BETWEEN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY AND
SENSE OF SELF
Tippett et al. build on their aforementioned model of the
relationship between autobiographical memory and the self,
making the hypothesis that diachronic unity (i.e., the belief that,
despite changes, we are the same person across the lifespan)
rests on phenomenological continuity (i.e., the experience of
remembering the self over time during episodic recall). When
phenomenological continuity is disrupted, however, diachronic
unity can still be supported by semantic memory, which enables
us to construct narratives from which semantic continuity
emerges.
The hypothesis was tested in a study involving patients with
mild-to-moderate probable Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and with
amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI), two conditions
where episodic memory deficits disrupt phenomenological
continuity. This alone should not lead to deterioration in
diachronic unity, provided that semantic continuity is well-
preserved; but if semantic continuity is also altered both in
AD and aMCI, there should be an associated deterioration
in diachronic unity. The latter was measured through a
self-persistence interview (beliefs about self-persistence,
explanations for stability/change); semantic continuity was
assessed measuring autobiographical reasoning (connections
between one’s conceptual self and the events of one’s life) and
(temporal, thematic, and causal) coherence of narratives.
The findings in both aMCI and AD groups confirm the
hypothesis that intact semantic continuity is sufficient to support
diachronic unity. In the aMCI group, the quality of life
narratives was largely preserved, as were measures of self-
persistence, indicating that even when the continuity afforded
by phenomenological re-experiencing is disrupted, semantic
continuity is sufficient to support diachronic unity. However, the
findings from the AD group indicate amore complex relationship
between diachronic unity and semantic continuity than originally
proposed in Prebble et al. (2013). For these findings reveal a
divergence between two aspects of diachronic unity: the AD
and aMCI groups did not differ from health controls in their
beliefs about their persistence over time, but patients with AD
showed deterioration in their ability to construct a sophisticated
justification for their persistence across time. The authors suggest
that in the AD group diminished life narratives that retain
features of cultural life scripts are sufficient for strong subjective
beliefs of self-persistence, but not for sophisticated explanations
about persistence. Better semantic continuity, with the ability to
weave high-quality life narratives, may scaffold the capacity to
understand and explain one’s diachronic unity, but this produces
less certainty about their self-persistence.
Wheeler and Gabbert adopt Tulving’s notion of episodic
memory as a specialized subcategory of memory relating to
the conscious recall of personally experienced events. Then
they usefully emphasize the distinction between a self-generated
cue and a self-referent cue—the former represents the critical
properties of a target memory; the latter acts as a cue relating to
an aspect of the self. On this background, they provide the first
overview of the research work that showed that self-generated
cues represent an effective and viable mnemonic technique which
can aid recall in a variety of settings.
The authors also theoretically contribute to this research area
by speculating on the memory mechanisms that lead to the
improvement of memory through self-generated cues. Three
mechanisms seem able to explain the effectiveness of self-
generated cues. (1) Spreading activation models which view
information in long-term memory as being represented by a
network of associated concepts. It is possible to recall a given
item from memory by recalling other information associated
with the target; this is made possible through the process of
activation spreading through the network. (2) The principles
of encoding-specificity (or encoding-retrieval specificity), i.e.,
the idea that retrieval cues are effective only to the extent that
information within the memory cue is also contained within the
target memory trace created at the time of encoding. (3) Cue
distinctiveness (or an absence of cue overload) which refers to
whether a cue is uniquely associated with a target memory—if a
cue is linked to multiple memory traces (and so is “overloaded”),
then it becomes more difficult for that cue to activate the
current target trace. The authors conclude by suggesting that self-
generated cues represent a promising development in episodic
memory domains.
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Vanderveren et al. shift the focus to memory specificity
and memory coherence, two characteristics of autobiographical
memory that have been related to psychological well-being
and the occurrence of psychopathology. To make a first
attempt at a theoretical integration of memory specificity
and memory coherence, the authors situate them within the
Self-Memory System (SMS). Concerning memory specificity,
people suffering from depression or PTSD are reported to
experience specific difficulties retrieving episodes and tend
to overgeneralise memories. Their semantically (rather than
episodically) structured memory impedes time traveling and
social life and, consequently, self-regulation—thus predisposing
to further suffering. Nonetheless, the whole overgeneralisation
literature can be traced back to Williams and Broadbent’s
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT), which attested specific
difficulties to retrieve personal memories cued by emotion words.
In AMT episodic memories are circumscribed by time (no
more than one day). Conversely, in SMS episodic memories are
defined by event-specific information, which is a unity given
by a continuity given by perceptual episodes not necessarily
coincident with AMT’s temporal slot; this discrepancy raises the
problem of understanding what AMT actually measures.
Coherent memories are also associated to well-being.
Coherence allows the construction of a unifiedmeaning, which in
turn promotes a sense of self-continuity. It is also a precondition
for self-regulation, to the extent that it allows a subsumption
of an event under a meaningful history. Nevertheless, some
theoretical problems still remain unresolved, mostly concerning
what relevant dimensions of coherence exactly are: temporal,
causal, or thematic coherence? Or a mix of the three? Moreover,
the prevalence of cross-sectional studies still leaves unanswered
the developmental question: is memory incoherence a genuine
predictor of psychopathology; or is rather one of its side effects?
The authors conclude by pointing out that the whole research
on memory would beneficiate from a more unified view on
specificity and coherence. More iterated models, such as SMS,
do not consider the two as separate dimensions, but rather
point out to their interconnectedness. Far from neglecting some
peculiarities, such as episodic amnesia leaving largely preserving
coherence, the authors still recommend further research from
a more integrated prospective. With its emphasis on the
interconnectedness between current personal goals (supervising
coherence), episodic, perceptually vivid traces and long-term
memories, SMS is in best position for this scientific new deal.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY, LIFE
NARRATIVES, AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF SELF-IDENTITY
Marchetti et al. focus on adolescence in the development of an
adult self, arguing that much more attention should be devoted
to the role of body, against a tradition that puts at the forefront
the integration of the psychic and the social. Indeed, according to
the authors, the body is from birth (and even from the uterus) a
constructive, and expressive vehicle of the self.
In order to understand how the body supports the
construction of the identity in adolescence, the authors suggest
using the method of analyzing what happens when something
goes wrong, on the assumption that adolescents choose the body
to express their discomfort, for instance, through self-injury. On
this background, the authors’ main thesis is that the capacity
to mentalize represents a critical forerunner of the adolescent’s
perception of the physical self, insofar as the body is a carrier
of implicit memories. Hence, troubles with mentalization in the
child involve repercussions both on the child’s behavior and the
adolescent’s psychic integrity. Violence against the physical self
(in adolescence) could be an answer to the necessity of a change
or an elimination of parts of a self- constructed in infancy and
embedded in a bodily, implicit memory.
Finally, the authors point out the importance, particularly in
adolescence, of taking into account one’s own body in relation to
others’ bodies (and others’ minds): relationships do not develop
only on the basis of a meeting of minds but also—and perhaps
primarily and at a deeper implicit level—on recognition and
synchronization dynamics, which are, according to the authors,
bodily grounded.
Rollo et al. represent the social interactionist standpoint by
combining two lines of research: the former on the different ways
in which mothers reminisce about shared past experiences with
their children, the latter on mothers’ use of mental state talk
during conversations.
Research indicates that mothers vary in the way in which
they reminisce about shared past experiences with their
children: “elaborative” or “narrative” mothers show a highly
elaborative reminiscing style characterized by long and detailed
conversations about the past, interpretation of events and actions
in terms of intentions and mental states, frequent references to
the autobiographical experiences of their children; “repetitive”
or “paradigmatic” mothers, on the other hand, show a less
elaborative style, talk less frequently and in less detail about
the shared past, focus on labeling objects, and specifying their
relations with superordinate categories, or on repeating the
exact content of a previous utterance. Children whose mothers
are more elaborative during reminiscing seem to develop more
sophisticated autobiographical memory skills, such that they tell
more detailed and coherent narratives about their personal past.
Besides narrative styles, a large body of research point
to the conclusion that the frequency with which mothers
use mental state talk (Mental State Language, MSL) during
conversations is positively and significantly associated with
children’s performance in theory-of-mind tasks and the
development of their psychological lexicon.
Given this background, the authors sought to put together
these two strands of research by examining the relation between
narrative styles and the use of MSL in maternal conversations
during joint picture-book reading. The results (i) confirmed the
validity of the distinction between Narrative and Paradigmatic
communicative styles; and indicated that (ii) maternal narrative
styles changed as a function of children’s age (the mothers
of 4-year-old children were more narrative than paradigmatic,
whereas the opposite pattern occurred for the mothers of 5- and
6-year-old children); (iii) the use of communicative terms was
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significantly more frequent for narrative than for paradigmatic
mothers, and decreased with children’s age; (iv) mothers adapted
the referents of their MSL to the children’s age (the mothers of
younger children referred their MSL more frequently to the book
characters, then to themselves or to the child, and lastly to the
dyad). Taken together, these results support the idea that mothers
adapt their narrative styles and MSL input to the growing
abilities of their children—as the latter develop and refine their
interaction skills, they move from a narrative to a paradigmatic
way of systematizing the reality around them –, thus contributing
to the development of sociocognitive understanding.
Veglia and Di Fini explore the universe of personal life-
narrations, taken as one of the privileged locus where people
try to attribute meanings and look for cohesion and hierarchical
order of internal and external information. Their analysis
considered different literary genres as well as clinical narrative.
Starting from an evolutionary perspective, they postulate the
existence of a biological disposition to identify as fundamental
six Life Themes: Love, Personal Value, Power, Justice, Truth,
and Freedom, laying beyond the apparent, superficial multiplicity
of narrations. Interestingly (but not surprisingly, given the
evolutionary perspective adopted), a Leitmotif of Life Themes is
their relational, interpersonal nature.
The authors delve into the analysis of the role of interpersonal
relationships—notably, autobiographical memories related to
attachment figures—in personal narrative construction. Most
narratives, indeed, are co-created, maintained and revised within
the attachment context: parental and domestic relationships
during infancy, wider contexts from later childhood on.
While confirming, along with the existent literature, that
since childhood secure attachment is related to narrations rich of
cooperating caregivers, the authors attest that clinical narrations
are characterized by a poor integration due to a rigid or,
alternatively, confused exploitation of life themes (“arrested
narratives,” “unbounded narratives,” “under narration,”
“denarrations”). Starting from this analysis, they suggest
that a deeper comprehension of life themes in psychological
suffering could help to improve clinical success.
Using the three axes presence/absence of positive or negative
narrative occasions, high/low integration, and control of/sharing
the theme, the authors identify areas of well-being and,
conversely, area of distress, together with important indications
concerning the nature of the suffering. This schema, which
is co-constructed and shared with the patient and founds a
solid therapeutic alliance, gives the therapist a precious tool
for envisage and reinterpret together with the patient crucial
junctions of her life story, concerning internal, psychological
aspects as well as interpersonal relationships.
Beyond its specific, clinical point, the main interest of the
paper is its amenability to profitably dialogue and enrich other
classical reflections on narrative, such as Dan McAdams’ thesis
of central nuclei in life stories and John Bruner’s perspective on
narrative genres.
Rathbone and Moulin introduce the construct of self-image.
One component of the Self-Memory-System is the “conceptual
self ” which is made up of self-images and self-beliefs. Self-images
are “I am” statements which are frequently used in psychological
research as a measure of identity, as primes in experimental tasks,
and as cues to elicit autobiographical memories.
The authors present a descriptive study investigating self-
images in adults aged 17 to 88. Participants were presented with
an online questionnaire (Study 2) and paper questionnaires/tasks
completed in participants’ own homes (Study 1) or in the lab
(Studies 3, 4, and 5). All participants were asked to generate a
set of between 4 and 20 “I am” statements to describe long-term
and enduring aspects of their identity. The aim of the paper is
to present a database of self-image norms, focusing on people’s
identity statements.
According to the authors semantic facts about the self may
be useful to scaffold narrative continuity and reflect the multi-
faceted nature of the self and they are a powerful tool for
examining differences in how identity is constructed.
Results revealed that the most commonly generated category
of self-image was a social role: Friend followed by Student, Sports
player, and Occupation. The less commonly generated category
was Articulate and Caring. The highest frequency traits were
Happy, Optimistic, and Friendly. Negative self-images (Lazy,
Worry, Pessimistic) were also generated multiple times. The
youngest self-image category generated was Maths (e.g., “ok at
maths”) and the oldest was Serious (e.g., “serious minded”). The
most frequently cited self-images for females aged 60–70 was
Mother.
Lavazza is concerned with the modulation and potentiation
of memory and their relationship with personal identity. In fact,
several neuroethicists have recently addressed the use of new
possible tools to erase or mitigate negative personal memories.
After giving an outline of the state of the art of research in this
domain, the author discusses the ethical status of these practices
and shows how this can be differently assessed according to
different views of the self. In this respect, he takes as being very
important the distinction between (partially) normative theories
of the self (such as John Bruner’s and Marya Schechtman’s
narrative theories), and purely naturalistic theories of the self
(e.g., Peter Carruthers).
The artificial alteration of identity will be taken ethically
unacceptable only on those conceptions and models of personal
identity and self-according to which these act as reference points
also for a wider set of values. For instance, some authors
complained that chemical alteration of one’s memory might lead
to non-authentic choices. The idea is that the choice must be in
line with the “true” self, to the extent that this latter notion makes
sense.
Narrativist theories are inclined to put in question the idea
of a strong self, in virtue of their insistence of the continuously
tentative character of personal identity. Narratives write and
rewrite life stories incessantly. By contrast, neurobiological
theories of the self-promote a strong idea of the self, for
they identify the psychic healthy state in a neurobiological
condition. Use of drugs aims at maintaining this condition.
Hence, Lavazza seems point here to a contradiction: use of
molecules to modulate memories is ethically (more) allowed
if one endorses a weak notion of the self, but neurobiological
approaches to the self are committed to a strong notion of the
self.
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TRAUMA AND DISRUPTION OF
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Hart et al. aim at assessing the relationship between
neuropsychological functioning (notably, working memory and
cognitive flexibility), Post-traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD),
and trauma centrality, i.e., the extent to which a traumatic event
is taken as central to one’s identity and a turning point in the
story of our life. To this empirical research based on a cross-
sectional design took place 41 Iran and Afghanistan veterans.
Although some features of the study (small and full masculine
sample, use of on-line neuropsychological test) suggest further
investigation, a correlation emerges. While a growing body of
empirical research has already well-established the association
between, on the one side, PTSD symptoms and trauma centrality,
and, on the other side, neuropsychological disorders and PTSD,
the possible correlation between neuropsychological functions
and trauma centrality is the main focus of this study.
Beyond replicating the solid data attesting the other
correlations, the present research shows that lower levels of
working memory and (even if results only approach significance)
cognitive flexibility are associated with trauma centrality (ceteris
paribus, i.e., when measures of depression and PTSD are
controlled). However, the results, which are coherent with
the well-known overgeneralization of memories in traumatized
people, cannot shed light on the direction-of-causality question,
as cross-sectional studies assess all the variables at the same time.
Typically, cognitive deficits are unidirectionally taken to
affect trauma centrality and, more generally, identity; but things
could be more complex and interwoven, as suggested by
Conway’s work. In his Self-Memory System Conway postulates
a strict, continuous and bidirectional relationship between
long term mnemonic structures and the working self, i.e., the
hierarchical structure containing currently active personal goals.
In this theoretical framework, deficits in working representations
affect long term self-structures, conceived both as episodic
memories and normative, semantic self-structures. Working
self constantly mediates between the opposite requirements of
internal coherence and correspondence to reality, allowing only
the “right kind” of new acquired information to be stored in
long-term memory. SMS postulates also the opposite causal
direction, suggesting that permanent structures of the self-
influence current decisions taken by the working self. As well
shown in Conway et al. (2004), structures of personality—in their
Bowlbian perspective, internal working models—not only are
modulated by, but also modulate working self ’s functioning.
Carletto et al. view Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD)
as the crucial disorder to investigate autobiographical memory.
They present Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing
(EMDR) as the therapeutic technique able to re-elaborate non-
integrated memories and to consolidate new memories into
the already existing semantic links, promoting the insertion of
traumatic but no longer disturbing memory in a coherent and
adaptive autobiography.
PTSD is a disorder that develops in some people who
have experienced a shocking, scary, or dangerous event. People
who have PTSD may feel stressed or frightened even when
they are not in danger. The diagnosis include at least one
re-experiencing symptom (e.g., flashbacks—reliving the trauma
over and over, including physical symptoms like a racing heart
or sweating, bad dreams, frightening thoughts), at least one
avoidance symptom (e.g. staying away from places, events, or
objects that are reminders of the traumatic experience, avoiding
thoughts or feelings related to the traumatic event), at least
two arousal and reactivity symptoms (e.g., being easily startled,
feeling tense or “on edge,” having difficulty sleeping, having
angry outbursts), at least two cognition and mood symptoms
(e.g. trouble remembering key features of the traumatic event,
negative thoughts about oneself or the world, distorted feelings
like guilt or blame, loss of interest in enjoyable activities).
Traumatic memories are encoded differently than memories
of ordinary events, in multisensory fragments that traumatized
people cannot integrate in a structured narrative. From
a neurobiological point of view, during extreme stressful
situation amygdalar synapses are potentiated and this saturate
all amygdalar alpha-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole
(AMPA) receptors-bindings sites. Consequently, in the
hippocampus the recorded emotional memory trace cannot
be merged with the cognitive memory trace and the fragments
of emotionally charged memories remain trapped in the limbic
system and cannot be transferred to the cortical areas, where
a further processing and integration into already existing
networks should take place. Therefore, non-processed emotional
memories remain trapped and unchanged at subcortical level
without contextual integration, causing in some cases PTSD
symptoms.
If memories are adequately processed, PTSD symptoms can be
mitigated and memories integrated. EMDR is the psychological
treatment for PTSD presented by authors. The key aspect is
the use of Alternate Bilateral Stimulations (ABS) such as eye
movements (EMs).
Authors describe how EMDR works during the PTSD
treatment from a neurobiological point of view, mentioning the
same mechanism involved in sleep for memory consolidation,
arguing also for a potential role for cerebellum in the processes
involved in trauma.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY AND
PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC VERSUS
PHARMACOLOGICAL TREATMENTS
Mancini and Mancini describe ImRs (“Imagery Rescripting”), a
therapeutic technique that aims to reduce the distress associated
with negative memories of early aversive experiences. It consists
of prompting patients to rescript the autobiographical memory
in line with their unmet needs.
The ImRs procedure is based on two steps: (i) change in
perspective, from child’s one to adult’s one; (ii) try to meet the
child’s unmet needs. The second step requires empathy: empathy
on behalf of the adult validates the child’s suffering. This makes
explicit the rewriting work: the (negative) meaning inferred
during childhood (e.g., in attachment relations) is overturned in
the recognition of the child’s suffering.
ImRs has proven to be effective across several
psychopathologies such as depression, social phobia,
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obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,
and personality disorders. Yet, the mechanisms through the
result is obtained are not properly understood. The hypothesis
of the authors is that ImRs acts by reducing the meta-emotional
problem, i.e., by reducing the perception of a negative emotion
as something problematic and unacceptable. A large literature
mentioned by the authors seems to show that themeta-emotional
problem could be a trans-diagnostic phenomenon. Yet, since
there is still a lack of direct evidence that ImRs reduces the
meta-emotional problem, the authors propose an experiment to
test their hypothesis.
In sum, the authors argue that ImRs promotes the reduction
of symptoms and of negative self-belief both by changing the
valence of the aversive autobiographical memory and by reducing
their accessibility—both approaches offer a plausible explanation
of the observed reduction in negative self-belief. However, they
also believe that these approaches are not very accurate in
clarifying how the change in self-belief occurs. They suggest
establishing a link between the change occurring in the beliefs
about one’s own emotion and the change occurring in self-belief.
Kalsi et al. present the first neuroimaging meta-analysis
which report the changes in functional neural activity as an
effect of pre- and post-treatment of psychotherapy versus
pharmacological therapy in patients with affective disorders
(anxiety and depression).
The main outcome is the inverse effects of cognitive
and psychodynamic psychotherapy and antidepressant therapy
on the right paracingulate activity. The patients undergoing
psychotherapy showed an increase in the right paracingulate
activity while pharmacological treatment led to a decrease of
activation of this area. The authors conclude that this finding
seems to support the recent studies that hypothesize how
psychotherapy, through the self-knowledge and the meaning
processing, involves a top-down emotional regulation.
What is most remarkable for the Research Topic is that
the paracingulate cortex activity seems to be associated with
autobiographical memory—as well as with other self-monitoring
activities (visual self-recognition, conflict monitoring, verbal self-
monitoring, self-generated thoughts) and mentalizing abilities.
CONCLUSION
The main goal of this Research Topic “Self and Memory:
A Multidisciplinary Debate” was to offer a snapshot
of the growing cognitive, developmental, and clinical
psychological literature on the complex relationship
between autobiographical memory and the self against
the background of the main theoretical approaches in this
research area. The final collection of 12 articles does exactly
that and provide hints about where this research area is
going.
The contributions have all a multidisciplinary character,
but some of them focus more on one of the three strands of
thinking around self and memory described above (line 17),
others focus mostly on issues in the blossoming empirical
literature of psychology, psychopathology, and neuroscience
of self and memory. More specifically, Tippett et al., Wheeler
and Gabbert, and Rathbone and Moulin’s papers make the
most of Tulving’s approach to autobiographical memory;
Vanderveren et al., Veglia and Di Fini, and Hart et al.’s
contributions build on Conway’s perspective; Marchetti et al.,
Rollo et al., and Lavazza take advantage of Nelson’s approach
to autobiographical memory. Finally, the contributions of
Carletto et al., Mancini and Mancini, and Kalsi et al. focus on
clinical issues that cross-cut the three theoretical perspectives—
EMDR and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders; the influence
of Imagery Rescripting on the aversive autobiographical
memory; neuroimaging data about the effects of pre-
and post-treatment of psychotherapy vs. pharmacological
therapy.
We hope that the reader will find the collected articles both
informative and thought-provoking, and that this Research Topic
will serve to stimulate new theoretical debate and empirical
research.
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Diachronic unity is the belief that, despite changes, we are the same person across
the lifespan. We propose that diachronic unity is supported by the experience of
remembering the self over time during episodic recall (i.e., phenomenological continuity).
However, we also predict that diachronic unity is also possible when episodic memory
is impaired, as long as the ability to construct life narratives from semantic memory (i.e.,
semantic continuity) is intact. To examine this prediction, we investigated diachronic
unity in Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI),
two conditions characterised by disrupted phenomenological continuity. If semantic
continuity is also altered in these conditions, there should be an associated deterioration
in diachronic unity. Participants with AD, aMCI, and healthy controls (HC) completed
a self-persistence interview measuring diachronic unity (beliefs about self-persistence,
explanations for stability/change). Semantic continuity was assessed with a life-story
interview measuring autobiographical reasoning (self-event connections), and coherence
(temporal/thematic/causal) of narratives. Our results highlight a complex relationship
between semantic continuity and diachronic unity and revealed a divergence between
two aspects of diachronic unity: AD/aMCI groups did not differ from HC in continuity
beliefs, but AD explanations for self-persistence were less sophisticated. Semantic
continuity was most impaired in AD: their narratives had fewer self-event connections
(vs. HCs) and lower temporal/thematic coherence (vs. HC/aMCI), while both AD/aMCI
groups had lower causal coherence. Paradoxically AD participants who scored higher
on measures of beliefs in the persistence of the core self, provided less sophisticated
explanations for their self-persistence and were less able to explore persistence in their
life narratives. These findings support the importance of semantic continuity to diachronic
unity, but suggest a more nuanced and multifaceted relationship than originally proposed
in our model. In AD, diminished life narratives that retain features of cultural life scripts
are sufficient for strong subjective beliefs of self-persistence, but not for sophisticated
explanations about persistence. Better semantic continuity, with the ability to weave
high-quality life narratives, may scaffold the capacity to understand and explain one’s
diachronic unity, but this produces less surety about self-persistence.
Keywords: self-persistence, diachronic unity, Alzheimer’s disease, amnestic mild cognitive impairment, narrative
identity, phenomenological continuity, semantic continuity
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INTRODUCTION
Interviewer: Do you feel that you are the same person now as you
were when you were in your early 20s?
Participant: Yes, oh yes! I don’t know, I don’t know why. I feel like
I’m the same.
Interviewer:What do you think makes you the same person? How
would you explain how one and the same person could act in so
many different ways but still be the same person?
Participant: I feel the same.
- Extract from self persistence interview (Participant 010b from
AD group, MMSE= 10).
One of the most intriguing aspects of the self is its persistence and
unification across time. Known as diachronic unity (see Appendix
A for a glossary of italicised terms), this does not imply that
one is unchanged, but rather expresses a deep conviction that,
despite change, one continues to be the same person now as
in the past, and will continue to be the same person into the
future (Sani, 2008; Klein, 2010; Prebble et al., 2013). Intuitively,
autobiographical memory (AM) is critical to this experience
of diachronic unity. The act of remembering oneself in the
past instantly links the present individual to their past self:
mentally, emotionally, and experientially. Just as I can know
that my current experiences are my own because my subjective
experience tags them as such, so too I can know that my
episodically remembered past was experienced by “me.” This
sentiment is clearly articulated in Locke (1964/1970) claim about
the relationship between consciousness and identity: “as far as
this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action
or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same
self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one
that now reflects on it, that that action was done.” (p. 181).
Indeed the link between AM and sense of self appears so clear
that it is difficult to imagine a theory of diachronic unity that
does not incorporate a mnemonic element. Moreover, it has been
argued that the experience of continuity is a critical feature of
diachronic unity, distinguishing it from synchronic unity (i.e.,
the unification of self in the present moment) that is supported
by short-term memory (Tye, 2003; Rashbrook, 2013). The few
studies that have explored people’s subjective beliefs about their
diachronic unity suggest that a firm sense of persistence across
time is fairly ubiquitous both across cultures and across the
lifespan (e.g.,Troll and Skaff, 1997; Chandler et al.’s, 2003); they
also point to the potentially catastrophic consequences of any
deterioration in these beliefs (Chandler et al.’s, 2003; Hsiao et al.,
2013). To date, however, there has been little empirical research
into the cognitive mechanisms that serve to support diachronic
unity, and what role is played by AM. In this paper we report the
first systematic exploration of diachronic unity in two groups of
individuals with impaired episodic memory: those with amnestic
mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) and probable Alzheimer’s
Disease (AD).
We recently proposed two parallel mechanisms through
which AM may serve to support diachronic unity (Prebble et al.,
2013; see Figure 1). First, remembering one’s past experiences—
a form of AM known as episodic memory—is associated with
FIGURE 1 | Model of the temporally extended self, showing two
autobiographical memory mechanisms for continuity, and their proposed
relationship to diachronic unity.
projecting oneself back into the past to consciously re-experience
discrete moments in time (Wheeler et al., 1997; Tulving, 2002;
Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2009). Known as autonoetic
consciousness, we have argued this aspect of episodic memory
affords a sense of phenomenological continuity (Addis and
Tippett, 2008; Prebble et al., 2013). A number of single case
reports in the clinical literature of densely amnesic individuals
support this view (Tulving, 1985; Wilson and Wearing, 1995;
Postle, 2009). Patient C.W. provides a striking example; he lacks
all episodic memories and constantly reports that he is conscious
for the first time: “...this is the first sight I’ve had, the first taste
I’ve had (sipping his coffee) it’s like being dead” (Wilson et al.,
2008). Patient C.W. and other cases clearly demonstrate a severe
discontinuity of phenomenological experience. Yet there have
been few systematic explorations of how these deficits might
affect these individuals’ subjective beliefs about their diachronic
unity (Troll and Skaff, 1997), including their ability to logically
account for how and why they remain the same person across
time (Chandler et al.’s, 2003).
The loss of episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness
disrupts phenomenological continuity which in turn impacts
subjective beliefs of diachronic unity. However, it is possible that
even in the context of disrupted phenomenological continuity,
diachronic unity can be supported via a second mechanism:
semantic continuity. Rather than being experiential, this form of
continuity is knowledge-based, mediated by semantic memory,
an abstract and conceptual type of AM that synthesises large
amounts of information (including entire life periods and
repeated events) (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Critically,
semantic memory enables one to create narratives—life stories
that explain “who I was and how I came to be who I
am” and includes temporally-extended self-concept and personal
temporal chronology—from which semantic continuity emerges
(Klein et al., 2003; Piolino et al., 2006; Rathbone et al.,
2009). Interestingly the neuropsychological case studies of dense
episodic amnesia not only illustrate a severe discontinuity of
phenomenological experience, but hint at a form of diachronic
unity—a retained belief about their own self-persistence (Medved
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and Brockmeier, 2008; Postle, 2009; Philippi et al., 2012). While
clearly distressed that they are unable to remember their past,
they express an appreciation that they ought to possess a
mnemonic link to the past, which appears to presuppose some
notion of themselves as temporally-extended beings. Further,
although comments suggest a feeling of being marooned in the
present moment (Postle, 2009), their speech and thoughts are
not restricted to the present moment as one might expect if
one lacked any sense of temporal extension. H.M. not only
repeatedly retold the few (semanticised) AMs he had retained
(Corkin, 2002), he also expressed emotions that related to his
past and his future; anxiety about what might have happened
before but could not recall, and concern about how his present
actions might impact upon the future. Their words and actions
hint at an emotional and behavioural connection to their past
and future in the absence of any episodic memories that could
provide these links (for a similar model, see Bluck and Liao,
2013). This suggests that although the ability to mentally project
oneself into the past may contribute to diachronic unity, it may
not be essential.
To examine these proposed mechanisms through which
AM may support diachronic unity in the following study
we conducted a formal investigation of diachronic unity in
two groups with impaired episodic memory and autonoetic
consciousness: individuals with aMCI and those with probable
early-moderate AD (Rauchs et al., 2007; Addis et al., 2009;
Ally et al., 2009; Hudon et al., 2009; Irish et al., 2010).
If autonoetic recollection of event memories is essential for
diachronic unity, the marked deterioration in episodic memory
and autonoetic consciousness in those with AD should lead to a
corresponding deterioration in their subjective beliefs about their
self-persistence, and to a lesser extent in those with aMCI where
impairments of autonetic consciousness are less severe (Hudon
et al., 2009). Alternatively, if beliefs about self-persistence have
not weakened in these groups, this would provide some evidence
that episodic memory, and the phenomenological continuity it
affords, is not the sole mechanism supporting diachronic unity.
To this end, we examined how aspects of semantic continuity,
specifically narrative identity and personal temporal chronology,
is affected in individuals with aMCI and AD, and how any
such deterioration in turn impacts upon diachronic unity. These
two groups provide an excellent opportunity to investigate
these questions. As noted above, there are consistent findings
indicating both deficits in episodic memory and autonoetic
consciousness in aMCI and early AD, as well as preserved
semantic AM in aMCI (Murphy et al., 2008). In contrast there
is divergence in the literature as to whether semantic AM is
relatively preserved in early-AD (Gilboa et al., 2005; Martinelli
et al., 2013), or showing some evidence of decline (e.g., Addis and
Tippett, 2004).
Two main studies have explored diachronic unity, using
different approaches to assess subjective beliefs about one’s
persistence across time. Troll and Skaff (1997) examined beliefs
about self-persistence in older adults by asking two simple
questions: “In what ways have you always been the same?”
and “In what ways have you changed over the years?” They
attempted to separate subjective beliefs about whether one’s
“core self ” or essential person was still the same (e.g., “I feel
that my essence has always been the same”) from perceived
changes in the content of self-concept (e.g., characteristics and
traits) over time. Beliefs about one’s essential person directly
captures phenomenological sense of self-persistence, while beliefs
about content of self-captures persistence of the self-concept
(i.e., temporally-extended self-concept which likely impacts one’s
beliefs about their diachronic unity.
Chandler et al.’s (2003), in contrast, asked the young people in
their study to articulate an explanation for their self-persistence,
following an exercise with a fictional character. Participants were
first presented with a literary passage involving a character who
undergoes considerable personal change (e.g., Jean Valjean in Les
Miserables), and asked to explain why the character was still the
same person by the end of the story. Participants were then asked
to reflect on the ways that they had changed throughout their own
lives, and explain why they were fundamentally the same person
despite these changes.
It is not clear how these two ways of approaching beliefs about
diachronic unity might relate. For example, is a logical rationale
for one’s self persistence necessary in order to sustain a firm
belief about one’s persistence across time? There is evidence from
Chandler et al.’s (2003) work, that in young people, lack of a clear
explanation for self-persistence may be associated with suicidal
tendencies, suggesting that these aspects of diachronic unity may
be linked.
In this study, we combined both approaches to create a
comprehensive self-persistence interview that assesses diachronic
unity. The general aim of the interview was to guide participants
to think about, and describe, their subjective beliefs about how
they have changed and remained the same over their lives,
whether they continue to consider themselves to be the same
person, and the reasons underlying these beliefs. Instead of using
a fictional story to elicit thoughts about stability and change, we
primed participants by having them complete two versions of the
Twenty Statements Test (TST; Kuhn and McPartland, 1954), one
of which required participants to describe who they are in the
present using 20 “I am. . . ” statements, and the other of which
asked them to describe who they were in their early 20s. (The
results of the two TSTs are not discussed in this paper.) The aim
of this method was to provide a concrete point of comparison
for the older participants involved in the present study, inviting a
direct comparison between their own descriptions of themselves
in the present and past, before proceeding to the self-persistence
interview. This provided a more direct way to engage our
participants, particularly those with AD, in a discussion about
diachronic unity.
A proposed contributor to diachronic unity, semantic
continuity is characterised by the ability to construct a coherent,
meaningful life story out of one’s memories that highlights
personal temporal chronology. A central assumption of narrative
identity theory is that this narrative process is an adaptive
ability, possibly through its link to creating sense of continuity
(Habermas and Bluck’s, 2000; McAdams, 2001). More recent
investigations, however, have challenged the uniform benefit of
narrative identity, suggesting instead that the benefit of narrative
processes like autobiographical reasoning may depend on many
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complex factors (McLean and Mansfield, 2011; Greenhoot and
McLean, 2013; Habermas and Köber, 2014). Nevertheless, if
narrative processes are linked to sense of persistence, this
suggests that those who are able to construct “better” life
narratives should also possess a stronger sense of diachronic
unity. To date very little research has examined how narrative
identity and autobiographical reasoning may relate to diachronic
unity. Habermas and Köber (2015) found that the amount of
autobiographical reasoning in the life narratives of healthy adults
correlated positively with a sense of self persistence (measured
using a four item-scale assessing feeling of familiarity with
themselves in the past), but only in those who had experienced
serious disruptions in their lives (“biographical disruptions”) in
the previous 4 years. The authors suggest that narrative identity
may be important to self-persistence only when this sense of
continuity is challenged in some way (see also Habermas and
Köber, 2014).
No studies have yet investigated whether a loss of AM may
constitute such a challenge, or whether constructing a life story
capable of supporting diachronic unity is even possible in the
face of such memory loss. The few studies that have attempted to
examine narrative identity in AD suggest that limited narrative
abilities may remain even in the face of severe AM deficits (Mills,
1997; Usita et al., 1998; Surr, 2006). Although these studies did
not provide any formal analysis of the use of autobiographical
reasoning or the global coherence of narratives, their reports
provide some hints about how the quality of the narratives may
be affected. Surr notes that the majority of their AD participants
narrated stories which “integrated the whole of their life from the
past to the present. . . ” and appeared to be “...setting their present
experiences in the context of their past in order to maintain
a sense of self ” (Surr, 2006, p. 1727–1728). This description is
strikingly similar to descriptions of autobiographical reasoning,
providing a tentative suggestion that this capacity may also be
preserved to some extent in early stages of the disease.
These studies also touch on some difficulties with the
narratives created by those with AD, including an inability
to narrate all or part of a life story (Surr, 2006), producing
stories that were fragmented and repetitive (Mills, 1997), or
that lacked detail in the description of specific events (Usita
et al., 1998). Usita et al. found that although the life stories of
healthy participants were consistently chronologically ordered
and included culturally important life events (e.g., marriage,
having children), the stories of those with AD were not. Using
Habermas and Bluck’s (2000) terminology, these reports seem
to suggest that the life stories of those with AD lack temporal
coherence and the framework for a cultural concept of biography
(i.e., a cultural life script). Another study, however, found
that participants with dementia were more likely to include
culturally important life events in their stories than healthy adults
(Fromholt and Larsen, 1991), suggesting that this important
organisational structure for AM may be fairly resilient in AD.
As neither of these studies provided any measures of temporal
coherence or the cultural life script, it is difficult to assess these
conflicting claims.
A goal for the present study was to provide formal measures
of semantic continuity by assessing the extent to which narrative
processes—autobiographical reasoning and global coherence
including personal temporal chronology—are affected in aMCI
and AD. More importantly, we aimed to address the relationship
of these measures of semantic continuity with diachronic
unity. If the quality of the life story, and/or the ability to
construct a personal temporal chronology, are indeed important
for diachronic unity, those who score higher on measures of
global coherence and autobiographical reasoning would also be
expected to express more certainty about their persistence across
time.
To assess the use of autobiographical reasoning in life stories,
we examined self-event connections. Self-event connections
involve the creation of connections between one’s conceptual
self and the events of one’s life (Pasupathi and Mansour, 2006;
McLean, 2008; McLean and Fournier, 2008). They are suggested
to create continuity either by emphasising elements of personal
stability over time (stability connections), or by explaining how
and why an individual has changed as a result of life events
(change connections) (Pasupathi and Mansour, 2006; Pasupathi
et al., 2007; McLean, 2008). Autobiographical reasoning was
predicted to be particularly crucial for individuals with AD who
face significant challenges, or disruptions, with their diagnosis.
We also examined the global coherence of life stories
(Habermas and Bluck’s, 2000; Habermas, 2011) as a second
marker of the quality of semantic continuity. Whereas,
autobiographical reasoning involves links made between the
self and particular events within the story, global coherence
relates to the ability to link and integrate many events into
a cohesive whole. Habermas and Bluck’s (2000) describe four
main elements that contribute to the global coherence of a life
narrative. Causal coherence involves explaining how different
elements of the story led to, brought about or were dependent
upon other elements, including how aspects of the self were
affected by events in one’s life, and how one’s personality
contributed to the events that occurred. Thematic coherence
is the extent to which a narrative provides interpretive links
within the story by identifying higher-level similarities, motifs,
and metaphors that provide meaning and cohesion to the story.
In addition, global coherence includes two features that facilitate
the personal temporal chronology of the narrative. Temporal
coherence probes the integrity of personal temporal chronology,
specifically the ability to temporally locate, order, and sequence
events in relation to each other and within the wider context
of one’s life. Cultural concept of biography concerns the degree
to which one’s story incorporates culturally-accepted rules about
which elements are important to include in one’s life story. These
cultural expectations around the life story are suggested to form
a cultural life script, which provides the skeletal structure for life
stories.
In the present study, we aimed to provide the first systematic
exploration of sense of diachronic unity in those with aMCI and
mild-to-moderate probable AD. By using a range of novel and
pre-existing measures of diachronic unity, we sought to examine
how these different ways of conceptualising self-persistence
might relate, and how they may be differentially affected by
memory deterioration in these conditions. More specifically, our
model (Prebble et al., 2013) proposes two mechanisms through
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which AM may contribute to individuals’ subjective beliefs
about persistence: phenomenological continuity and semantic
continuity. Based on this model, we predicted that although AD
(and to a lesser extent aMCI) is characterised by a deterioration in
phenomenological continuity associated with episodic memory
deficits, this alone should not lead to deterioration in diachronic
unity, provided that semantic continuity is well-preserved. The
evidence reviewed above, however, indicates that aspects of
semantic continuity in AD (particularly narrative processes such
as autobiographical reasoning and global coherence including
personal temporal chronology) may nevertheless be altered,
which should in turn lead to deterioration in diachronic unity.
METHODS
Participants
Patient Groups
The AD and aMCI groups each comprised 15 individuals.
Inclusion criteria included formal medical diagnosis of either
probable AD or aMCI (Albert et al., 2011; McKhann et al., 2011),
fluency in English, no acquired language difficulties preventing
communication, and being capable of giving informed consent.
Potential participants were excluded if they had a history of major
head injury, cerebrovascular disease, neurological abnormality
(other than AD/aMCI), alcoholism or drug dependence,
psychiatric illness, or prolonged use of psychiatric medication.
Participants in the AD group were required to have a dementia
severity of mild-to-moderate, with a score of 10 or above (out
of 30) on the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein
et al., 1975). Individuals meeting these criteria were identified
by clinicians during routine memory clinic appointments (at
outpatient memory clinics run through two public hospitals and
two private memory clinics in Auckland, New Zealand), and
those who expressed an interest in the study were contacted
directly by the researcher.
Control Group
The healthy control (HC) group consisted of 25 older adults
recruited through advertisements distributed through retirement
villages and community groups involving older people. The same
exclusion criteria described above also applied to the HC group.
In order to screen for undiagnosed dementia, HC participants
in the control group were required to have an MMSE score of
25 or greater (Folstein et al., 1975). In addition, any potential
participants who described difficulties in memory, appeared
forgetful in the interview, or performed poorly on the MMSE
memory component, were screened for memory impairment
with the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning test (Rey, 1964). Only one
participant was excluded on this basis, with performance below
age-stratified norms (Strauss et al., 2006).
The demographic characteristics of the three groups are
summarised in Table 1. The groups did not differ significantly
in terms of sex, χ2
(2)
= 0.69, p = 0.71, age, F(2, 52) = 1.82,
p = 0.17, or years of education, F(2, 52) = 2.39, p = 0.10. As
expected, there was a significant group difference on general
cognitive performance (MMSE score), F(2, 18.11) = 14.65, p <
0.001 (Brown-Forsythe F test for groups with unequal variance),
TABLE 1 | Demographic characteristics of the study participants.
HC group aMCI group AD group
Number 25 15 15
Sex (F/M) 13/12 6/9 8/7
M (SE) M (SE) M (SE)
Age (years) 82.15 (1.51) 78.09 (1.61) 77.7 (2.79)
Range 67–98 64–87 58–95
Education (years) 14.58 (0.54) 13.97 (0.81) 12.6 (0.65)
Range 9–19.5 10–19 7–18.5
MMSE 28.2 (0.26) 26.87 (0.46)* 20.87 (1.42)*
Range 26–30 24–30 10–27
COWA 37.28 (2.43) 37.07 (2.58) 25.6 (2.46)#
Range 20–67 19–51 14–44
M,Mean; SE, Standard Error of the Mean; MMSE, Mini-Mental State Examination; COWA,
Controlled Oral Word Association test; HC, Healthy control; aMCI, amnestic Mild Cognitive
Impairment; AD, Alzheimer’s disease.
*Significantly lower than HC group.
#Significantly lower than HC and aMCI groups.
and verbal fluency (Controlled Oral Word Association score),
F(2, 52) = 6.17, p= 0.004. Post-hocGames-Howell tests confirmed
that MMSE scores of both memory-impaired groups (AD: p <
0.001; aMCI: p = 0.046) were significantly lower than the HC
group, and the AD group was significantly lower than the aMCI
group (p = 0.002). The AD group also scored significantly lower
than both the HC and aMCI groups (p ≤ 0.01) on COWA,
although the aMCI group did not differ significantly from the HC
group (p= 1.0).
Measures
Self-persistence Interview
This interview was designed to assess diachronic unity, and
incorporated elements from the approaches used by Chandler
et al.’s (2003) and Troll and Skaff (1997); note that we have
renamed the measures (as indicated by footnotes) to maintain
the consistency of the terminology used within the present
paper. Responses were transcribed verbatim and the entire self-
persistence interview transcripts were analysed when applying
each of the separate coding elements described below.
Perceived persistence1 (Troll and Skaff, 1997)
Participants were asked whether they believed that they were
still the same person as they were in their early 20s. The
yes/no responses to this question were recorded; however some
participants responded “yes and no” or “maybe.” “Yes” responses
were coded “3,” “yes and no” and “maybe” responses coded
“2,” and “no” responses coded “1.” For analyses involving a
dichotomous variable, mid-way answers were collapsed with the
“no” responses. If participants provided an explanation for their
answer, this text was transcribed verbatim, and coded as part of
the other sections of the interview, as appropriate (see below).
1Originally called “perceived continuity” (Troll and Skaff, 1997).
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Persistence of the I-self and Me-self2 (Troll and Skaff, 1997)
Participants were next asked how they believed they had
changed, and how they believed they had remained the same
since they were in their early 20s. An independent coder
read through the responses to identify elements that related
to the I-self (the essential, core self, the underlying essence
of who you are, the inner entity; related to beliefs about
phenomenological continuity) vs. the me-self (the attributes
one uses to describe oneself, e.g., traits, attributes, physical and
personality descriptions, behaviour, likes and dislikes, values and
beliefs; related to beliefs about semantic continuity). The coder
then scored each set of responses using two three-point scales
(an I-self and a me-self scale) based on a coding method from
Troll and Skaff. This method assessed perceptions of change vs.
persistence, with higher scores indicating a greater perception of
persistence: a score of “1” indicated a perception of fundamental
change, “2” indicated some change, and “3” indicated a firm
perception of persistence (no change) (see Table 2).
Persistence explanation3 (adapted from Chandler et al.’s,
2003)
The last part of the self persistence interview asked participants to
explain the reasons why, given the many changes that had taken
place in their lives, they still considered themselves to be the same
person:
What I now want you to do now is to think about the reasons that
you consider yourself to be the same person that you were when you
were a young adult. What do you think makes you the same person?
I want you to explain these reasons. How would you explain how
one and the same person could act in so many different ways but
still be the same person?
Responses were coded using a simplified version of Chandler
et al. coding scheme that used a five-point scale to grade
the complexity or sophistication of the response. Very simple
responses (level 1) highlight easily identifiable, surface qualities
of the self that have remained the same across time (e.g.,
particular physical features or simple personality traits) while
ignoring or downplaying elements of the self that have changed.
More sophisticated answers (which scored higher) are those
which integrate ways that the self may have changed while
also identifying factors that maintain stability. Persistence
explanations scored at the highest levels of sophistication identify
a core element of the self which has remained unchanged
despite (perhaps considerable) change in more surface attributes
(level 4), or demonstrate a meta-awareness of the paradox of
persistence by weighing up a number of possible explanations
that could account for change and persistence in the self (level
5) (see Table 3).
Life Story Interview (Adapted Negele and Habermas,
2010)
This interview elicited a life story which was then assessed
for various aspects of semantic continuity. Participants were
2Originally called the “continuity of the I-self and Me-self ” (Troll and Skaff, 1997).
3Originally called the “continuity explanation” measure (Chandler et al.’s, 2003).
provided with a very broad initial question, and were then left to
tell their story, uninterrupted and in their own words:
The main thing I would like to do today is for you to tell me your
life story. I would like you to tell me about your whole life, from
the time you were born until the present time. You might like to
tell me about the most important events in your life and the biggest
changes. You can tell me things that someone who doesn’t know you
might like to know about your life.
This method (originally used with children) was adapted for use
with older adults and AD participants by dividing the story into
four chapters: childhood (0–14 years), teenage years and early
adulthood (15–25 years), middle adulthood (26–50 years), and
late adulthood (51-present). These time periods were selected as
a compromise between the need for roughly equal life periods, the
need for as few time periods as possible to reduce task demands,
and the need to cleanly isolate theoretically important memory
periods (e.g., the reminiscence bump). Participants were given
10min to narrate each chapter. A brief summary of the task
instructions along with the relevant life period was placed in
front of them while they spoke (e.g., “Please tell me about your
childhood: Birth to 14 years old”). If they stopped speaking for
longer than 15–20 s, prompts were used to remind them of the
task and to elicit more information (e.g., “Is there anything else
that you can tell me about that period of your life?”) Initial
instructions were repeated when necessary. The life stories were
coded for a number of markers of narrative identity.
Self-event connections
These were defined as any statement which explicitly connected
the narrator’s self-concept and the events they are narrating
(based on definitions developed by Pasupathi and Mansour
(2006) and Pasupathi et al. (2007). Two types of self-event
connections were identified. Self-event stability connections
suggested a pre-existing quality of the self-explained, or was
illustrated by, an event (e.g., “I decided to go overseas because
I’ve always been really adventurous”; “This event shows how
persuasive I am”). Self-event change connections explained how
and why the narrator had changed as a result of life events (e.g.,
“After that, I became a lot more wary of other people”). The
dependent variable was the number of each type of statement
used in the life stories.
Global coherence
This coding protocol was adapted from an original manual
developed by Habermas and Diel (2005; see also Habermas and
de Silveira, 2008), translated from German and amended by
Reese and Suggate (E. Reese, personal communication, May 31,
2010). The coding scheme required a rater to read through
the life story, and assess how well it achieved three aspects of
global coherence. The temporal coherence score assessed the
degree to which the rater could follow when, and in what
order, events within the story took place. The causal coherence
score assessed the degree to which the rater understood how
the narrator had changed throughout their story (in terms of
personality, circumstances, or outlook), and how the events in the
story explain this change. The thematic coherence score assessed
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TABLE 2 | Summary of the coding scheme for the I-self and me-self questions of the self-persistence interview.
Score I-self persistence subscale Me-self persistence subscale
1. Fundamental change Indicates a perception of fundamental change in the core self (e.g.,
“The person I used to be is no longer there”)
Indicates a perception of fundamental change in one’s attributes (e.g.,
“I have changed in so many since I was young – personality, the way I
look and act, the people I associate with”)
2. Some change Indicates a perception of some change in the core self or uncertainty
about core continuity (e.g., “Not exactly the same person...You’re
different but the same—it’s hard to explain”)
Indicates a perception of some change in attributes (e.g., “In my
intellectual interests I’m pretty much the same; but I’ve changed in
appearance.”)
3. No change Indicates a firm perception of continuity in the core self (e.g., “I feel
my essence has always been the same.”)
Indicates a firm perception of stability in attributes. (e.g., “I’ve always
been calm, composed…independent. I’m just the same now.”)
Coding scheme adapted from Troll and Skaff (1997).
TABLE 3 | Summary of coding scheme used to score on the persistence explanation question of the self-persistence interview.
Level of
sophistication
Description Examples
Level 1 Response describes simple, surface elements of the self that have not
changed, while ignoring aspects that have changed.
I just seem to do the same things. If people talk to me I talk to them, if
people need help I help them. Always been the same.
Level 2 Response attempts to engage with the problem that people appear to
change by suggesting that apparent changes are in fact aspects of the
self that were present from the start but have never been seen until now.
When I was with my ex-husband, it really brought out my angry side. It’s
still there but now I don’t have to be that way so much.
Level 3 Response acknowledges the effects of time as the agent of growth and
development of pre-existing traits.
I am the same person, I have just grown. The experiences of my life
have brought out a mature version of me.
Level 4 Response attempts to solve the problem of change/continuity by
proposing a core, underlying essence of the self which remains
unchanged despite change in surface attributes.
Spiritually—your body changes but spiritually you stay the same.
Level 5 Response provides a “meta answer” which indicates that whatever
explanation the person may have to the problem of self-continuity is
simply one theory among many.
There are many ways you could answer that. I have the same brain.
Also, a lot of the attitudes you had when you were little....You remember
what you were. This also gives you continuity...Your genes don’t
change....attitudes stay with you / born in you?
Coding scheme adapted and simplified from Chandler et al.’s (2003).
how well particular elements within the story were linked or
positioned in relation to one another. An independent coder
rated each life story chapter for each type of coherence, and
scored the text on a four-point scale, from 0 (very low coherence)
to 3 (very high coherence). Chapter scores were summed to
provide a measure of each type of coherence for the life story as a
whole.
Cultural life script
Life stories were assessed to determine whether they included
cultural life script events. This list of events comprised events
identified in at least three studies that had surveyed large
numbers of individuals to assess which life events were judged to
be important to the life stories of a typical individual (Berntsen
and Rubin, 2004; Habermas, 2007; Bohn and Berntsen, 2008;
Thomsen and Bernsten, 2008; Rubin et al., 2009; Janssen and
Rubin, 2011; Tekcan et al., 2012). A total of 29 event categories
met this criterion. Some event categories were slightly tailored
for a New Zealand context (e.g., “enter day-care” was amended
to “enter day-care, kindergarten or preschool”; “College” was
changed to “University or Technical Institute”).
Each life story was read by an independent coder to assess
whether it contained any mention of each of the event categories
on the list (present/absent). It was scored as “present” only if
it was a personal event that occurred to the narrator. The total
number of event categories mentioned in the life story was tallied,
providing a score for the number of cultural life script categories
sampled by each participant.
The number of new occurrences of each event category was
also counted. Events were counted as new occurrences if they
described a new element in the story from within the same life
script category (e.g., attending two separate high schools, the
birth of successive children). The number of new occurrences was
tallied across event categories, providing a score for the number
of cultural life script events mentioned by each participant.
Seven events were mentioned so infrequently in the stories
that reliability could not be calculated and were therefore
removed from the analysis. For each of the remaining 22
event categories, inter-rater agreement for the present/absent
ratings across participants was calculated using Cohen’s Kappa
(see Coding Procedure, below): 4 showed moderate agreement
(range:.43 −0.59), 7 showed substantial agreement (range:.64–
0.77) and 10 had a near-perfect agreement (range:.82–1.0). The
kappa for the most frequently used event (Get a Job/Settle
on career) could not be calculated because this event was
present in almost every life story, and one coder had not
used the “not present” code for any transcripts. Percent
agreement between coders was very good (94%), as was the
intraclass correlation for the number of occurrences of this event
(ICC= 0.96).
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Awareness of Memory Deficits
A brief, structured interview was administered to the aMCI and
AD groups to assess awareness of memory deficits, based on
methods used by Loebel et al. (1990) and Sevush and Leve (1993).
The interview consisted of a few simple questions asking whether
participants thought they had problems with memory, and
whether they suffered from an illness impacting on theirmemory.
Due to time constraints, this brief assessment was favoured over
lengthier approaches (see Clare et al., 2005; Souchay, 2007).
Responses were scored on a three-point scale using a scoring
method adapted from Sevush and Leve (1993): responses
were scored “2” if they suggested a high level of awareness
of deficits (i.e., they acknowledged problems with memory
and an awareness of its severity); “1” if they indicated some
awareness of problems but underestimated the severity (e.g.,
they acknowledged minor problems, but suggested these were
akin to others their age or had always been a problem); and
“0” if they showed a complete lack of awareness of memory
impairments (e.g., denied any problems). Participants were not
required to name their diagnosis correctly in order to score 2,
but were required to provide some recognition that their memory
problems were greater than the normal aging experience.
Procedures
Coding Procedure
The self-persistence interview, life story interview, and awareness
of memory deficit interview were transcribed strict verbatim by a
professional transcriber. They were ordered using blind, random
numbering for the purposes of coding. A team of independent
coders were involved in the coding the various elements of the
present study: the self-persistence interview; the life stories for
self-event connections, global coherence, and cultural life script.
All coders were blind to group membership and, although they
were aware of the general topic matter of the study, they were not
aware of the hypotheses relating to the coding manuals they were
applying. For each separate coding exercise, a single, primary
coder was responsible for coding all of the transcripts. Coders
were trained to the manuals by one of the authors (S.C.P.), and
trial coding exercises were conducted using training examples to
ensure that reliability was satisfactory before the transcripts were
coded. For the awareness of memory deficits interview coding
was completed by one of the authors (S.C.P.) a minimum of 6
months, and in most cases 2 years, following the interviews.
Reliability was established by using a second independent
coder for each task, who double coded a random selection of 20%
of the transcripts. For ordinal scales and those which generated
a frequency count for each participant, the intraclass coefficient
was used, while for nominal scales, Cohen’s Kappa was used
(Cohen, 1960; Landis and Koch, 1977). Reliability statistics for
each coding element are set out in Table 4.
General Procedure
This study was part of a larger study examining the relationship
between AM and sense of self, and thus were embedded in a
more extensive procedure. The protocol was approved by the
Northern Y Regional Ethics Committee, and carried out in
accordance with the recommendations of the Ethical Guidelines
TABLE 4 | Inter-rater reliability measures for double-coded transcripts.
α α
Self-persistence
interview
Life story interview
I-Self persistence 0.91 Temporal coherence 0.89
Me-self persistence 0.87 Causal coherence 0.88
Persistence
explanation
0.96 Thematic coherence 0.75
Self-event change
connection
0.77
Self-event stability
connection
0.83
α Kappa
Awareness of memory
deficits interview
1.0 Cultural life script event
categories (present/absent)
Range:0.43–1.0
α = Cronbach’s alpha.
for Observational Studies, National Advisory Committee on
Health and Disability Support Services Ethics. All subjects gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. Each participant was interviewed twice (each 1.5–2 h
including breaks), with sessions held∼1 week apart.
Session 1 included introducing the study and gaining
informed consent, a brief background interview, assessment of
awareness of memory deficits, the MMSE, and the life story
interview. Session 2 included verbal fluency (COWA), TST
(present) and TST (Past), with the self-persistence interview
administered after other intervening tasks.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were carried out using IBM SPSS Statistics
20 for Windows. Frequency data were analysed using Chi-
square tests for independence. Analyses involving between and
within-group differences were analysed using mixed-factorial
Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs). When Mauchly’s Test of
Sphericity was violated, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction
was used. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons were used to test
for differences in significant within-subject main effects. For
significant group effects, the Games and Howell (1976) post-
hoc test procedure was used. As three groups were involved
in these comparisons, significant interactions involving “group”
were broken down using a two-step process. First, to determine
which groups contributed to the interaction, either a series
of Bonferroni-corrected one-way ANOVAs for each level of
the other variable were run or mixed-factorial analyses were
computed for each group pairing to determine which pairings
contributed to the interaction (HC/aMCI, HC/AD, aMCI/AD).
In each instance, the approach which resulted in the fewest
comparisons that clarified the nature of the interaction was
selected. Second, these omnibus ANOVAs were followed-up
using Bonferroni or Games-Howell pairwise comparisons, as
appropriate. For one-way ANOVAs where there was unequal
variance between the groups, the Brown-Forsythe F-statistic
was used (Field, 2009). Group differences in relation to ordinal
data was assessed using Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric tests,
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TABLE 5 | Number (percentage) of participants responding “Yes” or “No” to the
perceived persistence question of the self-persistence interview.
Yes No
HC group 11 (44%) 14 (56%)
aMCI group 7 (50%) 7 (50%)
AD group 7 (50%) 7 (50%)
HC, Healthy control; aMCI, amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment; AD, Alzheimer’s disease.
followed up with pairwise comparisons using Mann-Whitney
U-tests, correcting for multiple comparisons with a Bonferroni
correction. Spearman’s rho correlations were calculated for
ordinal data. The significance of correlations were determined
using a Holm-Bonferroni (sequentially-rejective) procedure
(Holm, 1979) to correct for multiple comparisons.
RESULTS
Diachronic Unity: Self Persistence
Interview
One participant from each of the AD and aMCI groups was
unable to complete the interview due to fatigue, leaving 25 HC,
and 14 in each of the AD and aMCI groups.
Perceived Persistence
Table 5 summarises responses to the question of whether they
believed that they were still the same person as they were in their
early 20s. A chi-square test (combining “yes and no” responses
with “no” responses) revealed no significant relationship between
group and type of response, χ2(2) = 0.19, p= 0.91.
Persistence of the I-self and Me-self
Participant responses (when asked how they believed they had
changed, and how they believed they had remained the same
since they were in their early 20s) were separated into aspects
which related to persistence of I-self (core) andme-self (traits and
characteristics), and rated for whether these responses indicated
no, some or fundamental change since their 20s. Figure 2
displays the distribution of each group in relation to these ratings.
The responses of three participants could not be coded in relation
to one of the subscales: two participants (one from each of the HC
and aMCI groups) provided no information relevant to the I-self
subscale, and one participant from the AD group provided no
information relevant to the me-self subscale. These participants
were excluded from the relevant portion of the analysis.
There was no significant difference between the groups in
relation to the ratings for degree of I-self persistence expressed
in their responses, H(2) = 2.34, p = 0.31. There was, however, a
significant difference between the groups in relation to the degree
of me-self persistence expressed, H(2) = 6.82, p = 0.03. Pairwise
Mann-Whitney U-tests (Bonferroni-corrected alpha level set at
p < 0.017) revealed that the AD group’s responses tended to be
rated as expressing greater me-self persistence than the responses
of the HC group (p = 0.016). The degree of me-self persistence
expressed in the responses of the aMCI group did not differ
significantly from the HC or AD groups (all p-values ≤ 0.28).
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of participants from each group providing each
response type on (A) the I-self rating scale, and (B) the Me-self rating scale of
the self persistence interview. HC, Healthy control; aMCI, amnestic Mild
Cognitive Impairment; AD, Alzheimer’s disease.
Persistence Explanation
The distribution of the level of sophistication of participants’
persistence explanations for each group are shown in Figure 3.
Of the AD group, 50% provided explanations for their persistence
that were at the simplest level of sophistication, compared with
16% of the HC group and 14% of the aMCI group. Responses
at this simplest level (level 1) focus on simple, surface attributes
to account for self persistence while ignoring ways in which
the individual may have changed, as illustrated by the following
response from a participant in the AD group:
If I was walking down the road, and saw someone bashing their dog
or kid, I’d stop them. I’ve always done that. If someone was old and
in a wheelchair, I’d help them. Always the same if someone needed
help I’d help them.
In contrast, around 70% of both the HC and aMCI groups
provided responses at the highest two levels of sophistication,
compared with just 30% of the AD group. Such responses either
grappled with the realities of how the individual had changed
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FIGURE 3 | Percentage of participants from each group providing each level
of sophistication of response on the persistence explanation. HC, Healthy
control; aMCI, amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment; AD, Alzheimer’s disease.
Scores of 1 represent the lowest level of sophistication, while scores of 5
indicate the highest level of sophistication.
while still identifying some core attributes which accounted
for self-persistence (level 4), or weighed up many competing
explanations for self-persistence (level 5), as illustrated by the
following excerpt from a member of the aMCI group (scored
level 4):
My experience has increased but my physical self has decreased,
aged. My brain problems/memory has changed my outlook. I get
depressed sometimes. I am not enjoying looking forward. [My
parents]. . . set standards for me. Not deeply religious, but stronger
religious feelings than I had and they brought me up on those
standards. And that has been a strong steer for me through my life.
Attitudes and values.
The groups differed significantly in the sophistication of their
persistence explanations, H(2) = 8.8, p = 0.01, with pairwise
Mann-Whitney U-tests (Bonferroni-corrected alpha level set at p
< 0.017) confirming that the AD group’s persistence explanations
were significantly less sophisticated (Mdn = 1.5; mean rank =
17.54) than those of the HC group (Mdn = 4; mean rank =
31.26; p = 0.01). There was also a non-significant trend for the
AD group to have lower scores than the aMCI group (Mdn =
4; mean rank = 28.86; p = 0.02). No significant difference was
found in the scores for the aMCI and HC groups (p= 0.57).
A possible criticism of this method of assessing diachronic
unity is that the task is a very difficult one, and the lower
sophistication in the AD group’s persistence explanations could
relate to more general disease-related deterioration including
general cognitive decline, loss of verbal fluency, or lack of insight.
However, no significant Spearman’s correlations were found
between the sophistication of persistence explanation scores and
MMSE, COWA, or awareness of memory deficits in the AD
group (all p-values> 0.12).
Taken together, these analyses indicate that while the AD
group demonstrated high confidence in their beliefs about their
persistence over time (perceived persistence, I-self persistence,
and me-self persistence), their ability to construct a sophisticated
FIGURE 4 | Mean number of self-event connections in the life stories as a
percentage of the total number of propositions for each group. HC, Healthy
control; aMCI, amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment; AD, Alzheimer’s disease.
Error bars denote one standard error of the mean. *AD group significantly
lower than HC group.
justification for their persistence across time was impaired. In
fact, Spearman’s rho correlations within the AD group revealed
a significant negative correlation between the persistence
explanation and perceived persistence, rs = −0.61, p = 0.019,
as well as a marginally-significant negative correlation between
the persistence explanation and I-self persistence, rs=−0.54, p=
0.047. In other words, those within the AD group who provided
more sophisticated explanations for their persistence also tended
to express less certainty over whether they remained the same
person over time. This observation suggests that perceived and I-
self (core) persistencemay represent different facets of diachronic
unity from the persistence explanation.
Semantic Continuity: Life Story Interview
Self-event Connections
All participants completed the life story interview. To compare
the amount and type of autobiographical reasoning used in
the life stories, a mixed-factorial ANOVA was conducted with
life period (childhood, early adulthood, middle adulthood, late
adulthood) and type of self-event connection (change, stability)
as the within-subjects factors, and group (HC, aMCI, AD) as the
between-subjects factor. The dependent variable was the number
of self-event connections in each chapter as a percentage of the
total number of propositions used in that chapter (see Figure 4).
There was a significant main effect for group, F(2, 52) = 4.7,
p = 0.01, with post-hoc Games-Howell comparisons showing
that the AD group used a significantly lower percentage of self-
event connections in their life stories (M = 5.31, SE = 0.52)
compared with the HC group (M = 7.10, SE = 0.36; p = 0.02).
The aMCI group did not differ significantly from either the HC
or AD groups (M = 5.70, SE = 0.56; both p-values ≥ 0.16).
There was also a significant main effect for type of self-event
connection, F(1, 52) = 5.74, p = 0.02, a larger percentage of
change connections (M = 3.47, SE = 0.19) used than stability
connections (M = 2.76, SE = 0.18). There were no other
significant main effects or interactions (all p-values ≥ 0.12).
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Global Coherence
A mixed ANOVA examined the difference between the groups
on the global coherence of their stories, with type of coherence
(temporal, causal, thematic) and life period (childhood, early,
middle, and late adulthood) as the within-subject factors and
group (HC, aMCI, AD) as the between-subject factor. There was a
significant main effect for group, F(2, 52) = 19.64, p< 0.001, with
the stories of the AD group rated significantly less coherent than
either the HC or aMCI groups (Games-Howell post-hoc tests:
all p-values < 0.001) while the aMCI and HC groups did not
differ (p = 0.44). There was also a significant main effect for life
period, F(3, 156)= 1.11, p< 0.001, with the early adulthood period
showing greater coherence than other chapters (all p-values <
0.01).
The main effect for type of coherence was also significant,
F(2, 104) = 101.85, p < 0.001, but was modified by a significant
interaction between group and type of coherence, F(4, 104) = 9.00,
p < 0.001 (see Figure 5). The analysis was rerun for each group
pairing, and the interaction remained significant for all three
pairs (all p-values ≤ 0.001). Pairwise comparisons showed that
the HC and aMCI groups scored higher than the AD group on
both temporal and thematic coherence (all p-values ≤ 0.004).
In relation to causal coherence, however, both the AD and
aMCI groups scored lower than the HC group (both p-values ≤
0.01). All three groups scored significantly higher on thematic
compared with causal or temporal coherence (all p-values <
0.001), but only the aMCI group scored significantly lower on
causal than temporal coherence (p-value < 0.001). No other
pairwise comparisons were significant (p = 1.00). These results
indicate that while the AD group scored lower on all forms of
coherence, the aMCI group showed a specific deficit in relation
to causal coherence.
Cultural Life Script
Separate one-way ANOVAs conducted on the number of cultural
life event categories sampled and the total number of cultural
life events mentioned in the life story. At a Bonferroni-corrected
alpha level (0.025) there was no significant group difference in
the number of cultural life script categories sampled, F(2, 32.39)
= 1.89, p = 0.17, or the number of events used in the life
stories, F(2, 52) = 3.41, p = 0.04, although the latter approached
significance. When the analyses were rerun using the number
of cultural life script events and event categories sampled as a
percentage of the total number of propositions used in the life
stories, there was no significant difference between the groups on
either number of categories sampled, F(2, 25.63) = 1.38, p = 0.27,
or the total number of events used in the life stories, F(2, 27.86) =
0.80, p= 0.46 (Brown-Forsythe). These findings indicate that the
memory-impaired groups did not differ from healthy controls in
their use of cultural life script events in their stories.
Diachronic Unity and Semantic Continuity
Next we examined the relationship between measures of
diachronic unity and semantic continuity in the AD group as
these participants had the most severe memory impairments.
Spearman’s rho correlations were conducted between three
measures from the self-persistence interview (I-self persistence,
FIGURE 5 | Mean score for each type of coherence (temporal, causal, and
thematic) across the whole life story, for each group. HC, Healthy control;
aMCI, amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment; AD, Alzheimer’s disease. Errors
bars denote one standard error around the mean. *AD significantly lower than
HC/aMCI groups; +Significantly lower than HC group.
me-self persistence, persistence explanation) and five measures
from the life story interview (the number of self-event stability
and change connections used in the life story, and ratings
for temporal, causal, and thematic coherence). To control for
differences in the length of the life stories, self-event connection
measures were percentages of the total number of propositions
used in the life story. Five of the 15 correlations were, or
approached, significance (Holm-Bonferroni correction, first-
level adjusted alpha, p < 0.003; second-level adjusted alpha, p
< 0.004). Two of these were related to perceived persistence:
a significant negative correlation with causal coherence, rs
= −0.84, p < 0.001, and a marginally-significant negative
correlation with the number of self-event stability connections,
rs= −0.62, p = 0.02. In other words, AD participants who
produced stories that were more causally coherent and contained
higher percentages of self-event connections were also more
inclined to state that they were not the same person they
were in their early 20s. There was also a consistent pattern
of marginally significant positive correlations between the
persistence explanation and quality of narrative identity. More
sophisticated explanations were associated with the greater use
of self-event stability connections, rs = 0.72, p = 0.004, and
greater temporal, rs = 0.58, p = 0.03, and causal coherence,
rs= 0.54, p = 0.049. This indicates that AD participants with
better narrative identity also tended to provide more complex
explanations for self-persistence. When the same correlations
were conducted within the HC group, as expected there were no
significant associations.
DISCUSSION
This study provides one of the first systematic investigations
of diachronic unity in memory-impaired older adults. In line
with our model of how AM supports diachronic unity (Prebble
et al., 2013; Figure 1), it is possible that for individuals with
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disorders characterised by impaired autonoetic consciousness
(Rauchs et al., 2007; Ally et al., 2009; Hudon et al., 2009; Irish
et al., 2010), subjective beliefs about their persistence across time
(diachronic unity) are maintained, and supported by semantic
continuity. We investigated this hypothesis in aMCI and AD by
assessing the integrity of, and relationship between, diachronic
unity and semantic continuity (narrative processes such as
autobiographical reasoning and global coherence including
personal temporal chronology).
Diachronic Unity in aMCI and AD
A central finding of this study was that the memory-impaired
groups did not differ significantly from healthy older participants
in relation to their subjective beliefs about their diachronic unity
(i.e., perceived persistence and I-self persistence). About half
of healthy and memory-impaired participants expressed strong
views that they remained the same person as they were in
their early 20s. This finding was accompanied by a preserved
sense of persistence of their core essence, which is consistent
with qualitative evidence from previous studies that those with
memory impairments may nevertheless retain a deep conviction
about their persistence across time (Medved and Brockmeier,
2008; Rathbone et al., 2009; Philippi et al., 2012).
Individuals with aMCI provided explanations for their
preserved beliefs of persistence that were as sophisticated as
those generated by healthy controls, as measured using Chandler
et al.’s (2003) continuity explanation. In contrast, in AD these
preserved beliefs about diachronic unity were explained in a
significantly less sophisticated way than both the HC and aMCI
groups. Specifically, half of the AD group provided answers that
relied on superficial, surface characteristics to justify stability,
while ignoring or downplaying aspects of personal change.
Importantly, this difference was not simply related to global
cognitive decline or reduced fluency. In contrast to Chandler
et al.’s findings with suicidal youth, our results suggest that a
coherent and sophisticated rationale for one’s persistence is not
necessary tomaintain a strong inner conviction that you continue
to be the same person across time; in memory-impaired older
adults even very simple persistence explanationsmay be sufficient
to sustain beliefs about one’s diachronic unity.
In fact, for those in the AD group, less sophisticated
persistence explanations were associated with greater certainty
about their diachronic unity (subjective persistence over time,
including their core I-self). One possible explanation is that
simplistic, “change ignoring” persistence explanations provide a
way to support a sense of diachronic unity without needing to
grapple with the realities of personal change, focusing instead on
superficial aspects of personal consistency, as illustrated by the
following response:
I can’t see myself being very different now. I just am like I am. If
people talk to me I’ll talk to them. I’m a mother, I help people.... I
just seem to do the same things. If people talk to me I talk to them,
if people need help I help them. Always been the same.
Focusing on superficial aspects of consistency may be a
useful strategy for maintaining a strong conviction about core
persistence in the face of memory loss. The AD group were
significantly more likely to emphasise greater persistence in the
me-self over time (i.e., traits and characteristics) than healthy
controls. A related suggestion has been made by Clare et al.
(Clare, 2003, 2004; Naylor and Clare, 2008) in relation to lack
of awareness about memory deficits. They suggest that reduced
awareness may provide an important strategy for reducing
threats to identity for certain individuals. In this study, however,
there was no significant correlation between our coarse measure
of lack of awareness of memory deficits and the use of more
simplistic persistence explanations. It is also possible that the
focus on stability rather than change in the responses of the AD
group may relate to their memory deficits, and an inability to
recollect the nuanced ways they have changed and stayed the
same across the lifespan.
Another possible account of these findings is that the
perceived persistence and I-self persistence measures used in
the present study do not directly assess beliefs about core
diachronic unity, but rather assess the level of engagement that
a participant has with difficult questions about self-persistence.
The direct questions regarding persistence used in the present
study (e.g., do you believe you are the same person? In what
ways have you changed?) appear to directly address questions
about self-persistence, yet someone could respond to these
questions in a manner that indicates essential changes to who
they are while nevertheless continuing to believe that these
changes have occurred to the same, unifying “me.” When
individuals express less conviction about their core persistence
on these measures, for example, by describing themselves as
being “a fundamentally different person,” this may not be a
marker for uncertainty or degradation in their beliefs about core
persistence, but rather an indication of intelligent engagement
with the enigmatic challenges of diachronic unity. It is difficult
to know how to distinguish such an answer from one in
which the individual has lost the ability to see themselves as
the same unified entity extending across time—a true loss of
diachronic unity. In this study those individuals with memory-
impairment who indicated doubts about their diachronic unity
(thus scoring lower on perceived and I-self persistence), tended
to produce more sophisticated explanations for their diachronic
unity, which indicates they did engage with the questions about
self-persistence. We suggest they may have been attempting to
explore the difficult questions of change and persistence over the
lifetime at a deep, level, which in turn allowed them to produce
sophisticated explanations for the changes they perceived in their
fundamental diachronic unity.
These issues indicate that further methodological work is
needed to determine how best to assess diachronic unity. In
particular, research is needed with groups who are likely to have
true disruptions in their subjective beliefs about self-persistence
(e.g., suicidal populations, Chandler et al.’s, 2003; Hsiao et al.,
2013) in order to determine whether they provide qualitatively
different types of answers regarding their diachronic unity.
Semantic Continuity in aMCI and AD
This study revealed that while many aspects of semantic
continuity were preserved in aMCI, there were a number
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of differences in the semantic continuity of individuals with
AD and healthy older adults. First, the life stories of the
aMCI group were similar to those of healthy controls in
terms of inclusion of cultural life script events, as well as
levels of temporal and thematic coherence. In particular, the
preservation of temporal coherence indicated that the ability to
construct personal temporal chronology is relatively preserved
in aMCI. Moreover, aMCI individuals appeared to engage in
autobiographical reasoning, although the number of self-event
connections they generated was at a level intermediate between
that of the healthy control and AD groups (differing significantly
from neither group).
Interestingly, however, there was a significant reduction in
the causal coherence of the life stories generated by the aMCI
group, indicating that they were less able to explain the causal
links between events, or between these events and their self-
concept. This finding may indicate that causal coherence, at least
as it was measured in the present investigation, requires a more
complex form of reasoning than the other types of coherence, and
is affected earlier in the disease process. Habermas and de Silveira
(2008) report that causal coherence develops steeply during
adolescence, and is more complex than temporal coherence.
Although they suggest that causal coherence is less complex than
thematic coherence, and demonstrate that thematic coherence
does not steeply increase until after age 16, it is interesting to
note that their findings suggest causal coherence is almost absent
in the stories of younger children, while a basic level of thematic
coherence is present.
Alternatively, it is possible that the impaired causal coherence
of the aMCI group may relate to the acute awareness that many
possessed about their memory loss, leading to a difference in the
way these individuals approached their stories. For example, in
attempting to remember all of the details of their stories, theymay
have focused more deliberately on including important dates and
events than on providing any meta-narrative to link the stories
together. In addition, the effort of producing these life stories,
including trying to remember the events and their temporal
order, may have required greater cognitive energy for those with
aMCI, leaving less to expend on more complex aspects of the
story like causally linking events. Future work could explore the
underlying basis of the reduced causal coherence in aMCI groups
by using a guided autobiographical reasoning assessment with
prompts to elicit these different reasoning processes.
In contrast to the limited change in semantic continuity
in the aMCI group, there was a more general reduction in
the quality of the narratives produced by the AD group.
This included less evidence of autobiographical reasoning, with
inclusion of fewer (as well as a lower percentage of) self-
event connections about change and stability in their life
stories. Moreover, there were reductions in temporal, causal
and thematic coherence. These findings indicate that the AD
group were making fewer links between the events they included
in their stories and their self-concept, and that they were less
able to convey the temporal order of events, the causal links
between the elements of the story, and the overarching motifs
and lessons that wove the story together. It may be that just
as episodic memories deteriorate in AD, so too does the ability
to link and integrate elements within the story into a coherent
narrative.
The present findings also revealed some deterioration in the
personal temporal chronology of those with AD. Consistent
with reports that the narratives of those with AD may lack
chronological ordering (Usita et al., 1998), the life stories of the
present AD group were rated as having lower temporal coherence
than the stories of the other groups. This was evident despite
the provision of a broad temporal structure by dividing the life
story into four sequential chapters, indicating deterioration in
the ability to convey the absolute and relative temporal ordering
of events through their life narratives. While this could relate to
difficulties in ordering and sequencing events in the process of
story construction, an interesting possibility is that this difficulty
reflects a disruption in the temporal organisation of AM itself.
Despite this, the use of the cultural life script was well-
preserved in the life stories of those with AD. Although there was
a non-significant trend for those with AD to use fewer cultural
life script events, after taking into account the length of their
stories, there was no difference between the groups in relation
to the number of cultural life script events, or event categories,
used. This finding differs from that of Usita et al. (1998), but is
consistent with those of Fromholt and Larsen (1991) and suggests
that in AD cultural knowledge about the events to include in a life
story remains largely intact.
These findings suggest that the organisational structure
provided by the cultural life script, and the memories linked to it,
may be relatively more resilient than other types of AM, perhaps
due to the important socio-cultural function of these memories.
This culturally-generated script may play an important role in
structuring and organising the last remnants of AM in AD
(Berntsen and Rubin, 2004). It is important to note, however, that
the measure used in the present study only addressed whether
the events were mentioned in the story, and not the detail or
accuracy of the stories. It is possible that AD participants retained
knowledge about the script (i.e., awareness that a given type
of event should be included in their life story) but not any
accuracy or detail about the event itself within their own life. The
resilience of cultural life script events may also be due to the list
of events being weighted to the first half of life, and particularly
the early-adulthood “reminiscence bump” period (Berntsen and
Rubin, 2004). To assess these possibilities, future investigations
should explore the detail and accuracy of the cultural life events
included in the stories of those with AD, and whether there is any
difference in the recall of cultural life events from different life
periods.
Relationship between Semantic Continuity
and Diachronic Unity
The present findings suggest a complex relationship between
semantic continuity and diachronic unity. There was a consistent
pattern of positive, marginally significant correlations between
the sophistication of the persistence explanation and the quality
of semantic continuity within the AD group, including the
greater use of self-event stability connections, and greater
temporal and causal coherence of life stories. This finding
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provides tentative support for the view that the ability to
construct a quality life story, which links one’s AMs into a
coherent narrative that explains the development of the self
across time, is associated with more sophisticated explanations
for why one continues to remain the same person. Additional
evidence for this notion comes from the aMCI group who had
preserved autobiographical reasoning and temporal/thematic
coherence of their life stories, and were able to generate
persistence explanations as sophisticated as those produced by
health controls. When considered together with the disruptions
to phenomenological re-experiencing evident in aMCI (Ally
et al., 2009; Hudon et al., 2009; Irish et al., 2010), this pattern of
findings provides support for our model’s prediction that intact
semantic continuity is sufficient to support diachronic unity
(Prebble et al., 2013).
An intriguing possibility, in line with the present model,
is that the association of semantic continuity and diachronic
unity reflects a causal relationship: that the ability to weave
a high-quality life narrative scaffolds the ability to understand
and explain one’s persistence across time. The fact that this
relationship was present in the AD group, but not the healthy
controls is consistent with Habermas and Köber’s (2014, 2015)
finding and suggestion that autobiographical reasoning may be
necessary for reflecting upon, and understanding, diachronic
unity only when there are disruptions to self-persistence.
A diagnosis of AD, and the accompanying personal and
circumstantial changes, may constitute such a disruption. In the
face of such disruptions, any deterioration in the ability to weave
AM into a coherent narrative may contribute to an impaired
ability to understand, at a higher conceptual level, why they
remain continuous beings over time.
It is also possible, however, that what may underlie these
relationships is cognitive decline in AD which is not directly
related to memory, but affects both the construction of
quality life narratives and successful engagement in the self-
persistence explanation task. However, the loss of sophistication
in self-persistence explanation in the AD group was not
significantly correlated with general cognitive decline (MMSE)
or verbal fluency (COWA), suggesting that other factors were
involved. Nevertheless, other more subtle reasoning processes,
not captured by simple measures like theMMSE, may be affected.
To assess this possibility, future studies could use a control
paradigm that requires a similar, but non-self-related reasoning
exercise (e.g., explaining the persistence of animals or inanimate
objects over time) in order to determine whether it is the ability
to engage in such logical reasoning processes that is affected,
or whether there are specific deficits in explaining one’s own
persistence.
Although better semantic continuity was associated with
increased sophistication of self-persistence explanation, it was
not associated with greater certainty about diachronic unity.
On the contrary, in the AD group a significant negative
relationship was found between the causal coherence of life
stories and certainty about whether they remained the same
person. This finding parallels those reported above in relation
to phenomenological continuity: better memory performance (in
this case, better integration of AM into a life narrative) was
associated with more sophisticated explanations about, but less
certainty of, self-persistence.
A limitation of the current investigation is its focus on past-
facing diachronic unity and continuity. Recent theories have
postulated that the adaptive function of the episodic memory
system may not relate to reliving the past, but rather in being
able to imagine, and therefore plan for, the future (Tulving,
2005; Suddendorf et al., 2009; Tulving and Szpunar, 2009), and
neuroscientific work has established a connection between the
ability to remember one’s past and the projection of oneself
forward into the imagined future (Schacter and Addis, 2007;
Addis et al., 2008). It may be that the ability to mentally project
oneself forward in time, and/or construct a story about the future
self, plays a vital role in phenomenological and semantic forms of
continuity and thus also diachronic unity.
While research into future thinking has focused primarily on
the role of episodic memory, there are studies suggesting that
semanticised AM may play an equally important role. Patients
with semantic dementia, who have profound semantic memory
deficits but largely preserved episodic memory, have been found
to be as deficient at imagining personalised future scenarios
as individuals with AD, suggesting that semanticised AM may
provide the scaffolding that allows episodic memory details to
be recombined into novel future scenarios (Irish et al., 2012).
There is also evidence that fundamental breakdowns in the sense
of semantic continuity in semantic dementia can arise from
problems with the ability to mentally project oneself forward in
time, and may be associated with suicidal behaviour (Hsiao et al.,
2013). This future-facing aspect of continuity and diachronic
unity, and its association with semantic and episodic memory
ability, is an important area for future investigation.
SUMMARY
This study provides some important insights for our model
of how AM supports diachronic unity by examining whether
semantic continuity can provide a sense of self persistence
in disorders where AM deficits disrupt phenomenological
continuity (Prebble et al., 2013). The findings in both aMCI and
AD support the predicted importance of semantic continuity
to diachronic unity. In aMCI, the quality of life narratives was
largely preserved, as were measures of self-persistence, indicating
that even when the continuity afforded by phenomenological
re-experiencing is disrupted, semantic continuity is sufficient to
support diachronic unity. However, the findings from the AD
group suggest a more nuanced relationship than was originally
proposed in our model. Underlying the complex pattern of
findings was a divergence between the two aspects of diachronic
unity in the AD group: beliefs about the persistence of the
core self over time (i.e., perceived and I-self persistence) vs. the
sophistication of persistence explanations. The AD group had
maintained the former, but showed deterioration in the latter.
Within the AD group, those who scored higher on measures
of persistence of the core self also provided less sophisticated
explanations for their self-persistence and were less able to use
their AM as a vehicle to explore how they came to be the
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person they are through their life narratives (i.e., poorer semantic
continuity).
These apparently paradoxical findings indicate a multifaceted
relation between diachronic unity and semantic continuity
in individuals lacking phenomenological continuity as occurs
in AD. Those individuals with AD who retain better quality
semantic continuity and life narratives, including better
autobiographical reasoning and greater global coherence, are
able to produce a more complex persistence explanation. This
is accompanied by less conviction about the persistence of the
core self, without incorporating some degree of fundamental
change. Thus, better semantic continuity in individuals with AD
may facilitate deep engagement with issues of self-persistence,
and this may be reflected both by more sophisticated responses
on the persistence explanation, and by responses to questions
about diachronic unity that indicate an appreciation of personal
change across the lifespan.
A poor quality life narrative that nevertheless contains regular
features of a cultural life script, appears to be sufficient for
individuals with AD to perceive familiarity with their past
and thus maintain strong subjective beliefs of self-persistence
over time. Nevertheless, when the connection with one’s
remembered past is diminished by the combination of poor
phenomenological and semantic continuity, this may contribute
to a less sophisticated understanding about personal persistence;
one which over-emphasises superficial aspects of stability and
fails to integrate an understanding of change. Further work is
needed to investigate whether this apparent lack of engagement
with the paradox of diachronic unity in individuals with AD
and diminished semantic continuity is due to an inability to
remember personal change, or may serve as an important
protective mechanism for the self-persistence of those with AD
in the face of tremendous personal change.
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APPENDIX A
Glossary
Autobiographical memory: Memory that is personal in nature in
that it involves the self (e.g., personally-experienced events, facts
about the self).
Autobiographical reasoning: A narrative process that involves
creating connections between different parts of the life story
(e.g., events in the past, present, and future) and the self and can
emphasise stability or change; this process serves to increase the
temporal, causal, and thematic coherence of the life story.
Autonoetic consciousness: The sense of consciously re-
experiencing a past event; a critical feature of episodic memory.
Diachronic unity: The unification of the self as a single
entity that persists across time; self-persistence.
Episodic memory: A form of autobiographical memory that
represents specific events that one experienced in the past.
I-self: the essential, core self, the underlying essence of who
you are, the inner entity; related to phenomenological continuity.
Me-self: the attributes one uses to describe oneself, e.g., traits,
attributes, physical, and personality descriptions, behaviour, likes
and dislikes, values and beliefs; related to beliefs about semantic
continuity. Narrative: Coherent and meaningful life story that
convey “how I was and how I came to be who I am” that
highlights the temporally-extended self-concept and personal
temporal chronology.
Narrative identity: Sense of identity emergent from the process
of constructing a life story.
Phenomenological continuity: The subjective experience of
the self-existing over time, arising from episodic remembering
and autonoetic consciousness.
Self-persistence: See diachronic unity.
Semantic continuity: The knowledge that the self exists over
time; a by-product of the construction of a coherent, temporally-
extended narrative.
Semantic memory: An abstract, conceptual form of
autobiographical memory that synthesises large amounts of
knowledge and facts about the self, including self-concept (e.g.,
traits, preferences) and knowledge of past experiences, etc.
Temporally-extended self-concept: The self-concept (e.g.,
trait-self knowledge, preferences, behaviours) in the past, present
and future; incorporates change and stability of self-concept.
Personal temporal chronology: The temporal sequence of
events experienced in one’s life; can be measured by temporal
coherence of life narratives.
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Facilitate Recall: A Narrative Review
Rebecca L. Wheeler* and Fiona Gabbert
Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, United Kingdom
We draw upon the Associative Network model of memory, as well as the principles
of encoding-retrieval specificity, and cue distinctiveness, to argue that self-generated
cue mnemonics offer an intuitive means of facilitating reliable recall of personally
experienced events. The use of a self-generated cue mnemonic allows for the spreading
activation nature of memory, whilst also presenting an opportunity to capitalize upon
cue distinctiveness. Here, we present the theoretical rationale behind the use of this
technique, and highlight the distinction between a self-generated cue and a self-referent
cue in autobiographical memory research. We contrast this mnemonic with a similar
retrieval technique, Mental Reinstatement of Context, which is recognized as the most
effective mnemonic component of the Cognitive Interview. Mental Reinstatement of
Context is based upon the principle of encoding-retrieval specificity, whereby the overlap
between encoded information and retrieval cue predicts the likelihood of accurate
recall. However, it does not incorporate the potential additional benefit of self-generated
retrieval cues.
Keywords: retrieval cue, encoding-specificity, spreading activation, cue distinctivness, cue generation, self-
generated cue, Mental Reinstatement of Context, encoding-retrieval match
INTRODUCTION
Being able to reliably recall a personally experienced event is sometimes of critical importance.
A good example is when an eyewitness is required during a police investigation to give a complete
and accurate account of criminal activity witnessed. In a more everyday context, the recall of
personally experienced events can function as a means to understand ourselves and others in the
world around us. Through recalling personal memories we can identify who we are as an individual
consistent over time, learn from the past, solve current problems, and plan for the future. We can
also strengthen social ties and build and maintain intimacy in our relationships through the sharing
of stories about past events (Fivush, 2008; Harris et al., 2014).
Successful recall of information from memory is often dependent upon the provision of retrieval
cues (see Tulving, 1974 for discussion). Retrieval cues are aspects of an individual’s physical and
cognitive environment which aid the recall process; they can be explicitly provided at recall, self-
generated, or encountered more incidentally through the retrieval context (Pansky et al., 2005).
Given the potential importance of accurate recall of personally experienced events outlined above,
it is unsurprising that numerous mnemonic techniques have been developed to facilitate this
process. The most successful of these build upon established principles of memory, such as the
idea that encoding information leaves behind a memory trace comprised of multiple pieces of
related information. This means that effective retrieval cues are those which contain a large amount
of overlap with encoded information, and that different retrieval cues may facilitate the recall of
different items of information (Geiselman et al., 1986).
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In the discussion that follows we outline the qualities
necessary for a retrieval cue to be effective, and based
upon the extant literature, argue that self-generated retrieval
cues represent a unique opportunity to maximize each of
these qualities. We contrast use of self-generated cues with
established context reinstatement techniques, in particular
Mental Reinstatement of Context, found principally within the
eyewitness domain. Based upon this discussion, we argue that
the theory underpinning Mental Reinstatement of Context also
supports the effectiveness of self-generated cue mnemonics,
and that self-generated cues offer an additional opportunity
to capitalize upon the benefit of cue distinctiveness. We close
by outlining three memory principles underlying each of
these mnemonic techniques: spreading activation, encoding-
specificity, and cue distinctiveness. Our aim throughout this
review is to consider how existing memory theories might
contribute to the beneficial effect of self-generated cues on recall,
as demonstrated by the empirical studies outlined, and not to
consider alternative explanations of these findings.
DISCUSSION
Episodic Memory
The recall of personally experienced events falls within the
domain of episodic memory. Episodic memory, first proposed as
a memory system by Tulving (1972), consists of highly detailed
sensory information about recent experience. It principally
involves recalling the what happened, where, and when of
events. As such, episodic memory deals more with personal
experience than with general facts about the world and ourselves.
It is the ‘personally experienced’ aspect of episodic memory
that distinguishes these memories from semantic memories
for more general facts (Tulving, 2001). This concept has been
revised by Conway and colleagues to define episodic memory
as a system containing highly event-specific, sensory-perceptual
details of a recently experienced event. These events usually
cover a relatively short-time span, often lasting just minutes or
hours (Conway, 2001). It is the high levels of sensory-perceptual
detail incorporated into episodic memories that make the
re-experiencing of previous events possible through ‘mental time
travel,’ something Tulving argues is likely to be unique to humans
(Tulving, 2001, 2002). Tulving (2002) suggests that the episodic
memory system is relatively early-deteriorating, and Conway
(2001) argues that episodic memories persist on a longer-term
basis only when incorporated into autobiographical memory
structures (indeed Conway argues that autobiographical memory
structures typically consist of one general event, alongside at least
one episodic memory). Autobiographical memory, in contrast to
the shorter-term, high event specificity of episodic memory, can
be taken to be a system of long-term memory containing three
levels of specificity: lifetime periods, general events, and event-
specific knowledge. It is also generally considered that the self
is of central importance to autobiographical memory (Conway
and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Here, we refer to episodic memory
in line with Tulving’s (1985) suggestion of episodic memory as
a specialized subcategory of memory relating to the conscious
recall of personally experienced events. In this sense, episodic
memory is both a particular type of encoded information, and
a particular type of recollective experience (Tulving, 2002).
Effective Retrieval Cues
A number of key qualities have been suggested as necessary for
a retrieval cue to effectively support recall. Good quality retrieval
cues often have: (i) constructability (cues generated at encoding
can be reliably reproduced at recall); (ii) consistency between
encoding and retrieval within a given context (i.e., an effective
retrieval cue should be compatible with the memory trace created
during encoding and show high cue-target match); (iii) strong
associations with the target and the ability to be easily associated
with newly learned information; and (iv) bidirectionality of
association (the cue recalling target information, and target
information recalling the cue). It is also important that retrieval
cues are distinctive or discriminable. That is, it should be possible
to distinguish cues from one another, and to differentiate the
target memories associated with each. If retrieval cues are not
recognized as being distinct from one another, then cues are
likely to become associated with more information, which in
turn reduces the effectiveness of the cue in prompting the recall
of target information. This is known as cue overload (Watkins
and Watkins, 1975), which leads to slower less accurate recall
as a result of a cue (node) containing too many associative
links (the fan effect; Anderson, 1983a). In addition, fuzzy trace
theory (e.g., Brainerd et al., 1995) suggests that multiple traces
are encoded within memory for a single event. In other words,
separate memory traces are created which contain either general
information about an event (gist traces) or exact details of the
same event (verbatim traces). It has been suggested that gist
traces are likely to be activated by a wider range of retrieval cues
than verbatim traces (Tuckey and Brewer, 2003). This means that
more distinct retrieval cues are necessary to access detailed target
information (Bellezza and Hoyt, 1992; Tullis and Benjamin,
2015a).
Self-Generated Cues
The self-generation of cues to prompt recall of information at a
later date is a relatively natural process; for example, individuals
regularly create file names to cue themselves as to the contents,
create slides to prompt themselves as to presentation content,
or take notes on important information to allow detailed recall
in the future (Tullis and Benjamin, 2015b). Generally, it can be
expected that individuals should be effective at generating cues to
prompt their own future recall. When generating cues ourselves
we are able to rely upon rich, unique, personal knowledge
to produce cues which are often distinctive, highly associated
with the target, and consistent between encoding and retrieval
(and therefore stable over time). Research has demonstrated
that individuals do not consistently favor any one of these
principles over the others when self-generating retrieval cues;
instead, they utilize these characteristics flexibly to fit with
the current task demands (Tullis and Benjamin, 2015a). For
example, when learners are provided with information about
the similarity of competing targets (they were made aware that
targets were similar to one another) prior to generating their
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cues, they focused more on distinguishing between the targets
through maximizing cue distinctiveness, and so improved their
performance on a recall task (Tullis and Benjamin, 2015a).
Defining a Self-Generated Cue
Research has suggested that the most effective self-generated cues
are likely to have been developed with the explicit purpose of
cueing later retrieval. This helps individuals to make deliberate
choices distinguishing the target from other items stored within
memory, rather than merely describing the properties of the
target (Tullis and Benjamin, 2015a). In this way, developing self-
generated cues can be considered as an active process, resulting
in cues which uniquely and functionally represent the critical
properties of the target memory (Mäntylä and Nilsson, 1983).
For example, when learners were told directly that the cues they
generated would be used to guide a future retrieval attempt
(mnemonic cues), their cues tended to include more idiosyncratic
knowledge and personal experience, were more distinctive, and
associated to fewer potential targets, and so facilitated greater
levels of recall than cues generated to simply describe the target
(Tullis and Benjamin, 2015a). Self-generated cues are likely to
include idiosyncratic details based upon the personal context of
encoding. They are also likely to make particular use of distinctive
aspects of the information to be encoded to distinguish the
representation of the target memory from others already stored
in memory (Mäntylä, 1986).
As far as we are aware there is no widely agreed definition
of a self-generated cue. Here, we refine the definition of a
self-generated retrieval cue to mean any detail salient to the
individual, and actively generated by the individual themselves,
which serves to facilitate more complete retrieval of a target
memory, and as such represents the critical properties of the
target memory. In defining a self-generated cue, it is also
important to distinguish our interpretation of a self-generated
cue from other similarly named concepts within the domain of
memory research. For example, from the related concept of the
generation effect, as well as from self-referent cues commonly
found in the autobiographical memory literature. Each of these
is treated individually below.
The generation effect or elaborative processing
It has been suggested that information is better recalled when it
has been actively and effortfully processed, rather than passively
received. This can be considered as a necessary but not sufficient
prerequisite for unique encoding (Slamecka and Graf, 1978;
Mäntylä and Nilsson, 1983). Production of unique cues at the
encoding stage encourages enhanced encoding of target material.
One means of inducing more active unique encoding is to have
participants generate the stimuli to-be-recalled for themselves.
For example, participants might be given a word with some
letters replaced with blanks. This is often presented alongside a
strong semantic cue (e.g., fruit: a p _ l _). Learners are asked to
complete the word, and then to encode this word for later recall
(Schmidt, 1991; Laffan et al., 2010). Self-generated stimuli are
more accurately recalled than stimuli passively encoded under the
same conditions, and this effect persists over a longer retention
period. This effect (known as the generation effect) holds constant
across a range of measures such as cued and uncued recognition,
free recall and cued recall, and confidence ratings (Slamecka and
Graf, 1978; Mäntylä and Nilsson, 1983; Laffan et al., 2010).
The generation effect can be considered as representing the
impact of deeper, semantic, more distinctive encoding strategies
(Derwinger et al., 2005). While this potentially works on some
of the same principles as our definition of self-generated cues,
these two processes are subtly different. In essence, it seems
that when a generation effect approach is taken, learners are
generally trying to generate the encoding material. In contrast,
a self-generated cue in our context is one that is generated by the
individual (and so can be as idiosyncratic as necessary) to prompt
the recall of encoded material, but does not necessarily consist of
the target material itself. It is worth noting that some research
has found that the generation effect improves memory for target
items, but can lead to a reduction in memory for contextual
details (Mulligan, 2004; Mulligan et al., 2006). It is not yet known
whether self-generated cues might also fail to enhance memory
in all contexts.
Self-referent cues
References to ‘self-referent cues,’ ‘self-relevant cues,’ or ‘personally
relevant cues’ are not uncommon in the autobiographical
memory literature. It has been suggested that there is a strong
relationship between the self and memory, and that in particular
the self-referencing of autobiographical memories distinguishes
them from other types of memory (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce,
2000). In addition, it has been suggested that memory is, at least
in part, organized around the concept of the self (see for example
Greenwald and Banaji, 1989; Symons and Johnson, 1997).
A self-referent cue generally involves processing information in
reference to the self. In the simplest terms, this means thinking
about oneself during the encoding process (Turk et al., 2015). In
doing so the individual associates a piece of to-be-remembered
information with a self-relevant item (as in Greenwald and
Banaji, 1989). This has been shown to have broader implications
for recall, as well as impacting achievment in educational contexts
(as in Turk et al., 2015). However, this is somewhat different from
the definition of a self-generated cue to (non-autobiographical)
retrieval we outlined above. The main distinction being that self-
generated cues reflect those that represent critical properties of a
target memory, while self-referent cues are those that act as a cue
relating to an aspect of the self.
The Benefit of Self-Generated Cues Over Cues
Generated by, or for, Others
It is well-established that strong cue-target relationships, cue
distinctiveness, and compatibility between encoding and retrieval
are necessary to maximize the effectiveness of a retrieval cue. It is
reasonable to assume then that if we are able to capitalize upon
each of these principles, then recall performance will be further
improved. If this is the case, then allowing individuals to generate
their own retrieval cues represents our best opportunity to utilize
cues that are unique, and include a high level of cue-target match.
Indeed, some researchers have already argued that the high levels
of recall demonstrated when the target information shares a
unique relationship with the cue become more striking when
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the cue is self-generated (Hunt and Smith, 1996). This is not
altogether surprising; if effective retrieval cues are both distinctive
and compatible with the encoding experience, then it follows
naturally that cues are more effective when they are self-generated
than other-generated. The ‘tester’ cannot know what information
was most salient to the learner at the time of encoding, nor
can they anticipate which aspects of that information are most
distinctive to the learner (Mäntylä, 1986). As a result, other-
generated cues (i.e., cues that are formulated by someone other
than the individual themselves) rely heavily upon more general,
semantic, gist-based aspects of the target information, rather
than the more specific idiosyncratic episodic details incorporated
into self-generated cues. In this sense, other-generated cues
can be considered to rely primarily upon associative strength
(between cue and target), without the additional benefit of cue
distinctiveness and encoding-retrieval match offered by self-
generated cues. In support of this, Tullis (2013) highlights that
when learners recalled an incorrect target, this response appeared
to be driven by the associative strength between the cue and the
incorrect response. This suggests that when learners are unable
to access specific episodic details for a cue they resort to a
‘best guess’ based upon associates of the cue provided to them.
In other words, when specific episodic details are unavailable,
learners fall back upon more general semantic knowledge. This
suggests that strong cue-target associations (favored by spreading
activation theories of memory) are the backup route to recall,
when cue-target overlap and cue distinctiveness fail.
It has been argued that research into self-generated cues
makes an important contribution beyond the understanding of
cue distinctiveness. For example, in examining the use of self-
generated cues, we are able to move beyond understanding
encoding as the perception and comprehension of an item, to
viewing this process as an additional source of potential retrieval
cues (Hunt and Smith, 1996). This argument was based primarily
around the extraordinary findings of Mäntylä and Nilsson (1988)
who showed that given distinctive self-generated verbal cues and
a consistent encoding-retrieval environment, recall of unrelated
verbal targets is consistently of a high level, even with a long
retention interval. This advantage is specific to the producer of
the cue, with the cue itself failing to function effectively as a
prompt for another individual’s recall. In effect, even where two
individuals have encoded the same information, they are likely to
produce unique retrieval cues, and so benefit exceptionally well
from their own cues.
The retrieval benefit of self-generated cues over other-
generated cues has been suggested as being linked to the
generation process (e.g., through encouraging more active
processing of the target memory). However, the research outlined
above suggests that this benefit is the result of both the generation
process, and the generation context. The potentially idiosyncratic
nature of self-generated cues means that one individual’s cues
that are given to another individual at test would be unlikely
to benefit their performance, even if the same information
had been presented at encoding. Despite this, individuals do
frequently generate cues to benefit others in naturalistic settings.
For example, we might consider how best to prompt an employee
to complete a task, or cue one another’s memories for shared
events when reminiscing with friends (Tullis and Benjamin,
2015b). It is then interesting to examine how asking individuals
to generate cues specifically for use by others impacts upon the
types of cues generated, and the effectiveness of these cues at test.
During one such study participants generated cues for themselves
and cues for others. At recall, they received another person’s
cues (this could be a friend or stranger), but never their own
self-generated cues. Results suggest friends are able to cue each
other more effectively than strangers. However, performance
overall improved when participants were provided with cues
generated with the knowledge that the cue would be used to
support someone else’s recall (Andersson and Ronnberg, 1997,
Experiment 2).
Tullis and Benjamin (2015b) examined how the quality of a
retrieval cue changed when it was generated for use by others
rather than use by the self. Participants each generated two cues
for each of 60 words. These cues were to be used to support their
own later recall attempt, or to aid another learner in recalling
the items on the wordlist. The stimulus words were selected
as having relevance to the life of college students, and so were
considered to offer opportunities for the use of cues based on
personal experience. Cues presented at recall were either self
or other-generated, and were intended for use by either the
self or another individual. In general, cues generated for the
self were consistently more idiosyncratic, and so less beneficial
when presented to another learner. Consequently, performance
was better when participants received an other-generated cue
meant for another individual, than an other-generated cue
meant for the self. In addition, self-generated cues intended
for another individual were no longer as effective in facilitating
the originator’s recall performance. Although this difference did
not reach significance, this does suggest that the benefit of
self-generation of the cue is removed when self-generated cues
are intended for use by others. This is perhaps as a result of
the reliance on more semantic cue-target associations, rather
than distinctive, and often idiosyncratic details, of the encoding
experience. It can therefore be assumed that the benefit of self-
generated cues lies in the inclusion of personal experience and
idiosyncratic knowledge to create a distinctive and meaningful
cue.
Empirical Tests of Self-Generated Cue Mnemonics
Mäntylä and colleagues were among the first to note the benefit
of self-generated cues on recall. Mäntylä and Nilsson (1983)
were able to demonstrate strikingly high levels of recall (around
96% of a 30-word list), but only when participants were able
to self-generate retrieval cues, and when these same retrieval
cues were presented at test. These extraordinarily high levels of
recall have been replicated in other contexts. For example, when
participants were able to generate three cues at encoding, and
then received these cues during an immediate recall test they
recalled around 90% of up to 600 words. Performance levels
declined slightly when only one self-generated cue was presented
at test (to around 50–60%), but self-generated cues consistently
resulted in high levels of performance. When other-generated
cues were presented performance was particularly low (around
5% given one cue, rising to 17% when three cues were presented;
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Mäntylä, 1986). This suggests that the benefit of self-generated
cues lie with the inclusion of idiosyncratic details within the cues,
resulting in a unique cue which overlaps with few targets. It is
then unsurprising, in terms of the encoding-specificity principle
of memory, that these cues were only beneficial when they were
self-generated (Hunt and Smith, 1996).
The high levels of performance demonstrated by Mäntylä
and Nilsson (1983) and Mäntylä (1986) did however decline
considerably as the retention interval increased. This decline was
suggested as being the result of a decrease in the compatibility of
the encoding and retrieval context, stipulated as a requirement of
effective recall by the encoding-specificity principle of memory
(Mäntylä, 1986). If this is the case then it is possible that that
retrieval is impaired because the meaning of a cue is interpreted
differently at encoding than at recall, and so consistent use of
cues could help to maintain levels of performance. Essentially,
reducing within participant cue variability for the same target
item should reduce the decline in performance. Mäntylä and
Nilsson (1988) asked participants to focus in particular on
distinctive properties of the target when generating a cue in an
attempt to reduce the intrasubject variance (and so make it more
likely that the exact same cue will be produced on more than
one occasion). They showed that when cues are generated with
distinctive features in mind, then the decline in performance
over time is much smaller (in comparison to a group who
generated their own cues according to personal experience as
an appropriate description of the target word) than has been
previously suggested (e.g., Mäntylä, 1986). This effect persists
throughout a retention interval of up to 6 weeks. This suggests
that asking learners to focus specifically on distinctive aspects of
the to-be-recalled information during encoding results in self-
generated cues which maximize distinctiveness in a way that is
unaffected by changes in context (reduced levels of encoding-
retrieval match), and in turn ensures that levels of performance
are maintained over time (Mäntylä and Nilsson, 1988).
Self-generated cues have also been shown to be effective in
recalling more complex stimuli. For example, recall of paragraphs
of text has been showed to improve with use of self-generated
cues. van Dam et al. (1987) asked participants to study 20
standalone paragraphs in a factual narrative. Recall of the
contents of each paragraph was more complete when participants
were able to first generate a list of keywords (from memory)
that they felt represented the content of each paragraph (i.e., the
generated keywords did not have to be present in the paragraph).
Interestingly, this was only effective when keyword generation
took place before the first full recall attempt. When an initial recall
of the paragraph contents was attempted, and then the keywords
were generated to supplement this attempt, self-generated cues
had no impact on the amount recalled.
Furthermore, research has suggested that there is a potential
benefit of self-generated cues for those experiencing the
beginnings of cognitive decline. For example, use of self-
generated cues has been shown to facilitate the recall of a word list
in both young adults (aged 20–39) and older adults (aged 70–89).
Learners generated cues that were either semantic or phonetic
(rhyming) dependent upon the instructions given. A benefit
of self-generated cues was shown regardless of the level of
processing at which the cue was generated. However, the benefit
was more pronounced for older adults, and in particular self-
generated semantic cues greatly reduced age-related differences
in performance (Sauzéon et al., 2013). The fact that self-generated
cues may benefit older adults more than younger adults is
particularly striking, and further distinguishes self-generated cues
from self-referent cues. For example, while both younger and
older adults have been shown to benefit from encoding items
to be recalled with reference to the self, research has suggested
that older adults benefit less from self-referent processing than
younger adults. In particular, it has been suggested that the
effectiveness of self-referent encoding varies dependent upon the
availability of cognitive resources, and that older adults are more
limited in their ability to use this technique flexibly (Gutchess
et al., 2007).
In addition, training in the use of a mnemonic, whether this
was an established mnemonic or a self-generated strategy, has
been shown to improve four-digit number recall of older adults.
Older adults were trained using a number-consonant mnemonic
(whereby a series of number-consonant pairs are memorized, and
a word-phrase generation technique used to memorize number
strings) or asked to use a systematic approach during practice
sessions to develop an effective strategy for recalling the target
digit-strings. The self-generated strategy group were asked to
monitor their encoding processes and to make a note of the
strategy they adopted to memorize each four-digit number string.
For example, in attempting to memorize 2468 participants might
enter “my birth year (24), my wife’s age (68),” “digit sequence
beginning at 2 and adding 2,” etc. If participants were unable
to think of a specific strategy they might report “repeated the
numbers,” etc. In this way the participants retrieval strategies,
and the reporting of these strategies, was not constrained in
any way. Both trained groups outperformed a control (who
received no training or practice time) at pre-test and post-test,
both with and without cognitive support (cognitive support
consisted of the generation of a word cue to prompt recall).
Between the two training groups, the mnemonic group showed
an improvement in performance from pre-test to post-test, and
this improvement was magnified when post-test support was
provided. In contrast, the self-generated strategy group showed a
(non-significant) improvement from pre-test to post-test without
support. This reached significance when post-test support was
provided. The fact that both groups showed broadly similar levels
of improvement from pre- to post-test is particularly striking
when it is considered that the self-generated strategy group
received slightly less training than the mnemonic strategy group
(Derwinger et al., 2003). The gains in performance made by
both the trained groups were also shown to persist after an 8-
month delay (Derwinger et al., 2005). This gain persisted for
the self-generated strategy group even when cognitive support
was removed (the trained mnemonic group in contrast showed a
decline in performance at this stage). These findings suggest that
cognitive support is less necessary for the benefit of self-generated
strategies to be maintained, in comparison to a more cognitively
demanding mnemonic technique (Derwinger et al., 2005).
Although self-generated cues and self-generated mnemonic
strategies have been used successfully by older adults, it is
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org October 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 183032
fpsyg-08-01830 October 25, 2017 Time: 14:58 # 6
Wheeler and Gabbert Self-Generated Cues and Recall
important to note that this finding is not as clear cut as might first
appear. For example, Mäntylä and Bäckman (1990, Experiment 2)
demonstrated that when participants were asked to recall a target
word in response to presentation of a cue word self-generated
3 weeks prior, younger adults outperformed older adults. Mäntylä
and Bäckman argue that these results reflect an age-related
increase in encoding variability. For example, when both younger
and older adults were asked to generate properties for target
words in two sessions up to 3 weeks apart (with the instruction
in the second session to generate properties describing their
current interpretation of the target word, rather than trying to
recall the descriptions generated in the first session), older adults
were less consistent in the properties generated. Older adults also
tended to rely on more generic properties, rather than utilizing
more distinctive idiosyncratic properties (Mäntylä and Bäckman,
1990, Experiment 1). They suggest that this increase in age-
related encoding variability is likely to contribute to the decline
in episodic recall performance. Despite this, the potential benefit
of self-generated cues in facilitating recall of both younger and
older adults is something which merits further research.
Context as a Retrieval Cue
Retrieval cues can also come from the context of an event. The
contextual dependence of memory and the benefit that physical
or mental reinstatement of encoding conditions at retrieval can
have upon recall has long been established in laboratory research
(see for example, Smith, 1979). The relationship between memory
and context is a natural extension of the encoding-specificity
principle of memory (Tulving and Thomson, 1973). In addition,
the provision of contextual cues may enhance the completeness
of recall through facilitating the spread of activation from
accessible items to those not initially accessible (Hershkowitz
et al., 2002).
One of the most established and frequently tested context
reinstatement techniques is the Mental Reinstatement of Context.
This is one of the cognitive mnemonic techniques incorporated
into the Cognitive Interview (developed by Fisher et al., 1984).
Mental Reinstatement of Context describes the process of guiding
the individual to reconstruct an internal representation of the
physical context of an event. This generally includes instructions
to “reinstate in your mind the context surrounding the event”
through considering the layout of the scene, the weather, the
people and objects that were nearby, and so on. It is also considers
the personal context of the event, through attempting to recall
thoughts, feelings, and reactions to the event to-be-recalled
(Geiselman et al., 1985). This technique is frequently used within
laboratory studies on eyewitness memory. A recent meta-analysis
suggested that 100% of the studies conducted using the CI and
its variants over the preceding 25 years had incorporated MRC
instructions (Memon et al., 2010). It is also noted as being a highly
effective recall technique. For example, provision of physical cues
from encoding and encouraging mental reinstatement of the
context of the event has been suggested to increase the accuracy
of identifications in an eyewitness context (Krafka and Penrod,
1985). This process has been shown to result in an increase in
the level of detail (although not necessarily the amount of detail)
provided in real-world accounts (e.g., Hershkowitz et al., 2002).
The Benefit of Self-Generated Cues Over Context
Reinstatement
It has been suggested that the benefits of context-based
cues become more apparent only when more effective cues
are unavailable, suggesting that the benefit of context-based
mnemonic approaches can be overshadowed if individuals are
able to provide their own cues (Pansky et al., 2005). One potential
means of reinstating context whilst also encouraging the use of
an individual’s own cues is the Sketch Mental Reinstatement of
Context. Developed by Dando et al. (2009, 2011) this technique
allows trained interviewers to guide individuals toward using
their own contextual cues when recalling a complex event. When
using this technique, the witness sketches details of the event
to be recalled, describing these aloud as they do so. Use of the
Sketch Mental Reinstatement of Context has been suggested as
comparable to the standard Mental Reinstatement of Context
procedure in terms of both accurate information elicited and
overall accuracy. The additional benefit of the Sketch Mental
Reinstatement of Context is that it introduces self-generated
contextual cues which are likely to be more salient (and so more
effective) than contextual cues provided by an interviewer (for
example through the standard MRC procedure).
However, even where context reinstatement techniques can
be combined with self-generated retrieval cues, there remains
problems with the application of these techniques. Context
reinstatement techniques such as Mental Reinstatement of
Context can be both difficult and time-consuming to implement
effectively. For example, trained interviewers report finding
Mental Reinstatement of Context (and other Cognitive Interview
techniques) cognitively demanding, requiring flexibility, and
difficult to incorporate in real world settings (Kebbell et al., 1999;
Brown et al., 2008). It should be noted here that the Sketch Mental
Reinstatement of Context technique has been suggested to reduce
some of these demands, but more research is needed before this
can be stated conclusively.
In contrast, the limited work that has investigated the use
of self-generated cues in an applied context suggests that they
might be preferable to techniques which require greater levels of
training. As Derwinger et al. (2005) suggest the ease of use and
personal compatibility inherent in self-generated strategies may
mean that they are relatively easily incorporated into everyday
routine, thus providing practice effects over time. The self-
generated cue research described thus far has some applied
relevance, but still relies primarily upon fairly artificial stimuli
and artificial means of self-generated cue production. The work
outlined in the following section begins to take steps to move the
use of self-generated cues into a more ecologically valid domain.
When faced with a complex event, particularly one rich in
temporal details or involving multiple actors, accurate recall
of information becomes a more cognitively demanding task.
Interviewee-led cueing methods have begun to appear in an
eyewitness domain, and these techniques show undoubtable
promise. For example, Hope et al. (2013) demonstrated that use
of the timeline technique facilitated retrieval in an eyewitness
testimony context. When using this technique individuals are
able to delineate a complex event into key stages by placing
person description cards and action cards on a physical
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cardboard timeline. This allows the interviewee to recall the
individuals, actions, and sequences involved in a complex event
in a witness-compatible manner (e.g., by beginning at the most
salient point of the event). Use of this technique has been
shown to facilitate the retrieval of more details than a free recall
account alone, with no cost to accuracy. This benefit persists even
after a 2-week delay. Furthermore, use of multiple mnemonics,
including self-generated cues, during an interview about repeated
events (in this case family gatherings) facilitated witness recall,
even when the witness judged that they had recalled as much
as they were able (and after repeated attempts to keep trying
yielded no more information). Results showed an increase in
recall of around 70% when using a combination of seven distinct
mnemonics than when recalling unaided (Leins et al., 2014).
Taken together these findings suggest that self-generated cues
may be an intuitive means of facilitating recall in everyday
settings.
Theoretical Underpinnings of
Self-Generated Cue Mnemonics
The research outlined thus far suggests a clear benefit of the
use of self-generated cues on retrieval. We now address the
theory underlying this approach. There are three key principles
of memory which contribute to explaining the effectiveness
of self-generated cues: the spreading activation theory of
memory, the encoding-specificity principle of memory, and cue
distinctiveness. We outline each of these in turn in the sections
that follow, and speculate on how these principles of memory
relate to the success of self-generated cues in aiding retrieval.
Spreading Activation Theory of Memory
In attempting to recall information from episodic memory
we have to access long-term memory, a relatively slow
process in comparison to other human information processing
systems (Anderson, 1983a). Spreading activation models view
information in long-term memory as being represented by a
network of associated concepts. The assumption is then that it is
possible to recall a given item from memory by recalling other
information associated with the target. This is made possible
through the process of activation spreading through the network
(Anderson, 1983a; Crestani, 1997).
Memory is generally viewed as a network of interlinked
nodes (as in Collins and Loftus, 1975; Anderson, 1983b). Within
these networks, units of memory are conceptualized as cognitive
units, made up of a node and its associated elements (or key
properties of the node). Cognitive units make up the essential
units of encoding and retrieval. During encoding, a cognitive
unit is formed via a copy in working memory, which is later
transferred as a more permanent long-term memory trace
(Anderson, 1983b). Associative networks are formed of generic
nodes, representing concepts or categories and knowledge about
the category member, and episodic nodes, representing specific
instances of generic nodes, connected by associative links
(Tuckey and Brewer, 2003). There has been some debate around
whether cognitive units are limited or unconstrained in terms
of the number of linked elements they are able to contain.
Irrespective of this, it is likely that memory networks represent
a complex structure of links between concepts and associated
properties (see Collins and Loftus, 1975; Anderson, 1983b, for
examples of opposing views on this issue).
Spreading activation models generally assume that when
information is encoded in memory it is also incorporated into a
semantic network. In other words, information can be considered
as being organized around semantic similarities. If this is the
case, then the extent to which any one concept primes activation
of another is a function of the number of connections between
the two concepts. In other words, as activation spreads between
semantically related memories during a recall attempt, the recall
of one item often primes the recall of other semantically related
items and so on (for further discussion of this assumption and the
underlying experimental data see, Collins and Loftus, 1975).
Further support for the assumption of semantic organization
of memory networks is shown through the use of category
clustering recall techniques. Paulo et al. (2016) examined whether
recall of a complex eyewitness event could be improved by asking
participants to recall the target event in terms of the person,
object, action, and location details of the event. Their results
suggest that this category clustering is an effective mnemonic
technique. Paulo et al. (2016) suggest that according to Collins
and Loftus (1975) spreading activation theory of semantic
processing, a key benefit of recalling via semantic (or category)
clusters is that this approach gradually allows activation within
the network to reach a level which triggers other semantically
related information which may not otherwise have been activated
and recalled.
Spreading activation models of memory all generally view
a memory search as the process of spreading activation from
concept nodes along associative links throughout a semantic
network until a threshold is reached (Collins and Loftus,
1975). The original spreading activation theory was proposed
by Quillian (1962, 1967) who attempted to develop computer
simulations of human memory search (see also developments
by Collins and Loftus, 1975; Anderson, 1983b). It is generally
accepted that a memory cue (sometimes termed a memory
probe) triggers a memory search beginning at the node or nodes
originally activated by the cue. The activation then spreads
to all nodes connected to the initial node, and then to all
nodes linked to these first tier activated nodes, and so on
(Collins and Loftus, 1975). As activation spreads throughout the
network information associated with the sources of activation
becomes available (Anderson and Pirolli, 1984). This process
is shown in Figure 1 below. In this example, the cue triggers
activation of the black node; this activation then spreads to
the three dark gray nodes connected to the initial node (the
first tier or spreading activation), and from there the activation
continues down all pathways connected to the first tier activated
nodes to reach the light gray second tier of activated nodes.
Anderson (1983a) suggests that the transmission of activation
is bidirectional; as shown in Figure 1, nodes can rebound
activation back upon nodes which are already activated (e.g.,
the light gray node outlined in a dashed black line rebounds
activation received back to the initially activated node). The level
of activation reached by each node begins to decrease as soon as
the information contained in the node drops from the focus of
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FIGURE 1 | The spread of activation through a memory network (adapted from Crestani, 1997).
attention (Anderson, 1983b) and continues to decrease with the
passage of time (Collins and Loftus, 1975).
Figure 1 also depicts the fanning of activation down parallel
paths. Activation begins at the initially activated node and
continues out along multiple parallel paths. Where an active
concept node has links to multiple other nodes (these links are
referred to as the fan of the concept), the activation spreads
in parallel among these pathways. For example, the level of
activation initially received at the source node (in black) splits
simultaneously down the three pathways leading to the dark gray
first tier activated nodes. Anderson (1983a) argues that nodes
have a finite capacity for activation, and so the more paths a
node is connected to, the less activation it is able to send down
any one path (as the level of activation transmitted out along the
path is a function of the amount of activation received minus
the total number of paths connected to the node), and so the
slower the recall process is. In essence, this means that where the
fan effect occurs the amount of activation available for any one
pathway decreases, and the time taken to retrieve information
increases. The more facts that are linked to a given concept, the
longer it takes to recall any one fact associated with that concept
(Anderson and Reder, 1999).
Targets are recognized (or recalled) when a threshold level
of activation has been reached (Anderson, 1983a). The overall
amount of activation a given node receives predicts the amount
of time it will take to accurately recall the information contained
within that node (Anderson, 1983b). The level of activation that
a node receives can be considered as a product of the strength
of their associations. Nodes which are more closely or strongly
related to the source of activation receive more activation than
those which are further removed. In other words, as activation
spreads throughout the network, its strength decreases. As
Collins and Loftus (1975, p. 411) state “activation is like a signal
from a source that is attenuated as it travels outward.” In this way,
the level of activation of other nodes within the network varies
in terms of their degree of association to the source nodes. The
activation arriving from multiple sources at a single node will
sum. As such, information contained within any given node is
processed more quickly when multiple sources spread activation
to the target node (Anderson and Pirolli, 1984). Ultimately the
level of activation within a given area of the network predicts
the speed and accuracy with which information within that area
can be recalled (Anderson, 1983b). To illustrate, in Figure 1 the
information stored in nodes to the left of the vertical dotted
line is more likely to be recalled quickly and accurately than the
information stored in nodes on the right (all else being equal,
the activation received by nodes on the left is greater than that
received by those on the right). Individuals can also capitalize
upon the gathering of activation within specific areas of a network
by refocusing activation from the initial node to a more active
subnode to enable faster a spread of activation (see Anderson,
1983b for discussion).
Within spreading activation models of memory there has been
some debate around which factor ultimately predicts the time
taken to recall a target item. It has previously been assumed
that the time taken to recall an item is a function of the
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amount of time it takes activation to spread throughout the
network (Ratcliff and McKoon, 1981). In contrast, Anderson
(1983b) suggests that processing time can be explained as the
time taken for activation to reach a peak (an asymptotic level of
activation). This argument is based primarily on the findings of
priming studies (see Anderson, 1983b for discussion), and is a key
feature distinguishing Anderson’s (1983b) model of spreading
activation from other spreading activation models. The strength
of individual nodes and their associated links also contributes
to understanding of how some nodes reach higher levels of
activation sooner than others. One assumption of the fan effect
described above is that as a node becomes active, each path from
the concept node to its properties is equally activated. However,
data suggests that this might not always be the case. As stated
above, both Collins and Loftus (1975) and (Anderson, 1983a,b)
argue that the strength of the relationship (and so the distance
between) a node and the source of activation predicts how much
activation that node is likely to receive. As a result, it can be
assumed that not all concepts and links are of equal strength
(Anderson, 1983a,b). For example, Anderson (1983a) suggests
that activation is allocated among competing paths based upon
their relative strength. He gives the example of slower response
times for two-fan facts studied four times, when an alternative
has been studied more frequently, and takes this as the basis
for the argument that activation is allocated based upon the
relative strength of each possible pathway (see Anderson, 1983a
for further discussion).
Proponents of spreading activation theories of memory
generally agree that individual nodes vary in strength. A number
of explanations as to how this occurs have been put forward.
For example, node strength may be predicted by frequency of
exposure. When facts about concepts are studied and tested more
frequently, the individual nodes containing these facts (and their
associated memory traces) become stronger, resulting in faster,
more accurate recall. This strengthening effect occurs even when
practice sessions occur in quick succession (for further discussion
of practice effects see Anderson, 1983b; Tuckey and Brewer,
2003). Anderson (1983b) argues that once formed traces are
not lost, but their strength does decrease gradually over time.
In this way, Schacter (1999) suggests that spreading activation
theories of memory can go some way toward explaining what
he refers to as ‘the sin of transience,’ or gradual forgetting
over time. When not bolstered by the strengthening effects that
retrieval attempts can have, the associated memory traces begin to
gradually weaken, and so to become less accessible over time. On
the other hand, Tuckey and Brewer (2003) argue that the strength
of associative links is also in part determined by how schema-
consistent or inconsistent the items encoded are. For example,
aspects of an event that are schema consistent are more likely
to be rehearsed and so are more likely to be strongly encoding
than those that are schema inconsistent. This is supported by
their finding that schema inconsistent information shows greater
levels of decay than schema consistent information. Regardless
of the reason for their strength, stronger nodes are also able to
transmit and receive greater levels of activation, and thus allow
more activation to gather in areas of the network containing
stronger nodes (Anderson, 1983b). The implication of this for
retrieval processes is that the most salient cues are the ones which
are most likely to enable fast, accurate retrieval of information.
Spreading activation theory and self-generated cues
Spreading activation theories underpin the effectiveness of
retrieval cues based upon a number of key properties. As has been
previously discussed, a high-quality retrieval cue generally has
a strong association with the target memory, whilst also being
able to easily incorporate new related information as necessary.
These associations should also be bidirectional, whereby the cue
recalls the target information, and the target information recalls
the cue (Bellezza and Hoyt, 1992). When the effectiveness of a
retrieval cue is described in terms of these properties, then it is
clear that the spreading activation theory of memory is of critical
importance in explaining successful recall. We suggest that self-
generated cues offer the opportunity to maximize the benefit of
these properties, and briefly outline how this may be the case
below.
It is well-established that recall of one item can prompt
further recall of semantically related items (Collins and Loftus,
1975). This occurs through the spread of activation through the
associative links of the memory network. When the associative
links are stronger, then information is recalled faster and more
accurately. For example, when recall of a target word is cued by
a word more closely associated with the target then the target is
recalled faster, than when the target is cued by a word situated
further away in the network (Ratcliff and McKoon, 1981). The
benefit of strongly associated semantic clusters has also been
demonstrated through category clustering recall. In line with
the spreading activation theory, if memory is indeed organized
according to semantic similarity, then focusing on and recalling
information by semantic cluster is likely to produce enough
activation to cue associated items. When individuals are asked to
make a second or third recall attempt using category clustering
(i.e., attempting to recall further information one semantic
category at a time, for example person details, action details,
and so on), then recall improves without a cost to accuracy,
compared to recall attempts using other established mnemonic
techniques such as the change order mnemonic (Paulo et al.,
2016). The prime benefit of this approach is that it is relatively
intuitive; individuals often spontaneously encode, organize, and
recall information in semantic clusters (see Paulo et al., 2016 for
further discussion).
Although further research is needed to test these assumptions,
we propose that self-generated cues represent a prime
opportunity to capitalize upon the semantic organization of
memory. In allowing individuals to define their own semantic
clusters, we give individuals the opportunity to focus their
recall attempts on clusters most compatible with their own
encoding of the target material. Self-generated cues also present
the opportunity to cue recall using strong associative links. In
allowing individuals to generate their own cues we maximize the
opportunity to trigger activation from the point most critical
to the recall of the target material. For example, by allowing
individuals to select their own cues we can capitalize upon the
strongest associative links, and minimize the distance in the
network between cue and target.
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The importance of the bidirectionality of associative links
becomes apparent when we consider ‘recognition failure’; where
associative links do not have bidirectionality, then it is possible
that a target memory will not be selected in a recognition context
without the associated learned cue or context. Interestingly,
this means that individuals may be able to recall details of the
target memory given an associated concept that they are not
able to provide in a recognition task (Tulving and Thomson,
1973; Wiseman and Tulving, 1976). Similarly, where a cue and
target evoke each other with high frequency (e.g., tree cues oak,
and vice versa) then the target is recalled more quickly when a
cue is provided, than when a cue and target evoke each other
with low frequency (e.g., cloth cueing orlon, or vice versa).
Importantly, where the cue and target evoke each other with
equal frequency then either word can be used to prompt recall
of the other (i.e., it doesn’t matter which is presented as the
cue, and which as the target). In contrast, where there is an
imbalance in this strength of association, and so the cue evokes
the target at a higher frequency than the inverse (as with seafood-
shrimp; seafood evokes the word shrimp at a higher frequency
than shrimp does seafood), then reaction time varies significantly
dependent upon which word was used to cue which (Collins and
Loftus, 1975). This demonstrates the importance of bidirectional
relationships. We suggest that if self-generated cues do indeed
offer the opportunity to minimize the distance between cue and
target within the semantic network, then it is also plausible
that they can contribute to maximizing the bidirectionality of
associative links.
Encoding-Specificity Principle of Memory
Initially developed by Tulving and colleagues, the encoding-
specificity principle of memory (or encoding-retrieval specificity)
refers to the idea that retrieval cues are effective only to the
extent that information within the memory cue is also contained
within the target memory trace created at the time of encoding.
As Tulving and Thomson (1973, p. 353) note “what is stored
is determined by what is perceived and how it is encoded,
and what is stored determines what retrieval cues are effective
in providing access to what is stored.” Put another way, the
encoding-specificity principle of memory takes as its core the
idea that it is only possible to retrieve what has been stored in
memory, and that the way this information has been encoded
and stored governs the ways in which this information can be
retrieved (Tulving and Thomson, 1973).
Tulving and Thomson (1973) agreed with the principles
of memory outlined in spreading activation theories that: (a)
information within memory is stored as a memory trace; (b) a
memory trace is a collection of elements, features, or attributes
of the encoded information; and (c) that an encoding phase is
situated between the perception of an event, and the creation of
a memory trace. However, they viewed retrieval as a selective
process, relying on a complex interaction between encoded
information and features of the retrieval environment (Tulving
and Thomson, 1973). Tulving and Thomson (1973) argue
that it is well-established that identical information encoded
under different conditions can lead to differences in recall and
recognition performance. Likewise, the information present at
retrieval can greatly influence the recall and recognition of
items stored under identical encoding conditions. These findings,
as well as more general forgetting, can be explained through
encoding-specificity in terms of the accessibility of information
in memory; information may not be lost, so much as inaccessible
given the cues available at the time of the recall attempt (Brown
and Craik, 2000). Together, these ideas suggest that different cues
might make different memory traces more accessible than others,
which in turn raises the question of what constitutes an effective
retrieval cue.
Tulving and Thomson (1973) argue that the spreading
activation explanation of differences in recall performance as
being caused by differing strengths of memory traces is of little
practical value. Tulving and colleagues also suggest that the
benefit of a strong cue-target association is likely to be lost if
the cue is not also encoded alongside the target information (for
further discussion see Tulving and Osler, 1968; Thomson and
Tulving, 1970; Tulving and Thomson, 1973). If information is
not salient at the time of encoding, then it will not act as an
effective memory cue for the target, regardless of how central the
cue might be to the target in general terms (Brown and Craik,
2000). In essence, this means that the match between features of
recall and features of encoding is more important for a successful
retrieval attempt than the strength of the association between
the cue and the target information (Roediger and Guynn, 1996;
Pansky et al., 2005).
A number of studies have demonstrated support for this
concept. For example, across a series of three studies, Thomson
and Tulving (1970) demonstrated that when weakly associated
cues were encoded alongside target information, then strongly
associated cues provided at recall (but not at encoding) did not
facilitate retrieval of the target information. In addition, Higham
(2002) found strongly associated retrieval cues not presented at
encoding produced less correctly recalled information and more
incorrect recall than weakly associated cues which had been
previously presented at study. Furthermore, Rosenbluth-Mor
(2001 cited in Pansky et al., 2005) found that weakly associated
cues presented at both encoding and retrieval facilitated recall
in comparison to a no cue control, whereas presenting a
new (not seen at encoding) weakly associated cue at retrieval
impaired performance in comparison to a no cue control. Taken
together, these findings demonstrate that mismatch between
encoding and retrieval cues impairs recall, rather than the more
conventional view that increasing the match improves recall
(Pansky et al., 2005). It is, however, important to note that
this view is not universally shared by researchers. For example,
research has shown that an encoding-retrieval mismatch has a
more detrimental effect on those with high working memory
capacity than those of low working memory capacity. It has
been suggested that this effect is seen because individuals with
high working memory capacity are more likely to encode
information strategically, and to utilize these strategies at recall,
and so experience a decline in performance when their planned
strategies are disrupted (Unsworth et al., 2011). In addition, some
researchers have found means of improving recall performance
using strongly associated cues not presented at the time of
encoding (see Higham, 2002, for discussion of this).
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It is not the case that the encoding-specificity principle ignores
the role that semantic relationships between cues and items to be
recalled can play. Rather, this is seen as a part of the cognitive
encoding environment. For example, when encoding a wordlist
for later recall we can assume that information is encoded about
the appearance of a given word in the present context. This might
or might not include encoding information about the semantic
relationships between wordlist items: if so then another item
on the wordlist might constitute an effective retrieval cue, if
not then this will not be the case (see Tulving and Thomson,
1973 for empirical support for these claims). In addition, where
target words are encoded alongside cue words, there is often
an assumption that these cues will reappear at test, and as such
the cue word forms part of the context in which the target is
encoded. This means that the target memory trace cannot always
be readily accessed in a recognition context, where the memory
cue provided consists solely of the target word itself without
the associated encoding context. This is termed ‘recognition
failure’ (see Wiseman and Tulving, 1976 for further discussion
of recognition failure).
It should be noted that the encoding-specificity principle
and the spreading activation theory are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Anderson (1983b) argues that the findings of encoding-
specificity studies (such as Tulving and Thomson, 1973) can
still be incorporated into a spreading activation framework.
In particular, when a cue has multiple possible interpretations
(e.g., the word ‘jam’ might be interpreted differently dependent
upon whether it is presented alongside the associated word
‘raspberry’ or ‘traffic’), then the encoding context determines
which interpretation is encoded (potentially alongside other cues
from the encoding context itself). At retrieval, context can then
be used to determine the appropriate interpretation to activate,
and the activation spreads from this point out into the network.
The probability of recall or recognition is therefore higher when
the same interpretation is selected at both encoding and retrieval,
thus allowing activation to spread directly from the node directly
linked to the memory trace and reducing levels of activation sent
down pathways linked to alternative interpretations.
Encoding-specificity and self-generated cues
As previously noted, the encoding-specificity principle of
memory and spreading activation theory are not mutually
exclusive. Context can be used to activate appropriate concepts
within memory (Anderson, 1983b), and facilitate the spread
of activation through a memory network (Hershkowitz et al.,
2002). Research around the generation of cues for the self versus
another individual suggests that self-generated cues contain more
idiosyncratic episodic details than cues generated by, or for use
by, others. The latter tend to contain more generic, semantic
details (Mäntylä, 1986; Mäntylä and Nilsson, 1988). Interestingly,
cues generated by older adults to cue their own memory also
tend to show this same generic focus (Mäntylä and Bäckman,
1990). In addition, when learners recall an incorrect target in
response to a self-generated cue this seems to be driven by a
strong associative relationship between the cue and the incorrect
response (Tullis, 2013). Taken together, these findings suggest
that spreading activation can be considered as a ‘back-up’ route
in cue generation, seemingly forming a default option when
cognitive resources are low, or when recall via a more efficient
means (such as encoding-specificity or cue distinctiveness) has
failed. In this sense, spreading activation theory can essentially
be viewed as the foundation upon which effective retrieval
cues, whether generated by the self or another, can be built,
with encoding-specificity and cue distinctiveness providing an
additional benefit beyond this default route.
The encoding-specificity principle of memory suggests that
good quality retrieval cues have a high level of overlap between
encoding and retrieval. This allows cues generated at encoding
to be reproduced at retrieval reliably and consistently. These
qualities, combined with the benefit of semantic clustering, make
for highly effective retrieval techniques. For example, while the
category clustering recall technique previously outlined allows
recall to be cued using strongly associated semantic clusters, this
technique also provides the additional benefit of framing recall
in an encoding compatible manner. The same benefit is provided
by self-generated cues; indeed, we would suggest that this benefit
is magnified in the case of self-generated cues. According to the
principle of encoding-retrieval specificity, effective cueing relies
on a knowledge of the most salient aspects of information to be
recalled. If this is the case then it follows logically that the best
cues are generated by the self to guide recall, rather than by an
other.
Cue Distinctiveness
Overall, the idea that the same material may be encoded
differently in a different cognitive context, resulting in different
routes through which to access the information, lies at the heart
of the encoding-specificity principle of memory. Yet, Tulving and
Thomson (1973) also highlight the influence of other, somewhat
indefinable factors. They demonstrate that an additional factor
is likely to operate alongside the properties of an encoded
item, and that this unknown factor further impacts upon the
chance of successful retrieval. As Nairne (2002) states, even when
we ensure a nominal match between encoding and retrieval
(e.g., through use of identical cues), this does not guarantee a
functional match between the cue and the memory trace for
the target item. Therefore, despite the widely accepted beliefs
that once encoding has been completed it is the match between
encoding and retrieval conditions that is the primary predictor
of memory performance, data from memory studies (see Nairne,
2002) suggest that there must be other factors also at play.
One candidate which may help to explain the differences in
recall performance not captured by encoding-specificity, is cue
distinctiveness1.
Nairne (2002, p. 390) considers the process of remembering
to be “an active process of discrimination” during which we
use retrieval cues to guide us toward viable retrieval candidates.
1It should be noted that some researchers distinguish between the terms ‘unique’
and ‘distinctive’ (see Mäntylä and Nilsson, 1983 for discussion of this). While we
agree with Mäntylä and Nilsson (1983) that a careful conceptual analysis of these
terms is needed, this is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, throughout this
manuscript we use the terms unique and distinctive interchangeably to describe a
retrieval cue which recalls one particular memory at the exclusion of others, and as
such can be considered to have diagnostic value.
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He argues that although the encoding-specificity principle of
memory is of some practical value, its theoretical relevance is
limited. The rationale behind this claim is that the relationship
between encoding and retrieval is correlational rather than
causal. Instead Nairne (2002) argues that cue distinctiveness has
a stronger influence on retrieval. Increasing the overlap between
encoding and retrieval benefits recall through increasing the
probability that distinctive features unique to the target will be
utilized. He is not alone in this belief; it has been suggested that
a key property of an effective retrieval cue is discriminability
(Bellezza and Hoyt, 1992). Retrieval cues which are distinct
from each other are more likely to prompt the recall of target
information, and more likely to result in the recall of verbatim,
rather than gist-based information (Anderson, 1983a; Anderson
and Reder, 1999; Tuckey and Brewer, 2003). Cue distinctiveness
is based upon similar principles.
Cue distinctiveness (or an absence of cue overload) refers
to whether a cue is uniquely associated with a target memory.
If a cue is linked to multiple memory traces (and so is
‘overloaded’), then it becomes more difficult for that cue to
activate the current target trace. This clearly will reduce the
effectiveness of the cue in facilitating recall of the target
information (Watkins and Watkins, 1975). In other words, a
retrieval cue is useful only to the extent that it provides diagnostic
information about the occurrence of a target item (Pansky et al.,
2005). Cue distinctiveness is also entwined with the encoding
process. Encoding information in ways that lead to a more
precise memory trace, and in doing so separating one encoding
experience from others contained within memory, facilitates
recall. Distinctiveness is critical to this process (see Schmidt,
1991, for a review of the distinctiveness literature). When unique
elements of an event (those which do not overlap with other
events) are encoded, then these elements form a unique identifier
for the target event, and so increase the likelihood that it can
be discriminated from other events stored in memory. Where
this distinct element is available at retrieval then the unique cue
reinstates the original memory trace, provided that the context
(of the distinctive element) is the same (Hunt and Smith, 1996).
Most researchers currently favor a two-factor account, which
accepts that both encoding-retrieval match (encoding-specificity)
and cue overload (or cue distinctiveness) combine to influence
memory performance. However, Nairne (2002) argues that this
approach impedes our ability to make practical predictions about
memory performance. He gives an example of trying to recall a
target event (E1) from a series of events (E2, E3, and so on). If
a participant is cued with an event feature unique to the target
event (feature X1), then this is likely to facilitate recall. However,
if the feature used as a cue was present for events one, two, and
three (E1, E2, E3), then this cue (feature X2) loses its diagnostic
value, making it more difficult to discriminate the target event
memory from other competing event memories. In this case, we
can reasonably expect recall performance to decline. In short,
memory performance is equal to the match between cue (X1) and
target (E1) and declines as the number of items associated with
cue (X1) increases (Nairne, 2002). The critical aspect of the cue
distinctiveness principle then is that cue-target match is necessary
but not sufficient for accurate retrieval. Nairne (2002) and other
advocates of the benefit of cue distinctiveness (e.g., Moscovitch
and Craik, 1976) accept that retrieval cues are effective only if they
match the memory trace of the target item (as in the encoding-
specificity principle of memory), but suggest that diagnostic cues,
which specify a single target item and exclude others, are key in
predicting recall performance. In other words, if a retrieval cue is
specific to the encoded event, then this is more likely to result in
accurate recall than a more generic cue, and it is this diagnostic
value that is key (Nairne, 2002; Goh and Lu, 2012).
Several studies have shown support for cue distinctiveness
as a predictor of recall performance. For example, Moscovitch
and Craik (1976, Experiments 2 and 3) manipulated the number
of targets paired with a cue, and the similarity of this cue to
others encoded. Participants encoded questions as cues alongside
target words, and were then asked to recall the target words
given the question cue. When cues were shared among a set
of 10 targets, recall performance was lower than when each
target was prompted by a distinct cue question. This is consistent
with other research (e.g., Watkins and Watkins, 1975) and with
well-documented effects such as the list length effect. However,
Moscovitch and Craik’s findings suggest that this effect was not
universal across all stimuli (for example semantically encoded
words, or items associated with a positive response to the
cue question). In addition, they noted that recall of rhyme-
encoded words showed little decline in response to the shared
cue manipulation. They argue that this suggests that there are
‘levels’ of distinctiveness, and that surface level distinctiveness is
of little importance in comparison to more meaningful forms
of distinctiveness. In order to test this hypothesis, Goh and
Lu (2012), manipulated both encoding-retrieval match and the
degree of cue overload in a 2 (overload: high, low) 2 (encoding-
retrieval match: high, low) design. In each condition participants
learned a list of word pairs and were later tested on these pairs
in a cued recall task. In high encoding-retrieval match conditions
participants were provided with the originally encoded cue word,
alongside a second cue of the semantic category the target word
belonged to. In low encoding-retrieval match conditions, only
the originally encoded cue was provided. To manipulate cue
overload, Goh and Lu (2012) ensured that the semantic category
cue provided at test applied to several (in some cases all) of the
words learned at encoding (high cue overload) or was unique to
the target word (low cue overload). Goh and Lu’s (2012) results
suggest that high encoding-retrieval match does not necessarily
facilitate recall, showing instead that high encoding-retrieval
match improves performance only when cue overload is low
(see Brandimonte and Passolunghi, 1994, for similar support of
cue-distinctiveness in a prospective memory task).
Cue distinctiveness and self-generated cues
The principles of encoding-specificity and cue distinctiveness
can be difficult to disentangle in terms of their contribution to
the effectiveness of retrieval cues, and of self-generated cues in
particular. It is clear, however, that cue distinctiveness adds to
the effectiveness of cues with a high degree of encoding-retrieval
overlap. For example, while the effectiveness of a cue which has
a high level of overlap with the target, and contains idiosyncratic
details about the encoding context can be understood in terms
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of encoding-specificity, maintaining this advantage can be seen
as a product of cue distinctiveness. In other words, the best
retrieval cues are those which emphasize distinctive aspects
of the target, resulting in increased consistency with which
targets are produced in response to cues over a longer retention
interval. Where this consistency is lost, we see increased encoding
variability, and poorer memory performance over time (Watkins
and Watkins, 1975; Mäntylä and Bäckman, 1990; Anderson and
Reder, 1999). Asking learners to focus specifically on distinctive
aspects of the to-be-recalled information during encoding results
in self-generated cues which maximize distinctiveness in a way
that is unaffected by changes in context (reduced levels of
encoding-retrieval match), and in turn ensures that levels of
performance are maintained over time (Mäntylä and Nilsson,
1988). In addition, the idiosyncratic nature of self-generated
cues means that one individual’s cues that are given to another
individual at test would be unlikely to benefit their performance,
even if the same information had been presented at encoding.
This additional benefit of cue distinctiveness beyond merely
cue-target overlap demonstrates the separate qualities that cue
distinctiveness and encoding-specificity bring to effective self-
generated cues. Cue distinctiveness is naturally maximized where
cues are self-generated. Where individuals generate cues for use
by others, they tend to revert back to more general, semantic,
gist-based aspects of the target information, rather than the
more specific idiosyncratic episodic details incorporated into self-
generated cues. In this way, self-generated retrieval cues capitalize
upon cue distinctiveness, and so maximize the effectiveness of the
cue (Mäntylä, 1986; Hunt and Smith, 1996).
CONCLUSION
Successful recall of information from memory is often dependent
upon the provision of retrieval cues. Retrieval cues might form
part of the retrieval context, and can be self or other-generated
(Pansky et al., 2005). In line with the spreading activation
theory of memory, and the principles of encoding-specificity,
and cue distinctiveness, effective retrieval cues are often strongly
associated with the target item, have a strong cue-target overlap,
and differentiate between different items stored within memory
(Bellezza and Hoyt, 1992; Tullis and Benjamin, 2015a). Based
upon the literature discussed, we argue that if self-generated
cues are taken to be cues containing details salient to the
individual, and actively generated by the individual themselves,
which serve to facilitate more complete retrieval of a target
memory, and as such represent the critical properties of the target
memory, then it follows logically that self-generated retrieval
cues represent our best opportunity to capitalize upon these
three principles of memory. In particular, it is in relation to
the principle of cue distinctiveness that self-generated cues offer
an advantage over other mnemonic techniques (e.g., Mental
Reinstatement of Context). While other-generated cues rely
heavily upon more general, semantic, gist-based aspects of the
target information, self-generated cues are able to incorporate
more specific idiosyncratic episodic details to maximize the
diagnostic value of a cue (Nairne, 2002). This important when
it is considered that the benefits of context-based cues become
more apparent only when more effective cues are unavailable. In
other words, the benefit of context-based mnemonic approaches
can be overshadowed if individuals are able to provide their own
cues (Pansky et al., 2005).
Overall, the literature discussed suggests that self-generated
cues represent an effective and viable mnemonic technique
which can aid recall in a variety of settings. The high level of
compatibility of self-generated cues with individual requirements
and abilities means they do not require complex training or
regular practice to be used effectively. As a result, we suggest
that self-generated cues represent a promising development in
episodic memory domains. Throughout the preceding discussion
we have speculated on the effectiveness of self-generated cues,
however, further research is needed to establish the extent of
the contribution self-generated cues are able to make to the
field. In particular, future research should seek to replicate
existing findings on the benefit of self-generated cues, especially
in comparison to other mnemonic techniques such as Mental
Reinstatement of Context, or category clustering techniques.
Future research is also needed to extend current knowledge of
the most effective means of self-generating retrieval cues. For
example, through establishing the qualities of an effective cue
generation technique, and by contrasting existing methods of
cue generation. Future research should also seek to establish
the boundary conditions of effective self-generated cues. For
instance, under what conditions are self-generated cues most
effective, or what impact does varying the delay between
encoding, cue generation, and recall have upon retrieval. It
may also be of interest to investigate whether use of self-
generated cues improve item memory, but reduce memory for
context as has been shown with the generation effect (Mulligan,
2004; Mulligan et al., 2006). It is also important to establish
the potential implications of use of self-generated cues in a
variety of settings, for example in eyewitness testimony contexts,
educational settings, and during collaborative learning and recall.
Throughout this article we have also speculated on how spreading
activation theories, the encoding-specificity principle of memory,
and cue distinctiveness each contribute to the effectiveness of self-
generated cues. While we acknowledge that these principles are
often strongly intertwined, we believe that it would be beneficial
for future research to address which of the mechanisms outlined
contributes most strongly to the success of self-generated cue
techniques.
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Autobiographical memory forms a network of memories about personal experiences
that defines and supports well-being and effective functioning of the self in various ways.
During the last three decades, there have been two characteristics of autobiographical
memory that have received special interest regarding their role in psychological well-
being and psychopathology, namely memory specificity and memory coherence.
Memory specificity refers to the extent to which retrieved autobiographical memories
are specific (i.e., memories about a particular experience that happened on a particular
day). Difficulty retrieving specific memories interferes with effective functioning of
the self and is related to depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Memory
coherence refers to the narrative expression of the overall structure of autobiographical
memories. It has likewise been related to psychological well-being and the occurrence
of psychopathology. Research on memory specificity and memory coherence has
developed as two largely independent research domains, even though they show
much overlap. This raises some important theoretical questions. How do these two
characteristics of autobiographical memory relate to each other, both theoretically
and empirically? Additionally, how can the integration of these two facilitate our
understanding of the importance of autobiographical memory for the self? In this article,
we give a critical overview of memory specificity and memory coherence and their
relation to the self. We link both features of autobiographical memory by describing
some important similarities and by formulating hypotheses about how they might relate
to each other. By situating both memory specificity and memory coherence within
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s Self-Memory System, we make a first attempt at a
theoretical integration. Finally, we suggest some new and exciting research possibilities
and explain how both research fields could benefit from integration in future research.
Keywords: autobiographical memory, memory specificity, memory coherence, self, Self-Memory System
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INTRODUCTION
Research has consistently demonstrated the intricate relationship
between autobiographical memory and the self. Different features
of autobiographical memories contribute to well-being and
effective functioning of the self in various ways and some of
these memory characteristics show some overlap. In this paper,
we will focus on two features of autobiographical memories
in particular: memory specificity and memory coherence.
Research on these two features developed rather independently
throughout the past three decades. This is, in our opinion,
quite surprising since there seem to be similarities between
both when comparing both literatures. Memory specificity and
memory coherence show, for example, similar associations to
well-being and psychopathology. They also show a quite similar
developmental pathway throughout childhood and adolescence.
These similarities make us wonder how they might relate to
each other and how they both relate to the self. Integrating
both research domains offers, in our opinion, new and exciting
possibilities for future research. The goal of this paper is therefore
to point out the exciting research possibilities that can come
from integrating coherence and specificity and explain why and
how both research fields could benefit from such integration in
future research. First, we will focus on the relationship between
autobiographical memory and the self, after which we will
give a brief overview of the literature on memory specificity
and memory coherence and how they relate to the self. We
will also point to some remaining questions and limitations
within both research fields. Then, we will link both features
of autobiographical memory by describing some important
similarities and by formulating hypotheses about how they might
relate to each other. We will make a first attempt at a theoretical
integration by positioning both memory specificity and memory
coherence within Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s Self-Memory
System. Finally, we will suggest some new and exciting research
possibilities and we will describe in more detail how integrating
both in future research could be beneficial for research on both
memory specificity and memory coherence. Throughout this
paper, we will refer to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s Self-Memory
System (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) to illustrate the
reciprocal and intricate relationship between autobiographical
memory and the self. Although the Self-Memory System is just
one of many available theoretical models, we have chosen this
model because it offers an interesting theoretical framework to
look at how memory specificity and memory coherence could
potentially be integrated.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY AND
THE SELF
Autobiographical memories are memories about personally
experienced events that go beyond the mere factual description
of the event to include personal beliefs, thoughts, and emotions
(Bruner, 1990; Fivush, 2010). Together they form a network
of memories called autobiographical memory, which contains
personal information that make up a person’s unique life story
(Fivush et al., 2011). The structure of this integrative network
is illustrated in Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s Self-Memory
System (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al.,
2004). An individual’s personal life story consists of different
layers of autobiographical memories that are represented in
the autobiographical knowledge base and the episodic memory
system: life story schema, lifetime periods, general events, and
event-specific knowledge. These categories are ordered in a
hierarchy going from general to specific personal information.
Life story schema is a mental representation of major components
of a person’s life and represents the individual’s understanding
of how one’s life story is constructed within the culture one
lives in. Lifetime periods represent certain periods in a person’s
life with a clear beginning and ending that have distinctive
thematic features (e.g., my time at the University of Leuven).
General events are more specific than lifetime periods and
are composed of clusters of repeated events or sequences of
related events that share a certain theme (e.g., driving to
class in the mornings). Accessing one memory of a general
event triggers others that are comprised within the same
or related clusters. Finally, event-specific knowledge refers to
perceptual and sensory-rich information about single personal
experiences (e.g., my thesis defense). Autobiographical memories
are retrieved through the consecutive activation of these three
categories, with more general information at the top layers
triggering related information at the more specific levels (Conway
and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004). Together, the
personal information that is stored in these different hierarchical
layers represents who we are, were, and can be in the future
(Conway, 2005).
Autobiographical memory supports well-being and effective
functioning of the self in different ways. Before we describe the
role of autobiographical memory for the self in more detail, we
will take a closer look at how the self can be conceptualized. In
the Self-Memory System of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, the self
is represented by three separate constructs that interact with each
other: the working self, the conceptual self and the long-term self
(see Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004). The
working self consists of a hierarchy of current personal goals that
are thought to guide cognitions, emotions, and behavior toward
achieving these goals. Personal experiences are organized and
evaluated in function of their correspondence to current goals.
The result of this evaluation determines which experiences will be
more likely to be encoded and later recalled by favoring personal
events that are in accordance to one’s goals. The long-term self
contains more permanent information about the self that is
required for the working self to organize and evaluate personal
experiences. One aspect of the long-term self is the conceptual
self, which consists of attitudes, values, beliefs, relational schemas
etc. Besides the conceptual self, the long-term self also includes
the autobiographical knowledge base, which we discussed earlier.
The working self, conceptual self, and long-term self interact
and by doing so, influence the formation of autobiographical
memories.
The previous seems to indicate that autobiographical memory
and the self share an intricate and reciprocal relationship. The
self mediates the formation of autobiographical memories and
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controls their accessibility. Conversely, autobiographical memory
serves the self in many different ways (see Bluck and Alea, 2002;
Fivush, 2011; or Pillemer, 1992 for a more detailed overview).
First of all, autobiographical memories provide a sense of
continuity through time for the individual; the idea that one is
the same person now as in the past and will be in the future.
Even if one changes, these changes are explained and understood
through experiences of growth that lead to new perspectives on
self. Second, autobiographical memory facilitates the creation
and maintenance of a social network through reminiscing with
others. Third, memories about past personal experiences guide
our current and future behavior. Fourth and final, by constructing
memories about negative or stressful experiences and integrating
these memories within a broader framework, autobiographical
memory facilitates the process of coping with and resolving
negative emotions (Fivush, 2011). These self-serving functions
of autobiographical memory all contribute to well-being (Fivush,
2011).
Single autobiographical memories consist of different
features, like the amount of detail they entail, their emotional
intensity, structural characteristics, etc. Research on how specific
characteristics of personal memories contribute to well-being
enhances our understanding of how autobiographical memory
relates to the self. In this paper, we take a closer look at two
particular features of autobiographical memories and how
they both relate to the self: memory specificity and memory
coherence.
MEMORY SPECIFICITY
During the last three decades, one particular characteristic
of autobiographical memory, namely memory specificity, has
been an important topic of research. Memory specificity is
usually operationalized as the ability to retrieve specific personal
memories following emotional cue words. For a personal
memory to be considered specific, it has to consist of a particular
event that happened at a particular time and place and did not
last longer than 1 day (Williams and Broadbent, 1986). The whole
memory specificity literature can be brought back to a rather
coincidental observation by Williams and Broadbent (1986).
They found that, compared to a healthy control group, depressed
and suicidal individuals showed difficulty retrieving specific
personal memories following emotional cue words (a paradigm
that is now commonly referred to as the Autobiographical
Memory Test or AMT). Instead of retrieving specific memories
as instructed, they responded more frequently with overgeneral
memories such as categorical memories (i.e., the memory
refers to a class of generic events) or extended memories (i.e.,
the described event lasted longer than 1 day) (Williams and
Broadbent, 1986). This phenomenon is referred to as Overgeneral
Autobiographical Memory or OGM. When asked to recall a
specific memory following the cue-word ‘happy,’ someone who
has a tendency to recall overgeneral memories would say for
instance ‘Whenever I’m on vacation’ instead of giving a more
specific answer like ‘I felt happy last Saturday night when I went
to the movies with my best friend.’
As we mentioned earlier, autobiographical memory serves the
self in four different ways; it helps us guide future behavior, form
and maintain a social network, create a continuous sense of self
and cope with negative emotions and experiences (Pillemer, 1992;
Bluck and Alea, 2002; Fivush et al., 2003; Fivush, 2011). These
four functions all have been found to relate to psychological and
physical well-being (Fivush, 2011). To explain the importance
of the specificity of autobiographical memories for the self, we
consecutively describe the way memory specificity is involved in
these four functions.
Self-Guidance
Memory specificity supports effective functioning of the self by
guiding current and future behavior. For instance, when faced
with a problem, being able to recall a specific past event facilitates
problem solving since knowledge about past solutions can be
transferred to the current situation. In other words, being able
to recall a specific past experience that is similar to the current
situation and the details about how the past situation was dealt
with enhances problem solving of the current situation (Evans
et al., 1992; Goddard et al., 1996, 1997; Scott et al., 2000; Raes
et al., 2005). Difficulty recalling specific memories therefore
hinders problem solving. Additionally, difficulty remembering
specific past experiences also relates to difficulty picturing specific
future events and setting goals for the future (Belcher and Kangas,
2014). Not being able to imagine specific future happenings has
been found to evoke feelings of hopelessness (Evans et al., 1992;
Williams et al., 1996).
Self-in-Relation
Sharing autobiographical memories with others facilitates the
formation and maintenance of a social network. It is assumed
that people develop close and intimate relationships with others
by sharing specific personal memories (Alea and Bluck, 2003). In
order to really get to know someone, sharing specific personal
memories is important, since these memories reveal the person’s
unique life story (e.g., unique adventures or obstacles they
encountered throughout their life) (Habermas and Bluck, 2000).
By doing this, the individual differentiates oneself from others
(Beike et al., 2016). Research has indeed shown that sharing
specific personal memories increases intimacy and closeness.
People report feeling more intimate to the conservation partner
and experiencing a more positive mood after conversations
in which specific memories were shared (e.g., Pasupathi and
Carstensen, 2003; Alea and Bluck, 2007). This relationship
between intimacy and sharing specific memories appears to be
bidirectional, since feeling close to someone facilitates sharing
specific personal memories. Feelings of intimacy and closeness
create a safe context to disclose specific personal information,
which in turn increases intimacy (Beike et al., 2016). However, a
recent study by Beike et al. (2016) has shown that sharing specific
personal memories does not increase intimacy and closeness
more than disclosing general personal information does. So, the
act of sharing personal information in itself appears to be more
important for creating close relationships with others than the
nature (specific versus general) of the information.
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Self-Identity
Besides guiding future behavior and facilitating social
interactions, memory specificity is also involved in creating
a stable sense of self. Autobiographical memory represents
someone’s unique personal history that defines who one is
across time. Recalling specific personal experiences plays an
important role in creating a continuous sense of self (Bluck and
Habermas, 2000), which is considered a crucial developmental
task during adolescence (Erikson, 1968; McAdams, 1985). By
interpreting, evaluating, and linking together different specific
personal experiences that are believed to be significant to
understand who one is, a sense of self evolves. This refers to the
process of autobiographical reasoning, which facilitates identity
development (Bluck and Habermas, 2000; Habermas and Bluck,
2000; Fivush et al., 2011). However, studies directly examining
the influence of memory specificity on identity development
are rather scarce. It is, nonetheless, reasonable to assume that
difficulty recalling specific personal experiences would have an
influence on one’s sense of self. If someone is unable to recall
specific memories that are unique to the person and differentiate
oneself from others, it is plausible to assume that this would be
associated with a less profound and stable sense of self. Some
studies on autobiographical memory in patients with Alzheimer’s
disease and certain personality disorders seem to support this
hypothesis. Alzheimer’s disease is for example characterized
by deficits in recalling personal memories (including specific
memories), which leads to an impaired sense of self and identity
(see El Haj et al., 2015). Additionally, there seems to be a negative
association between identity confusion and memory specificity in
patients with Borderline Personality Disorder (Van den Broeck,
2014), and patients with Dissociative Identity Disorder show
signs of overgeneral autobiographical memory as well (Huntjens
et al., 2014). Research specifically addressing the influence of
overgeneral autobiographical memory on sense of self and
identity development would be a valuable addition to these
findings.
Self-Regulation
Being able to recall specific personal memories contributes to
aspects of psychological well-being and effective functioning
of the self, as demonstrated earlier. Additionally, research has
shown that overgeneral autobiographical memory contributes
to the development of psychological problems like depression
and post-traumatic stress disorder (see Sumner et al., 2010
or Williams et al., 2007 for reviews). When individuals
experience negative emotions or events, they have to regulate
and resolve them in order to move on. If these self-regulatory
processes are insufficient or maladaptive, the individual is
at risk to develop psychological problems. Different emotion
regulation strategies relate to the presence of overgeneral
autobiographical memory and can explain the relationship
between overgenerality and psychopathology, which we will
discuss in more detail later on. First, we take a closer look at the
association between overgeneral autobiographical memory and
psychopathology.
Research has shown that patients who suffer from depression
or PTSD have more difficulty recalling specific memories
following emotional cues than healthy controls. More specifically,
studies have shown that overgeneral autobiographical memory
can predict the course and onset of depression over and above
initial depressive symptoms (Sumner et al., 2010). This difficulty
retrieving specific memories remains present whilst in remission.
In other words, overgeneral memory appears to be a steady
characteristic of depressed and formerly depressed individuals
(see Williams et al., 2007 or Sumner et al., 2010 for a review).
This tendency to recall general rather than specific memories
has likewise been observed in individuals suffering from PTSD.
Patients who suffer from PTSD show difficulty retrieving specific
memories related to the trauma they experienced and over
time this difficulty expands to unrelated memories as well (e.g.,
Kuyken and Brewin, 1995; Williams et al., 2007). Additionally,
overgeneral autobiographical memory is able to predict PTSD
diagnosis following a traumatic experience (Kleim and Ehlers,
2008).
It is commonly assumed that overgeneral memory is not a
general characteristic of psychopathology, but that it is specific
to affective disorders like depression and PTSD (Williams et al.,
2007). Patients who suffer from generalized anxiety disorder,
OCD, or specific phobias for example do not exhibit difficulty
retrieving specific memories (Burke and Mathews, 1992; Wilhelm
et al., 1997; Wessel et al., 2001; Wenzel et al., 2002, 2003). The
same applies to eating disorders (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2003)
and personality disorders like borderline personality disorder
(e.g., Van den Broeck et al., 2015). When overgeneral memory
is observed in other psychological disorders, it can usually be
explained by comorbid depressive symptomatology (Sumner
et al., 2010; but see Ridout et al., 2015).
Different mechanisms can explain the development of
overgeneral autobiographical memory. Williams and colleagues
(Williams, 2006; Williams et al., 2007) developed a theoretical
model (CaR-Fa-X model) that focuses on three underlying
mechanisms that are thought to explain the development of
overgeneral memory and how it relates to psychopathology;
rumination, functional avoidance, and impaired executive
functioning. When trying to recall a specific event, an individual
will start his search at the most general level of autobiographical
memory and carry on to the level of event-specific knowledge.
Different mechanisms can interrupt this search, whether or
not in interaction with each other, and lead to overgeneral
memory. Ruminating, or continuously dwelling over one’s sad
or depressive feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), can disrupt the
search for specific memories. When searching for a specific
memory, an individual with a negative self-concept could
activate a general memory about him- or herself that triggers
ruminative thinking about the memory and the personal
value of it. While ruminating about this general memory,
the individual will not continue the search for a specific
memory. Repeated ruminating can result over time in the
development of overgeneral autobiographical memory. Besides
rumination, functional avoidance of the potentially negative
and overwhelming emotions memories can evoke, also plays a
role in the development of overgeneral memory. By avoiding
to recall specific personal experiences, intentional or otherwise,
one protects oneself from the associated emotions. By not
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being confronted with the potential negative and painful
emotions related to the memory, the avoidant behavior will
be negatively reinforced, increasing the likelihood of avoiding
specific memories in the future. The avoidant behavior can
generalize to other memories and eventually lead to overgeneral
memory. So, the functional avoidance mechanism could be seen
as a means of affect regulation that could be beneficial in the short
term, but maladaptive over time. Finally, the search from general
lifetime periods to event-specific knowledge requires sufficient
executive capacities. When asked to recall a specific memory, the
individual has to be able to inhibit non-related autobiographical
knowledge and hold the final result of the search in his or her
working memory. Affective disorders like depression are often
characterized by reduced executive functioning, which hinders
the search.
The role these mechanisms play in the development of
overgeneral autobiographical memory has been repeatedly
studied over the past two decades. Although several studies
support the claims and predictions of the CaR-Fa-X model, there
are studies that fail to replicate these findings (see Valentino,
2011; Sumner, 2012; or Williams et al., 2007 for reviews).
Summary and Discussion
More than three decennia of research on memory specificity
has demonstrated the important role memory specificity
plays in psychopathology and the mechanisms that underlie
this relationship. To recapitulate, individuals suffering from
depression and PTSD have been found to experience
difficulty recalling specific personal memories compared to
healthy controls. It has been theorized that three different
mechanisms are responsible for the development of overgeneral
autobiographical memory; rumination, functional avoidance
and impaired executive capacities. However, the field of
memory specificity is not without limitations. Since the original
observation by Williams and Broadbent (1986), different research
labs started focusing on this surprising cognitive phenomenon
by implementing the same emotional cueing design, which is
now commonly referred to as the Autobiographical Memory
Test (AMT). The memory specificity literature is therefore
originally based upon one particular paradigm instead of
theoretical considerations. This paradigm-driven nature of the
memory specificity literature created methodological benefits
by facilitating comparisons between studies from different
research groups, but it also raised some important theoretical
questions. The most important question, in our opinion, being
what the AMT actually measures. How Williams and Broadbent
originally operationalized specific memories in the instructions
of the AMT as being “memories about a particular event that
happened on a particular day and did not last longer than
1 day” does not correspond to the way specific memories are
defined in the Self-Memory System (Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). Conway and Pleydell-Pearce define specific
memories or ‘event-specific knowledge’ as detailed information
about individual events that are particularly rich in perceptual
and sensory information. No limitations about the duration
of the event are imposed. More research seems necessary to
examine what the AMT exactly measures and how this can
best be fitted within the Self-Memory System of Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce.
MEMORY COHERENCE
As we mentioned earlier, autobiographical memories contain
various features that relate to different aspects of psychological
well-being. In addition to their specificity, autobiographical
memories also differ in their overall internal structure, i.e.,
memory coherence. In this paper, we depart from the
multidimensional model developed by Reese et al. (2011).
This model states that personal memories can be considered
coherent if three conditions are met; (1) the memory contains
information about when and where the events took place, (2)
the events are described in a logical and chronological order
and (3) the memory consists of a highpoint and resolution,
along with affective and evaluative information (Reese et al.,
2011). These criteria show that memory coherence goes beyond
the mere structural aspects of autobiographical memories to
include a qualification of the emotional representation of the
events. These three conditions of memory coherence represent
three separate subcomponents or dimensions; respectively
contextual, chronological and thematic coherence (Reese et al.,
2011). Memory coherence is usually assessed by asking
individuals to narrate about a personal experience (either
orally or on paper), after which these narratives are coded
for their coherence by an independent rater using one of
the available coding schemes. Similar to memory specificity,
memory coherence is related to well-being and effective
functioning of the self in various ways. In what follows,
we describe how memory coherence is associated with the
self, but first we illustrate the concept a bit more with an
example.
“The 50th wedding anniversary of my grandparents about 6 months
ago was definitely one of the happiest moments of my life. They
threw a big party at their house. When we arrived, we all got
a copy of their original wedding picture with the schedule of the
evening on the back. They renewed their vows during a ceremony
in the garden, which is next to a beautiful lake. It looked so
beautiful and romantic! My grandpa gave a beautiful speech, which
made me very emotional. Afterward, we all had dinner and my
grandparents reminisced about their lives together. I’ve always been
a firm believer of true love, but a couple of months before my
grandparents’ anniversary, I went through a tough break-up. This
made me kind of pessimistic and doubtful. Seeing my grandparents
in love after all those years made me realize that true love is out
there and that I should continue looking for it.”
This narrative can be considered coherent across all three
dimensions. By describing exactly when and where the event took
place, the individual creates a contextual coherent account of
the experience. By using words like ‘first,’ ‘then’ and ‘afterward,’
the sequence of the events becomes clear. When referring to
a previous break-up and stating when this took place relative
to the anniversary, the individual places the experience within
a broader timeframe, making the narrative chronologically
coherent. Finally, the narrative contains a subjective evaluation
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of the experience and ends with a resolution, which contributes
to the thematic coherence of the narrative.
Self-Guidance
Memory coherence facilitates emotional problem solving
through the process of meaning making. Narratives reflect the
way in which we make sense of the world and our experiences
(Bruner, 1990; McAdams, 2001). By creating coherent narratives
about past experiences we can create meaning. This is particularly
important when faced with negative or stressful experiences.
Creating coherent narratives about negative or stressful events
makes it possible to express and regulate the related thoughts
and emotions and, eventually, come to some sort of resolution or
closure (Pennebaker, 1997; Fivush and Baker-Ward, 2005). This
facilitates recovery and is beneficial for the effective functioning
and well-being of the self. One could then utilize this previous
experience for future occurrences However, creating coherent
narratives about negative events can be challenging, since the
related emotions can be overwhelming. As research on this topic
has shown, narratives about negative events are generally more
coherent than narratives about positive or neutral events (Fivush
et al., 2008). This could be explained by the fact that negative
or stressful experiences imply a problem that must be solved,
which in turn may lead to more efforts to construct coherent
narratives about the events in order to understand and create
meaning out of them (Fivush et al., 2008). So, memory coherence
facilitates emotional problem solving and should be considered
an important part of the meaning making process, because it
represents the extent to which people can explain and understand
the events they have experienced (Fivush et al., 2008).
Self-Identity
As we mentioned earlier, creating a stable and continuous
sense of self is key to a healthy identity development, which is
an important developmental task during adolescence (Erikson,
1968; McAdams, 1985). Akin to memory specificity, memory
coherence is involved in forming a personal identity. Through
the process of autobiographical reasoning (i.e., interpreting,
evaluating, and integrating different specific personal experiences
that are believed to be significant to understand who one is),
single narratives will be connected and integrated into an overall
life story (Habermas and Bluck, 2000; Habermas and de Silveira,
2008). An individual’s life story is a subjective representation of
his or her personal and unique development (Habermas and de
Silveira, 2008). It’s important that this life story is coherent and
not merely a bundle of single narratives, since forming a coherent
overall life story leads to feelings of purpose and meaning in
life, and results in the formation of a continuous sense of self or
personal identity (Kernberg, 1984; Antonovsky, 1985; McAdams,
1985; Habermas and de Silveira, 2008).
Self-in-Relation
Besides facilitating emotional problem solving and creating a
continuous sense of self, memory coherence is also involved
in the social function of autobiographical memory. Narrating
and reminiscing about personal experiences is a highly social
activity that facilitates the creation and maintenance of a social
network. Through reminiscing with others our lives become
intertwined and we create a shared past (Fivush et al., 2006).
The manner in which this reminiscing occurs, especially in
the context of mother-child reminiscing, relates to the child’s
memory coherence and well-being (see Fivush et al., 2006
for a review). Mothers who are more coherent will be more
elaborative when reminiscing with their children (Reese, 2008).
This elaborative style of reminiscing about personal experiences,
especially about negative or stressful experiences, is related to
numerous adaptive outcomes (Fivush et al., 2006). Besides being
more coherent when reminiscing with others later in life (e.g.,
Fivush and Fromhoff, 1988), children from elaborative mothers
also tend to have a more coherent and consistent self-concept
(Welch-Ross et al., 1999; Bird and Reese, 2006) and a more
advanced emotional understanding (Laible, 2004). Additionally,
these children possess more effective coping styles and show
less internalizing and externalizing symptoms (Sales and Fivush,
2005; Fivush and Sales, 2006).
Self-Regulation
As we mentioned earlier, creating coherent narratives about
personal experiences facilitates emotion regulation (Pennebaker,
1997; Fivush and Baker-Ward, 2005). This is particularly
important when faced with negative or stressful experiences,
since such experiences can make the individual vulnerable for
developing various psychological problems (e.g., Cole et al., 1990;
Kessler, 1997; Kendler et al., 2003). Keeping this in mind, it is not
surprising that memory incoherence is related to the presence
of psychopathology. Individuals who experience difficulty with
narrating about personal experiences in a coherent manner
show more internalizing as well as externalizing symptoms.
More specifically, memory incoherence has been associated
with depressive symptoms, behavioral problems, and PTSD
(e.g., Foa et al., 1995; von Klitzing et al., 2000; von Klitzing
et al., 2007; Müller et al., 2014; Stadelmann et al., 2015).
Additionally, a pattern of incoherence has been observed in
patients suffering from a borderline personality disorder, eating
disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Rasmussen et al.,
2017). Research also seems to suggest that memory coherence
can act as a buffer against the impact of negative life experiences.
As we discussed earlier, memory coherence enables creating
meaning out of a negative or stressful event and regulating
the related cognitions and emotions. As a result, it can be
argued that memory coherence protects the individual from
the damaging effects negative life experiences can have on
well-being, making incoherent persons more vulnerable (Müller
et al., 2014; Stadelmann et al., 2015). However, there are still
some outstanding questions and inconsistencies regarding the
association between memory coherence and psychopathology,
which we will discuss in more detail below.
Research on the association between memory coherence
and internalizing symptoms yielded inconsistent findings.
Stadelmann (2006, Unpublished), for example, found no relation
between a lack of memory coherence and the presence of
internalizing symptoms. Two possible explanations can be
formulated for these discrepancies. First, internalizing symptoms
form a very heterogeneous group of symptoms which contains,
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for example, both depressive and anxiety-related symptoms.
It is possible that memory coherence is only related to
one of these clusters of symptoms, which could explain the
inconsistent findings (Stadelmann et al., 2015). A related
explanation is the fact that the majority of studies used
broadband screening instruments (i.e., instruments that look
at a variety of psychological symptoms instead of focusing on
a specific disorder) that do not differentiate between different
types of internalizing symptoms, which may contribute to the
inconsistent findings.
The association between memory coherence and PTSD has
also been topic of intense debate over the past few years
(see Brewin, 2016; Rubin et al., 2016a,b). Different theories
postulate that PTSD is characterized by memory incoherence.
This means that when PTSD patients are asked to recall the
trauma they experienced, their memories of this event will be
more fragmented and disorganized, as compared to non-related
memories and healthy control groups. In accordance with this
hypothesis, numerous studies report more incoherence (in the
form of fragmentation and disorganization) in trauma memories
of individuals with PTSD compared to healthy controls (e.g.,
Foa et al., 1995; Harvey and Bryant, 1999; Halligan et al.,
2003; Jones et al., 2007; Kenardy et al., 2007; Jelinek et al.,
2009, 2010; Salmond et al., 2011; or see Brewin, 2014 for a
review). This incoherence also seems to predict the course of
PTSD over and above initial symptoms (Engelhard et al., 2003;
Halligan et al., 2003; Buck et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2007; Ehring
et al., 2008). There are, however, numerous other studies that
do not seem to support this hypothesis (e.g., Berntsen et al.,
2003; Waters et al., 2013a,b; or see Rubin et al., 2016b for
a review). Crucial differences between studies could possibly
contribute to these inconsistent findings. Some studies focus for
example on aspects of global coherence (i.e., life story coherence)
whereas other studies look at local coherence of the trauma
memory in particular. Variability in coherence ratings (self-
report, observer, etc.) and small sample sizes could also add to
these inconsistencies (Brewin, 2016).
Summary and Discussion
Research on memory coherence has clearly demonstrated its
importance for well-being and effective functioning of the self
throughout the years. To recapitulate, memory coherence is
associated with emotional problem solving, creating a personal
identity, and establishing and maintaining a social network.
Additionally, memory coherence has been found to be negatively
associated with depressive symptoms, behavioral problems, and
PTSD. Yet, there are some unresolved theoretical questions
and inconsistencies, as well as methodological issues within
this research field. First of all, there remains a lack of clarity
about which subcomponent of memory coherence (i.e., context,
chronology, or theme) is more or most important for the self.
Since Reese et al. (2011) proposed their multidimensional model
of coherence, there have been very few studies directly comparing
these dimensions in terms of their association with well-being
and psychopathology (Waters et al., 2013a; Rubin et al., 2016b).
Furthermore, since the memory coherence literature has taken
more of a developmental approach throughout the years, several
remaining questions regarding the dynamics between coherence
and psychopathology remain present. There is, for example, little
information about the nature and the direction of the relationship
between memory coherence and psychopathology, since most
studies are cross-sectional in nature. It remains therefore
unclear whether memory incoherence is truly a predictor
of psychopathology or a mere by-product of the disorder.
Additionally, knowledge about possible underlying mechanisms
that could explain the relationship between memory coherence
and psychopathology is rather scarce. More insight into the
dynamics between memory coherence and psychopathology
holds great potential for clinical practice (e.g., screening at-risk
individuals, training memory coherence as treatment for certain
disorders), but more research is needed. Besides unresolved
theoretical questions, there are some methodological issues.
Memory coherence has been operationalized in various ways
throughout the years. Additionally, different research fields that
study memory coherence, have used different coding schemes
to assess coherence within personal narratives. This lack of
clarity about the definition and assessment of memory coherence
makes it challenging to directly compare studies across research
fields. Unity and agreement in this regard could enhance our
understanding of memory coherence by making it possible to
directly compare studies and by enabling studies to build directly
on each other.
TOWARD AN INTEGRATION
Memory specificity and memory coherence are both features of
autobiographical memories that, as we portrayed earlier, relate
to aspects of well-being and effective functioning of the self.
Research on these two features developed throughout the past
few decades as two largely independent research domains, with
a more cognitive and psychopathological approach to the study
of memory specificity and a more developmental approach to
memory coherence. This separate development is unfortunate
given the fact that memory specificity and memory coherence
show a great number of similarities. These similarities made
us wonder how these two features of autobiographical memory
relate to each other. However, to the best of our knowledge, there
have been no studies examining the relationship between these
two features of autobiographical memory. Insights regarding
this association are important from a theoretical and a clinical
point of view. Evidence for an association between memory
specificity and memory coherence would for example allow
for a more extensive empirical and theoretical integration of
these two domains in the future. Knowledge from 30 years of
research on memory specificity could offer insights in the study
of memory coherence (e.g., the work on the dynamics between
autobiography and psychopathology, the work on training
autobiographical memory specificity as a treatment protocol for
depression). Conversely, the work on memory coherence, which
has a strong developmental background, would provide a broader
framework in which the work on memory specificity could
potentially be fitted. Both domains have their own strengths and
weaknesses, and both could potentially benefit from integration
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by taking advantage of the other’s strengths. In this section,
we will link memory specificity and memory coherence by
discussing some important similarities between the two and by
formulating hypotheses about how they might relate to each
other. We will make a first attempt at a theoretical integration
of memory specificity and memory coherence by situating them
in the Self-Memory System of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce. We
will conclude this article by suggesting some new and exciting
research possibilities and by explaining how both research fields
could benefit from integration in future research.
Similarities between Memory Specificity
and Memory Coherence
There seems to be quite some overlap between the way memory
specificity and memory coherence are operationalized, especially
between specificity and contextual coherence. One of the criteria
to categorize a memory as specific according to the AMT, is that
the memory has to consist of one particular event that happened
at a particular time and place (Williams and Broadbent, 1986).
This notion of time and place forms the basis of contextual
coherence (see Reese et al., 2011). We would therefore expect that
memory specificity and contextual coherence would be positively
related.
Memory specificity and memory coherence also show a
quite similar developmental pathway throughout childhood and
adolescence. Young children are generally less specific and
coherent than older children, although they are capable of
creating specific and coherent stories when parents guide them
by asking specific questions (O’Carroll et al., 2006; Reese et al.,
2011). Specificity and coherence both increase with age due to
the development of a similar skillset that supports specificity
and coherence, such as overall verbal abilities, notion of time
and place, perspective taking, memory storage capacity, and
so on (Howe and Courage, 1997; O’Carroll et al., 2006; Reese
et al., 2011). Memory specificity, as well as chronological and
contextual coherence, are largely developed by middle childhood
(Gathercole, 1998; O’Carroll et al., 2006; Reese et al., 2011).
Thematic coherence requires more sophisticated abilities like
self-knowledge and insight, and develops further throughout
adolescence (Reese et al., 2011).
As we mentioned earlier, autobiographical memory serves
the self in different ways; through self-guidance, self in relation,
self-identity, and self-regulation. Both memory specificity and
memory coherence are involved in these associations in similar
manners. Both support effective problem solving, be it in a
slightly different manner. Recalling specific past experiences that
resemble the current situation enhances problem solving by
transferring knowledge about the way the previous situation
was solved to the current situation (Evans et al., 1992; Goddard
et al., 1996, 1997; Scott et al., 2000; Raes et al., 2005).
Additionally, the ability to create a coherent narrative about
the current situation makes it easier to work through the
emotions evoked by the situation (Pennebaker, 1997; Fivush and
Baker-Ward, 2005; Fivush et al., 2008). One could then utilize
this previous experience for future occurrences. So, memory
specificity facilitates practical problem solving, whereas memory
coherence promotes the process of emotional problem solving.
In addition to being involved in problem solving, memory
specificity and memory coherence both play a role in the
development of a personal identity. As we pointed out
earlier, creating a sense of self is a crucial developmental
task during adolescence (Erikson, 1968; McAdams, 1985). By
autobiographical reasoning, the adolescent will link together
different specific memories that are unique to the individual
and differentiates him- or herself from others. By interpreting,
evaluating, and connecting these single memories, the adolescent
is able to form a coherent life story, which is a subjective
representation of one’s personal development (Bluck and
Habermas, 2000; Habermas and Bluck, 2000; Habermas and de
Silveira, 2008; Fivush et al., 2011). Creating a coherent life story
is key to a healthy identity development and leads to feelings of
continuity, purpose, and meaning (Kernberg, 1984; Antonovsky,
1985; Bluck and Habermas, 2000; Habermas and Bluck, 2000;
Habermas and de Silveira, 2008).
Autobiographical memory also serves a social function.
Through reminiscing with others about personal experiences, our
lives become intertwined and we create a shared past (Fivush
et al., 2006). The way in which this reminiscing occurs, especially
in the context of mother-child reminiscing, relates to the
development of both memory specificity and memory coherence.
Mothers who are more elaborate when reminiscing with their
children about their personal experiences (e.g., playdate or
school trip) tend to have children who are more specific and
coherent, concurrently and over time (Fivush and Fromhoff,
1988; Valentino, 2011; McDonnell et al., 2016). Elaborating on the
circumstances surrounding the experience (e.g., cause, context,
consequences) and the feelings it evoked (i.e., structural and
emotional elaboration) facilitates children’s memory specificity
by helping them form a coherent narrative of their emotional
experiences (Fivush, 2011; McDonnell et al., 2016). Whether
elaboration positively predicts memory specificity and memory
coherence depends on mother–child attachment status. Mothers
are usually more elaborate when the child is securely attached
(Fivush and Vasudeva, 2002). In contrast, elaborative reminiscing
predicts less memory specificity in anxious or avoidant attached
children (McDonnell et al., 2016). So, in addition to showing
similar developmental pathways, the development of memory
specificity and memory coherence are both influenced by the
same contextual characteristics that can account for individual
differences. Both features of autobiographical memory are
scaffolded by elaborative mother-child reminiscing, and this
association seems to be moderated by child attachment status.
In the previous two sections, we discussed how both memory
specificity and memory coherence relate to the self in terms
of self-regulation and psychopathology. This overview showed
that difficulty recalling specific memories and difficulty creating
coherent narratives about personal experiences show highly
similar associations to psychological disorders. Both overgeneral
autobiographical memory and memory incoherence are related
to the presence of depressive symptoms and PTSD. As we
pointed out earlier, besides inconsistencies in the literature,
several questions concerning the relationship between memory
coherence and internalizing symptoms and disorders remain
unanswered. Later on, we will explain in more detail how an
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integration could potentially contribute to resolving some of
these inconsistencies and unresolved questions.
Besides these similarities, there are some conditions in which
memory specificity and memory coherence seem to differ from
one another. For example, episodic amnesia seems to impact
memory specificity and memory coherence differently. Whereas
patients suffering from episodic amnesia show deficits in recalling
specific past events, they are still able to create coherent narratives
if sufficient details are provided to them. So, it seems that episodic
amnesia interferes with generating details about events instead of
binding them into a coherent narrative, suggesting that damage
to the hippocampus may influence the ability to recall specific
events differently than the ability to create coherent narratives
(Keven et al., 2017). To fully grasp the relationship between
memory specificity and memory coherence, more research seems
necessary to further explore the conditions in which they relate to
each other and the conditions in which they seem to differ.
Integration within the Self-Memory
System
Within the Self-Memory System, personal memories are stored
across four different hierarchical layers going from abstract and
general to concrete and specific (i.e., life story schema, lifetime
periods, general events, and event-specific knowledge). As a first
attempt to integrate memory specificity and memory coherence,
we will situate them both within this theoretical model. This will
provide more insight about how they might relate to each other
and to the self, which can guide future research.
When trying to position complex cognitive phenomena like
memory specificity and memory coherence in a theoretical
model, we have to make certain assumptions. Both memory
specificity and memory coherence are measured by scoring
written or oral responses to cue words or instructions. These
responses don’t necessarily tell us something about how this
autobiographical knowledge is organized on a higher cognitive
level, since we cannot access this directly. Therefore we assume
that someone’s ability to retrieve specific events and create
coherent accounts of the events is a reflection of the way
this personal information is organized within the individual’s
memory. However, whether or not this assumption is a correct
representation of the reality opens up a whole other debate, which
falls beyond the scope of this manuscript.
Memory specificity represents a subclass of memories about
single experiences that did not last longer than 1 day and
therefore corresponds with the level of event-specific knowledge,
which is the most specific and concrete level in the Self-Memory
System. Overgeneral autobiographical memory arises when the
search for specific memories truncates at a higher, more general
and abstract level (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Williams
et al., 2007). Different processes can influence this search and
contribute to the development of overgeneral memory (Williams
et al., 2007).
As we mentioned earlier, for a memory to be situated at the
most specific level in the Self-Memory System, it must refer to a
single event and it has to be rich in sensory and perceptual detail.
These requirements for detail fit well with the criteria for memory
coherence. A coherent memory contains specific information
about where and when the event took place (i.e., context) and
how the event unfolded (i.e., chronology). Additionally, the
memory contains subjective information such as the emotions
and cognitions that were evoked by the experience (i.e., theme).
Although the focus typically rests on a single event, coherent
memories are often extended in time. The individual will, for
example, situate the event in his life story and describe the
precursors and the consequences of the event, both short and
long term. If this were to be the case when coding for memory
specificity, such a memory would be categorized as a general
memory because the experience described lasts longer than 1 day.
However, Conway and Pleydell-Pearce do not impose a time
restriction, therefore allowing memory coherence to be situated
at the level of event-specific knowledge. So, we hypothesize
that both memory specificity and memory coherence can be
situated at the same hierarchical level in the Self-Memory
System.
Positioning memory coherence at the most specific level
of the Self-Memory System raises additional hypotheses about
the relations between memory coherence, memory specificity,
and the self. As we mentioned earlier, memory coherence is
involved in emotional problem solving through the process of
meaning making. Negative or stressful experiences are usually
in conflict with the individual’s current goals. The individual
will strive to resolve this discrepancy between the current
situation and current goals. By creating a coherent narrative
about the negative experience, the individual will be able to
create meaning and come to some sort of resolution (e.g.,
the realization that the current experience is not as negative
as originally thought, changing goals to better fit the current
circumstances, etc.), making the negative experience reconcilable
with the working self. Additionally, placing memory coherence
within the Self-Memory System makes it possible to theorize
about how the coherence of single experiences relates to the
overall coherence of the life story. The latter is represented by
the life story schema, which is situated at the top layer of the
Self-Memory System. As we mentioned earlier, being able to
create a coherent overall life story is key to a healthy identity
development. Through autobiographical reasoning, specific and
coherent memories will be connected and integrated into a
coherent life story schema. The working self (which contains
a hierarchy of current goals) and the conceptual self (which
contains personal attitudes, beliefs, etc.) will determine which
of those event-specific memories will be integrated and stored
within the life story schema. This shows how memory specificity,
memory coherence, and global life story coherence interact to
form a stable sense of self.
For this integration section, we based ourselves on Conway
and Pleydell-Pearce’s Self-Memory System, which offers a
potential framework to look at the relationship between memory
specificity and memory coherence and how they relate to the
self. However, the Self-Memory System is just one way of
trying to integrate memory specificity and memory coherence
and does not provide absolute or definite answers. Nonetheless,
this attempt at an integration suggests that there are a lot
of open questions regarding the relationship between memory
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specificity, memory coherence, and the self that can and should
be investigated in future research.
Future Research Recommendations
As we pointed out throughout the previous sections, there
is still room for improving our understanding of memory
specificity and memory coherence. We argue that one possible
way to achieve this is by examining how these features of
autobiographical memory relate to each other and how they relate
to the self. Given the similarities between memory specificity
and memory coherence, we hypothesize that at least a moderate
positive association could be expected between them. It seems
indeed reasonable to assume that if a person has only limited
access to specific personal memories, this would strongly impede
the construction of coherent narratives about these experiences.
Difficulty retrieving specific personal memories could also hinder
the construction of a coherent life story, which requires the
integration of multiple specific memories. Conversely, if an
individual cannot make sense of an experience, and therefore
cannot create a coherent narrative, this could disturb the
emotional processing of the event, which could make retrieval of
specific memories too threatening (Todd et al., 2013). This could
in turn make the individual vulnerable for the development of
emotional disorders. Additionally, given the similarities between
memory specificity and contextual coherence, it is possible
that memory specificity in fact is a subcomponent of memory
coherence. Although we cannot make any definite claims
about how memory specificity and memory coherence relate to
each other, these different hypotheses demonstrate that further
research is necessary.
More specifically, integrating memory specificity and memory
coherence in future research could potentially provide answers
to some remaining questions or resolve inconsistencies.
For example, it is unclear whether memory incoherence is
a vulnerability factor for the development of internalizing
symptoms or a mere consequence or by-product of those
symptoms. Likewise, little is known about possible underlying
mechanisms that can explain this relationship. Research on
memory specificity has focused greatly on its association with
psychopathology, resulting in different theoretical models
attempting to explain this association. Integrating memory
specificity and memory coherence could therefore offer
insights into the dynamics between memory coherence and
psychopathology. For instance, the mechanisms described in the
CaR-Fa-X model could be evaluated for memory coherence to
get a better understanding of how and why incoherence relates
to the presence of psychopathology. Additionally, research has
shown that overgeneral autobiographical memory is not a general
characteristic of psychopathology. It is, for example, related to the
presence of depression, but not to anxiety-related disorders. It is
possible that the same applies to memory coherence, which could
potentially resolve the inconsistencies we pointed out earlier.
Internalizing symptoms form a rather heterogeneous group
of symptoms (i.e., depression and anxiety-related symptoms)
and it is possible that memory incoherence only relates to
the presence of one of these two, which could explain the
inconsistent findings. Future research should therefore examine
how memory coherence relates to the presence of depressive
versus anxiety-related symptoms by using specific instruments
instead of broadband screening questionnaires that do not
differentiate between different types of internalizing symptoms.
So, by transferring knowledge about the dynamics between
memory specificity and psychopathology, we could potentially
resolve certain inconsistencies regarding the relationship between
memory coherence and psychopathology.
The domain of memory specificity could likewise benefit from
an integration in future research. As we mentioned earlier, there
seems to be some uncertainty regarding what is actually being
measured with the AMT. A strong correlation between memory
specificity and contextual coherence could indicate that memory
specificity can be seen as a component of memory coherence,
placing specificity within a broader framework. Insight into the
relation between memory specificity and memory coherence
could also have some clinical implications. For example, Memory
Specificity Training (MEST) has been shown to be effective in
decreasing depressive symptoms (Raes et al., 2009). If memory
specificity would indeed be a part of the coherence construct,
this could influence the content of the memory training. Instead
of only focusing on specificity, the training could target overall
memory coherence.
CONCLUSION
Research on memory specificity and memory coherence has
developed as two largely independent research domains over
the past three decades. This is, in our opinion, quite surprising
since they both show highly similar associations to well-being
and effective functioning of the self. These similarities make us
therefore wonder how these two features of autobiographical
memory relate to each other. Integration of these research
domains offers new and exciting possibilities for future research
and could result in new insights that enhance our understanding
of the relationship between autobiographical memory and the
self.
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With this contribution, we offer a perspective focused on the mind-body relation in a specific
phase of the life span: adolescence. In particular, we look at the complexity of some of the
processes involved in the construction of an adult Self, which results from the interaction between
experiences from infancy and a changing body during adolescence accompanied by implemented
mental and social abilities/possibilities. Our interpretative hypothesis goes back to the construct
of mentalization, focusing on the function of implicit bodily memories entwined with infantile
experiences as precursors of relational dynamics that are mentalistically mediated. When troubled,
these need to be dealt with, particularly during adolescence, when the demanding and inedited
quests of the body may represent a hurdle that has to be overcome to achieve the formation of an
integrated identity.
The development of cognition, the complexity of behavioral and social processes and, not last,
sexual maturationmark adolescence (e.g., Camaioni andDi Blasio, 2007; Faliva and Cozzani, 2011),
defined as period “in transition” (Rutter, 1992; Palmonari, 1997). The individual develops a sense
of self from infancy; however, during adolescence the very first conscious effort is made to answer
to the question “Who am I?.” This involves the organization of the individual’s abilities, beliefs
and history with the aim to form a coherent image of the Self through a sense of continuity over
time (Pasupathi and Hoyt, 2009). In this stage, beliefs about the Self as well as beliefs of others are
integrated within the process of identity development, which requires reaching a balance between
commitment and confusion about one’s beliefs, goals, values, and roles in society (Erikson, 1963).
When commitment occurs, possibly after exploration of different alternatives, the adolescent can
effectively resolve the identity issue dodging a chance to remain in a state of “identity diffusion”
characterized by absence of integration and lack of commitment (Makros and McCabe, 2001).
This scenario is further challenged by changes occurring in the adolescent’s social cognitive and
emotional brain, which significantly affect social behavior and choices during adolescence and,
namely, the process of “social reorientation” (Nelson et al., 2005; see also Immordino-Yang, 2016).
Within this complex frame, adolescents are conventionally thought to build their identity
hinging psychic with social (e.g., Erikson, 1950, 1953), very much in line with Mead’s general
conception of Self-construction (Mead, 1913). Less attention has been paid to maturation of the
body, the first biological marker of our lifelong experiences. In fact, as thoroughly argued by
several authors below discussed, in the transition from primary to tertiary intersubjectivity, the
individual’s transforming body and brain grow in active engagement with an environment of
human factors—organic at first, then psychological or inter-mental (Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978;
Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001; see also, Stern, 1985, 2004; Seganti, 1995).
Let’s try then to reverse the classical view placing the body at the “forefront.” The body is from
birth (and even from the uterus) a constructive and expressive vehicle of the Self. Not by chance, it
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has been suggested to add the body to the four levels of Doise’s
psychosocial analysis (Doise, 1982, Doise and Mapstone, 1986;
Brunel and Cosnier, 2012). Then, how do we enquire the body
to support the construction of an identity, the developmental
transition from infancy to subsequent epochs, ferrying through
adolescence? A plausible approach is to look at what happens
when things “go wrong.” It is emblematic that adolescents
choose the body to express their discomfort: the developmental
impasse in shaping the Self is explicit through injury of one’s
own body that—even if within dynamics involving different
etiopathogenetic factors—represents a glaring example of how
ruptures in developmental milestones carry effects through from
infancy to childhood, ultimately reflecting on the adolescents’
incapacity to manage all the dynamics underpinning their
balanced maturation (Sempio Liverta et al., 2005; Midgley and
Vrouva, 2012;Marchetti and Cavalli, 2013;Marchetti et al., 2013).
In this respect, the capacity to mentalize represents a critical
forerunner of the teen’ perception of the physical Self, as well as
of decisions taken with respect to their body. During the child’s
development, mentalization implies a gradual acquisition of the
ability to correctly attribute mental states to oneself and others
to understand behaviors, a maturation of reflective processes
regarding people’s internal states (Fonagy and Target, 2003; Allen
and Fonagy, 2006). Mentalization is a construct that primarily
origins from clinical studies and that—more than the construct
of Theory of Mind, which mainly refers to an ability—implies
one’s propensity to look at social events in terms of mental states.
It follows that, wherever mentalization fails, repercussions of
different types and degrees can be observed affecting the child’s
behavior before, and the adolescent’s psychological and physical
integrity after, in a continuum between typical and atypical
development.
Now, how can we approach mentalization failures that, as
hypothesized initially, may be also tied to implicit, bodily rooted,
memories shaped by infantile experiences? Moreover, assuming
these dynamics entrenched in the adolescent’s current perception
of the Self, how can the teen’s identification process be redirected
and reinstated?
To leave something behind, it needs to be somehow
remembered; to leave infancy, one needs to be able to disclose
it. One of the most frequent and powerful human activities
in which this process can take place is narrative: there seems
to be no other way of “describing "lived time" save in the
form of a narrative,” a selective achievement of memory recall
(Bruner, 2004, p. 692; see also Ricoeur, 1981; Nelson, 1989).
For Bruner, narrative - as approached from a constructivist view
intended as the mind “making the world”—encloses the sense
of Self, one’s autobiographical history (Bruner, 2004), which
inevitably binds to who we are here and now and to what we
carry around from our culture (see, e.g., Bruner, 1987, 1991,
2014). Relating mentalization and narrative, years of research on
narrative (e.g., Feeney et al., 1994; Fonagy et al., 1998; see also,
Van IJzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2008; George and
West, 2012; Rossouw and Fonagy, 2012) emphasize on the idea
that early experiences with primary caregivers are internalized
and eventually reflected in the adults’ self-narratives (Waters
et al., 2017), which are to be viewed not as a record of what
“actually happened” but rather as a continuing reinterpretation
of one’s experiences (Bruner, 2004). Seen from this perspective,
one can then muster the use of memory through narration—
regarded in this light as mentalization means—to build a sense
of continuity against threats of identity fragmentation. Narrative-
based practices would then emerge as an effective strategy helping
teenagers found on infantile narratives an “upgraded” narrative
accounting for the new personal resources and social quests. It
is clear that this process does not imply denying or forgetting
the past identity, but rather its integration—within one’s own
personality—with the new emerging identity.
But what narrative and which forms of memory are
to be used that will not betray what said here at the
beginning, and namely that the bridge that the mind needs
to cross to reach the adult land is the body? From very
early in life, the child is seen as an individual able to
continuously self-regulate (e.g., Tronick, 1982, 1989; Stern,
1985). A cognitive-affective system of attachment emerges,
able to continuously monitor the surrounding environment
and endowing the child with procedural knowledge of his
internal states with respect to relational events. These procedures
incorporate, according to the “sensory memory of attachment
relationships” (Seganti, 1995), information regarding the body
recorded as sequences of activation states. Any attempt
by the child to establish and maintain a balance between
his/her internal system and the interaction with the caregiver
would determine behavioral modifications persisting in memory
(Tronick, 1989) that translate, in the adult life, in a bodily
“unconscious/intuitive” response to the environmental stimuli
(Seganti, 1995).
Also Stern (1985, 2000, 2004) supported the idea that the
transmodal diffusion of the activation levels persist in the
adult as a continuous source of extra-linguistic, non-verbal,
evaluation of the interactive states with the others, which
unfolds in parallel with language production. Language forces
the individual’s perceptual experience within categories, selecting
only some parts of that conglomerate of sensations, perception,
and cognition that, on the other hand, keeps substantiating
the global non-verbal experience of our relations with the
world, most of the times bodily-mediated (see, Werner and
Kaplan, 1963). So-called “instinctive” behaviors may then stem
from an evaluation of reality based on unconscious procedural
memory liable to maintain an active and coherent Self in typical
development. What Seganti (1995) refers to as the process of
bootstrapping that can be then found in cognitive models of
sensorial data, like the Parallel Distributed Processing (e.g.,
Bucci, 1984; Rumelhart and Mcclelland, 1986; Kihlstrom, 1987),
relates to how information associated with the experience of
one’s body—alive and active—would be recorded in the adult’s
memory not only in a verbal format, but also in the form of
anticipatory sequences of activation states (from the viscera).
This idea recalls Damasio’s debated proposal of somatic markers
(Damasio et al., 1996), according to which signals would
arise in bioregulatory processes as related to the body-state
structure and to the brain representation of the body leading
to, for example, undeliberated inhibition of responses learned
previously (Damasio et al., 1996).
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Within this scenario, the hard work that narration should
undertake stems from the compromise between similarities
and oppositions between the sensorial memory of relations—or
bodily memory—and the present interactional context with
the purpose to adequate one’s own involvement to the new
relational situation in a continuous, fast and effective manner
(see, Seganti, 1995). This would allow individuals to re-establish
healthy bridging with their past (see also, Bucci, 1998). Through
narratives, it is therefore possible—both in daily life and in
therapeutic settings (even though with different modalities and
pervasiveness)—to access to unconscious defensive processes and
distress-related memories encapsulated and intertwined in our
mind and body. Once surfaced, they can be reflected upon and
reconstructed by ascribing new meanings and understanding
to past events (McAdams, 1993, 1998). Looking specifically
at adolescence, the capacity to think about one’s own mind,
so painstakingly built during infancy, is now put to test and,
wherever specific deficiencies are present, they now come
to light, pushing the adolescent into a painful and harmful
circuit that can result in real psychological problems. A good
capacity to mentalize can help the adolescent handle difficult
situations avoiding persistent discomfort and maladjustment. In
this sense, intervening timely and precociously on risk factors
can sensibly impinge upon the way in which young women and
men will resolve past situations to face a more serene future.
Bodily and representational have to be melded together, both
conceptually and with respect to prevention and rehabilitation
measures suited to aid adolescents in distress, fruitfully adjoining
concepts like internal working models of attachment, the
“procedural and sensorial memory of relationships,” narrative
as intended by Bruner, and the concept of Stern’s “present
moment, now” (Stern, 2004) as non-verbal means of psychic
transformation.
Lastly, while we here made an attempt to outline the role
of the body as a carrier of implicit memories strongly affecting
behavior over development—from childhood to adulthood
passing through the winding road of adolescence—we would
like to ultimately bring forward not only the role of one’s own
body, but rather of the individual’s body in relation to the
others’ minds and, mostly, to the others’ bodies. For all the
matters here addressed, this is particularly relevant when dealing
with adolescence. The need emerges preponderant to reflect on
theoretical models, educational and clinical at once, in which
one’s own body is regarded in relation to the others’ bodies as
a regulative system of the Self. The selection of our partners,
friends, and the relational circle in general is no coincidence.
Relationships do not develop only on the basis of a meeting of
minds but also—and perhaps primarily and at a deeper implicit
level—on recognition and synchronization dynamics, which are
in our opinion bodily grounded.
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Previous studies showed that mothers vary in the way in which they discuss
past experiences with their children, since they can exhibit narrative (elaborative) or
paradigmatic (repetitive) styles to different extents. Given this background, the aim of
the present study was to analyze differences in the mothers’ use of narrative styles
and mental state language (MSL), as a function of children’s age and gender. Thirty
dyads consisting of mothers and their 4- to 6-year-old children were observed during
a picture-book reading interaction. Maternal utterances were coded according to the
categories described by Tessler and Nelson (1994), classifying each mother as Narrative
or Paradigmatic. Eight categories of MSL were analyzed: perceptual, emotional (positive
and negative), volitional, cognitive, communicative, and moral. The results confirmed
the existence of the two maternal styles observed in the earlier studies. Importantly,
we found that the mothers of younger children were more narrative than paradigmatic,
whereas the opposite pattern occurred for the mothers of older children (they were more
paradigmatic than narrative). As concerns MSL, the results indicated that the use of
communicative terms was significantly more frequent for narrative than for paradigmatic
mothers, and decreased linearly with children’s age. Lastly, the mothers of younger
children referred their MSL more frequently to the book characters than to themselves
or to the child. Taken together, these results support the idea that mothers adapt
their narrative styles and MSL input to the growing abilities of their children, therefore
contributing to the development of social understanding.
Keywords: narrative style, mental state language, children, picture-book reading
INTRODUCTION
Although an implicit sense of self is already apparent before language acquisition (Rochat, 2010),
it seems clear that, during infancy, the establishment of an explicit self-concept is primarily driven
by the co-occurring growth in linguistic competence. This is because the comprehension and
production of grammatical forms such as personal pronouns and verb conjugations require young
children to draw an explicit distinction between the roles that can be assumed by themselves or by
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other people (Bates, 1990). In facts, recent research suggests
that the mastery of person reference is closely related to the
use of language to express one’s own and others’ mental states
(Markova and Smolík, 2014). The underlying assumption is that,
to correctly produce personal pronouns and mental state terms,
children need to acquire a full awareness of their own desires,
feelings, and thoughts (Rochat, 2010); furthermore, they must
also understand that other people can have different or even false
beliefs about a given situation (Doherty and Perner, 1998; Spataro
et al., 2017). Put in other words, they need to acquire an explicit
Theory of Mind (ToM) (Flavell, 2004; Wellman and Liu, 2004;
Low and Perner, 2012).
Theory of Mind can be defined as the “ability to appreciate the
existence of one’s own and others’ mental states (e.g., intentions,
emotions, desires), and use them to explain and predict
behaviors” (Longobardi et al., 2016b, p. 424; see also Flavell,
2004; Lecce et al., 2015). In the laboratory, this complex set of
skills is typically examined by testing children’s understanding of
first- and/or second-order false belief (Perner and Wimmer, 1985;
Wellman and Liu, 2004). However, a crucial distinction has been
drawn between passing false-belief tasks and spontaneously using
one’s own ToM abilities during conversations and interactions
with peers and adults (Meins et al., 2006; Grazzani and Ornaghi,
2012). Although the existence of a relation between these
two domains has been disputed (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan,
1995; Charman and Shmueli-Goetz, 1998; Meins et al., 2006;
Longobardi et al., 2016b), the spontaneous production of mental
state language (MSL: a specific type of language including
perceptual, physiological, emotional, cognitive and moral terms)
has been shown to forerun and predict the acquisition of ToM
and, more generally, the emergence of meta-representational
awareness (Beeghly et al., 1986; Bartsch and Wellman, 1995).
In agreement, significant positive associations between ToM and
MSL have been reported by studies examining the behavior of
preschool children in a variety of interactive contexts (e.g., book
reading; Dunn et al., 1991; Hughes and Dunn, 1998; Rollo and
Sulla, 2016).
Importantly for the present purposes, the acquisition of
an explicit ToM and the associated production of MSL are
strongly influenced by the quality and the frequency of
the social interactions to which children are exposed during
their first years of life. More specifically, social interactionist
approaches to cognitive development posit that the use of
language during mother–child conversations has a central
importance in promoting the development of mind-reading
skills (Ruffman et al., 2002; Symons, 2004; Taumoepeau and
Ruffman, 2006, 2008), since children learn to interpret the
meaning of their experiences by participating in culturally shared
activities (Nelson, 1996; Fivush et al., 2006; Bamberg, 2011).
Children’s participation in communicative interactions is also
critical to build their ability to construct and share stories
with others – a conversational skill that emerges in the early
childhood years and is strongly predictive of cognitive, literacy
and socioemotional development, as well as school readiness
and academic achievement (Deckner et al., 2006; Fivush et al.,
2006; Cristofaro and Tamis-LeMonda, 2012). Parents can indeed
scaffold the acquisition of children’s narrative ability by sharing
personal experiences during family reminiscing, by telling stories
during pretend play, or by reading stories from picture books
(Whitehurst and Lonigan, 1998; Escobar et al., 2017).
In this broad context, several researchers have begun to
examine the social origins of memory, by asking whether
differences in maternal narrative styles can affect children’s
memory for the narrated events (e.g., Engel, 1986, Unpublished;
Fivush, 1994; Nelson, 1996; Nelson and Fivush, 2000; Lange
and Carroll, 2003). Fivush et al. (2006), for instance, studied
mother–child conversations about past events and found that the
children of elaborative mothers, who engaged in richly detailed
descriptions (e.g., “Memaw and Grandad came over, and Daddy
cooked hamburgers out on the grill”: Haden, 1998) and open-
ended questions (e.g., “What did we do at the zoo?” and “Who
was there with us?”: Fivush et al., 2006), recalled significantly
more information than the children of repetitive mothers
(Fivush and Fromhoff, 1988; Reese et al., 1993; Haden et al.,
2001). A similar distinction between narrative and paradigmatic
interaction styles has been drawn by Tessler (1986, Unpublished)
and Tessler and Nelson (1994), on the basis of previous work
by Bruner (1986). According to these authors, narrative mothers
tend to interpret events and actions in terms of intentions and
mental states (e.g., “The frog is jumping on the stone because
she’s afraid to drown”: Tessler and Nelson, 1994); in addition, they
make frequent references to the autobiographical experiences of
their children (e.g., “Do you remember when we went to the
rugby match?”: Farrant and Reese, 2000); paradigmatic mothers,
on the other hand, focus on labeling objects and specifying
their relations with superordinate categories (e.g., “What kind
of animal is that? A bird, right!”: Tessler and Nelson, 1994),
or on repeating the exact content of a previous utterance
(e.g., Mother asks, “We had fun, didn’t we?” and in her next
turn repeats, “Yes, we had fun”: Haden, 1998). Although all
parents produce both narrative and paradigmatic utterances
when interacting with their children, most of them show a clear
predominance of one style over the other (Lange and Carroll,
2003). Adopting this classification, Tessler and Nelson (1994)
coded the spontaneous conversations occurring between mothers
and their children during a museum visit: the results showed that
the children of narrative mothers recalled the museum objects
more accurately than the children of Paradigmatic mothers.
Furthermore, in later studies, the use of a narrative style during
parent–child interactions has been found to relate to other
aspects of children’s cognitive development, including conscience
development (Laible and Thompson, 2000), emotion recognition
(Ontai and Thompson, 2002), socio-communicative competence
(Tadic´ et al., 2013), and ToM (Welch-Ross, 1997; Ontai and
Thompson, 2008).
Besides narrative styles, a large body of research point to the
conclusion that the frequency with which mothers refer to MSL
during conversations is positively and significantly associated
with children’s performance in ToM tasks and the development
of their psychological lexicon (Meins et al., 2002; Ruffman et al.,
2002; de Rosnay et al., 2004; Slaughter et al., 2007; Ornaghi et al.,
2011). Ruffman et al. (2002), for example, found that a composite
measure of mothers’ mental state utterances (including the
use of desire and think/know terms) at 3 years predicted
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unique variance in children’s ToM performance at 4 years.
Likewise, LaBounty et al. (2008) reported that the frequency of
mothers’ emotional explanations at 3.5 years predicted children’s
concurrent emotion understanding, whereas the frequency of
fathers’ explanations in terms of desires and emotions predicted
children’s concurrent and later ToM at 5 years. As concerns
the relation between mothers and children’s MSL, two classical
studies by Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006, 2008) showed
that maternal references to desires at 15 months significantly
predicted children’s later MSL and emotion task performance at
24 months. In addition, mothers’ talk about others’ thought and
knowledge to 24-month-old children significantly predicted their
MSL at 33 months (see also Furrow et al., 1992; Jenkins et al.,
2003; Rudek and Haden, 2005; Symons et al., 2006; Pearson and
Pillow, 2016).
The Present Study
Considering the empirical background briefly summarized in the
previous paragraphs, the present study sought to put together
these two strands of research by examining the relation between
narrative styles (as classified by Tessler and Nelson, 1994 and
modified by Rollo, 2003, Unpublished) and the use of MSL in
maternal conversations during a shared book reading activity.
More specifically, we were interested in determining whether
Narrative and Paradigmatic mothers differed in the use of specific
categories of mental state terms and/or in the total amount
of psychological lexicon directed to children. Although this
question has yet to be assessed, the findings illustrated by Welch-
Ross (1997) and Ontai and Thompson (2002), showing a direct
association between the frequency of elaborative comments in
maternal conversations and children’s later ToM, lead to the
prediction that elaborative/narrative mothers should produce
more mental state terms, compared to repetitive/paradigmatic
mothers. This result would be well consistent with previous
evidence demonstrating that the mothers’ use of MSL during
parent–child interactions promotes ToM in preschool children
(Meins et al., 2002; Ruffman et al., 2002; de Rosnay et al., 2004;
Symons et al., 2006; Taumoepeau and Ruffman, 2006, 2008;
Slaughter et al., 2007; Ornaghi et al., 2011). Hence, the positive
effects of maternal elaborations on ToM performance might be
potentially mediated by an increased frequency of internal state
terms. In addition to this primary aim, we were also focused
on determining whether maternal styles varied as a function of
children’s age and gender, and whether elaborative/narrative and
repetitive/paradigmatic mothers referred their MSL to different
agents – the self, the child, the dyad, the context or others
(e.g., the characters described in the book). As concerns the
first issue, available studies indicate that both mothers and
fathers tend to be more elaborative with daughters than with
sons (Reese and Fivush, 1993; Reese et al., 1993), and that the
mothers of children between 40 and 70 months of age tend
to become more elaborative over time. Regarding the second
issue, there is at least some evidence showing that maternal
references to others’ internal states play a key role in the
early development of psychological lexicon. Taumoepeau and
Ruffman (2008), for example, found that maternal references to
others’ cognitive states at 24 months were the most consistent
correlate of children’s later MSL at 33 months. Similarly, a study
by Longobardi et al. (2016a) showed that maternal references
to others’ mental states at 16 months were associated to the
children’s ability to use MSL to communicate their emotions at
20 months.
To summarize, the aims of the present study were: (a) to
confirm the validity of the distinction between Narrative and
Paradigmatic communicative styles; (b) to investigate whether
the mothers’ use of these two communicative styles varied as
a function of children’s age; (c) to identify internal state terms
in mother–child speech and determine differences related to
children’s age and gender; (c) to verify whether mothers classified
as Paradigmatic or Narrative differed in their use of MSL; and
(d) to investigate whether Narrative and Paradigmatic mothers
differed in the relative frequency with which they attributed
mental state terms to different agents.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty mother–child dyads were observed individually. Only
mothers and typically developing children whose first language
was Italian were included. Children were 19 females and 11
males ranged in age from 4 years 1 month to 5 years 11 months
(M D 4.74; SD D 0.49). The average age of the mothers was
35 years (SDD 3.86).
Children were recruited in a public school of northern Italy;
they belonged to a medium socioeconomic group (according
to parents’ education and occupation); their receptive language
was tested with the Italian adaptation of the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test-R (PPVT-R; Dunn and Dunn, 1981; Italian
version by Stella et al., 2001). The sample had no reported history
of psychiatric treatment or neurological disorders.
In order to explore any differences based on children’s age, we
created three balanced groups in terms of numerosity and age,
each composed of 10 children: (1) average age was 4.05 years
(SDD 0.04); (2) average age was 5.05 years (SDD 0.02); (3) finally,
the third group was composed of children who were 5 years and
11 months old.
Procedure and Measures
Mothers who agreed to participate in the study filled out an
informed consent form. The form was composed of two parts:
the research description and quotation of the relevant laws, which
was retained by the mothers; the signature sheet expressing the
consent for their participation in the study together with an
agreement on data disclosure, which was retained by the first
author.
The dyads were individually observed in their domestic
settings during a book reading interaction. The instructions given
to the mothers were as follows: “Look at this picture-book with
your child and behave as you normally do when you read a
picture-book at home.” The observer familiarized himself with
each dyad before each observation and did not interfere in
any way during the narrative interaction, in order to maintain
ecological validity.
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The picture-book (“Frog, where are you?”; Mayer, 1969) was
about the adventures of a frog in the pond, and has been largely
employed in previous research (e.g., Reilly et al., 2004). The
instrument was considered to be appropriate for the present
study, because it did not induce any particular way of telling the
story and therefore allowed the mothers to exhibit their usual
narrative style. The duration of the sessions was variable, ranging
from 15 to 25 min. To assess maternal style, the narratives were
audio-recorded, transcribed and then scored by two independent
judges.
The coding scheme included three successive steps:
(1) In the first instance, the transcripts were divided into
utterances – the minimal unit of analysis, formally
defined as “an uninterrupted stream of language, which
is distinguished from other utterances on the basis of
lengthy pauses, grammatical structure, and changes in
vocal intonation” (Longobardi et al., 2016a, p. 758). Each
utterance was then classified as Narrative or Paradigmatic
by two independent coders – inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s
κ) was 0.83, and each disagreement was resolved through
discussion with the first author. Maternal style was
finally defined by the relative prevalence of narrative or
paradigmatic utterances (more than 50%) on the total
number of utterances produced during the narration, as in
Tessler and Nelson (1994). Table 1 reports examples of the
eight narrative categories observed in the present study, out
of the 18 originally proposed by Tessler and Nelson (1994).
All other categories were excluded because they were not
relevant for the present investigation.
(2) Then, the transcripts were coded according to the eight
categories of mental lexicon used by Camaioni et al.
(1998, modified; see Table 2 for the coding scheme).
Following these authors, two measures were computed: the
overall proportion of internal state terms produced by each
mother, out of the total number of words used during the
interaction; and the relative frequency of each category, out
of the total number of internal state terms produced during
the interaction. Inter-rater reliability for coding each mental
term in the eight categories was good (Cohen’s κD 0.83).
(3) Lastly, for each internal state term produced by mothers,
the two judges coded whether it referred to the mother,
to the child, to the dyad, to the story characters (coded as
‘context’), or to others – identified as entities other than
the mother–child couple and the characters described in the
picture book.
RESULTS
Mothers’ Communicative Styles
The first aim of this study was to identify two different maternal
styles used during the picture-book reading interactions.
Following the procedure outlined in the “Materials and Methods”
section, 14 mothers out of 30 (46.7%) were classified as Narrative,
while the remaining 16 mothers were classified as Paradigmatic
(53.3%). When analyzed with respect to children’s age groups,
the two maternal styles showed a clear developmental trend that
coincided with the increase in children’s age. Mothers of 4.05-
year-old children were more Narrative than Paradigmatic (90%
vs. 10%); in contrast, the mothers of older children resulted to
be more Paradigmatic than Narrative [70% vs. 30% and 80%
vs. 20%, respectively; χ2.2/ D 11.52, p < 0.001]. Overall, these
results confirm the existence of the two maternal styles observed
in the earlier study (Tessler and Nelson, 1994), but additionally
indicate that mothers adjust their narrative style depending on
children’s age.
Interestingly, there were no significant differences
[F.2;27/ D 0.050; p D 0.951] in the total number of utterances
produced by mothers: M D 26.60 (age 4.05), M D 27.70 (age
5.05), and M D 24.60 (age 5.11). The latter finding suggests that
differences in the narrative styles were not due to differences in
maternal verbosity.
Mothers’ Mental State Language
Regarding the mothers’ use of MSL during the picture-book
reading, the overall percentages of internal state terms, out of the
total of words produced by mothers, ranged from a minimum of
1.37 to a maximum of 11.39 (M D 7.71; SD D 2.53). Considering
the different categories of internal state language, Table 3 shows
that emotional (positive), perceptual, and communicative terms
were used more frequently than the other mental state terms.
In Figure 1, we can observe the types of internal state words
used by mothers with their children. It can be noted that the
mothers of younger children used a wider variety of inner state
words referring to perception and emotion, while the mothers of
older children used more inner state words referring to cognitive
states or volition.
To formally verify differences in the mothers’ use of MSL
categories as a function of children’s age, we performed a
MANOVA (multivariate analysis of variance) that has showed
a significant difference in the use of communicative terms
[F.2;27/ D 4.498; p D 0.021; η2 D 0.44] with a decreasing
trend: mothers of younger children utilized more communicative
terms (M D 25.93, SD D 11.70) than mother of the 5.05-year-
old children (M D 20.03, SD D 10.19) and the 5.11-year-old
children (M D 12.17, SD D 8.15). Post hoc comparisons using
Bonferroni test indicated that the use of communicative terms
was significantly lower in the mother of older children (5.11-
year-old) than in the mother of younger children (4.05-year-old)
(pD 0.016).
A marginally significant increase was instead noted in
the use of volitional terms [F.2;27/ D 2,788; p D 0.080].
Mothers of 5.11-year-old children utilized more volitional terms
(M D 24.73, SD D 29.31) than mothers of the 5.05-year-old
children (M D 13.26, SDD 10.60) and the 4.05-year-old children
(M D 5.05, SDD 6.48).
With regards to children’s gender, no significant difference
was found: mothers used internal state terms with girls and boys
similarly. However, at a descriptive level (see Figure 2), it is
interesting to note that mothers addressed emotional positive
states more frequently to girls than to boys [F.1;28/ D 1.313;
pD 0.262], whereas emotional negative states were directed more
frequently to boys than to girls [F.1;28/ D 3.065; pD 0.092].
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TABLE 1 | Coding scheme used to categorize maternal utterances (Tessler and Nelson, 1994; Rollo, 2003, Unpublished).
Style Categories Definition Example
Narrative (1) Describe activity A depiction in basic, “surface” form of a behavior or
occurrence taking place in view of mother and child.
This frog is swimming in the pond.
(2) Autobiographical A reference to something in the (usually shared)
personal past; often a way of explaining by means
of connecting the sight/activity/occurrence with
something already experienced by the child.
Where were we, not so long ago, when we saw
something like this?
(3) Aesthetic/Affective A depiction in aesthetic rather informative terms or
expression of an emotion or attitude toward the
thing observed.
Those white flowers are beautiful, aren’t they? I love
those! They’re my favorite!
(4) Interpretation Utterance going beyond the basic information given
about the feelings, intentions, possible future
sequence of events or behavior relating to the
person or object being observed.
The frog is jumping on the stone because she’s
afraid to drown
Paradigmatic (5) Describe category Utterance labeling an object (or person) defining
class it belongs to.
What kind of animal is that? A bird, right!
(6) Basic knowledge Often used for purpose of explaining something in
the present situation referring to something child
already know (“semantic” knowledge rather than
“episodic” experience).
Sure, you know that. Where do frogs live?
(7) Specific physical properties/size Reference, often for purpose of focusing attention,
to perceptual properties of the object.
Look at these flowers, as they are great!
(8) Similarities/generalizations Also used as a form of classification. This is the same kind as that one.
TABLE 2 | Coding scheme used to categorize the internal state words produced
by mothers.
Type of internal
states
Examples of internal state words used by
mothers
Physiological To be hungry, to be thirsty, to be sleepy.
Perceptual To hear, to see, to look, to observe, to recognize, to
be cold, to be hot, to feel ill.
Emotional positive To enjoy, to be friends, to love, cheerful, happy,
nice, satisfied.
Emotional negative To be afraid, to become angry, to be sorry, to
sorrow, unhappy, unpleasant, sad.
Volitional To have intention of, to look for, to order, power
( D to be able of), to want, good.
Cognitive To know, to understand, to remember, to forget, to
dream, to think.
Communicative To say, to tell, to call, to ask.
Moral Duty (to be obliged to do), power ( D to have the
permission), to forgive, good, bad.
Maternal Communicative Styles and
Mental State Language
A primary aim of this research was to verify whether mothers
classified as Narrative or Paradigmatic differed with respect to
the use of psychological lexicon. A MANOVA carried out on the
eight categories of mental state terms found only one significant
difference between maternal style groups [F.1;28/ D 5.872;
p D 0.022; η2 D 0.54]: Narrative mothers used communicative
terms more frequently than Paradigmatic mothers (see Figure 3).
In addition, looking at Figure 3 it can be noted that there was
a marginally significant difference for the volitional category
[F.1;28/ D 3.455, p D 0.074], with Paradigmatic mothers
using these terms more frequently than Narrative mothers. In
TABLE 3 | Descriptive statistics for mothers’ categories of MSL.
Terms of mothers’ MSL %M SD
Physiological 0.46 1.75
Perceptual 19.13 11.87
Emotional positive 18.76 14.10
Emotional negative 5.25 9.51
Volitional 14.35 19.55
Cognitive 17.82 11.70
Communicative 19.37 11.33
Moral 3.94 8.32
contrast, Narrative mothers tended to use physiological terms
more frequently than Paradigmatic mothers [F.1;28/ D 3.069,
pD 0.091].
Referents of Maternal Mental State
Language
The last aim of the present study was to verify whether Narrative
and Paradigmatic mothers differed in the way in which they
referred mental state terms to themselves, to the child, to the
dyad, to characters of the picture book (context) or to others
(persons not described the book).
Overall, internal state words were referred preferably to
the context (M D 41.33) or to the child (M D 30.06),
while references to others (M D 13.28), to the mother
(M D 9.71), or to the dyad (M D 4.98) were relatively rare.
A MANOVA carried out on the referents of mental state
terms revealed no significant differences between Narrative
and Paradigmatic mothers [for example, References to the
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FIGURE 1 | Mean percentages of mental state terms used by mothers, as a
function of category (physiological, perceptual, emotional positive, emotional
negative, volitional, cognitive, communicative, and moral) and children’s age.
IntStat_tot = total percentages of mental state words.
FIGURE 2 | Mean percentages of mental state terms used by mothers, as a
function of category (physiological, perceptual, emotional positive, emotional
negative, volitional, cognitive, communicative, and moral) and children’s
gender. IntStat_tot = total percentages of mental state words.
child: F.1;28/ D 1.505; p D 0.23; References to the context:
F.1;28/ D 1.459; p D 0.24]. Interestingly, however, Pearson’s
correlations revealed that context references were negatively and
significantly related to references to the mother (r D  0.53),
to the child (r D  0.67) and to others (r D  0.44)
(all ps < 0.01). These results suggest that the more the
mothers referred mental state terms to the book characters,
the less they referred them to themselves, to the children
or to other persons out of the dyad (for example, their
relatives).
As a last point, we analyzed possible differences in the
references of maternal MSL as a function of children’s age.
The MANOVA results, reported in Table 4, show that the
mothers of younger children referred their MSL to the context
more frequently than the mothers of older children. Post hoc
comparisons with the Bonferroni correction showed that the
mothers of 4.05-year-old children referred mental state terms
to the context more often the mothers of 5.05-year-old children
(pD 0.031).
FIGURE 3 | Mean percentages of mental state terms used by mothers, as a
function of category (physiological, perceptual, emotional positive, emotional
negative, volitional, cognitive, communicative, and moral) and narrative style.
1 = Physiological words; 2 = Perceptual words; 3 = Emotional words
(Emotional positive + Emotional negative); 4 = Emotional positive words;
5 = Emotional negative words; 6 = Volitional words; 7 = Cognitive words;
8 = Communicative words; 9 = Moral words.
DISCUSSION
Narratives provide a coherent structure for recounting the
past to others, but also for representing the past to ourselves
(Rollo and Benelli, 2003). Since language is the medium
through which children learn the canonical narrative structures
(Bruner, 1991, 1996), it is also the primary means through
which adults “socialize” children (Fivush, 2014). In this context,
mother–child conversations are essential instruments through
which children learn the cultural norms that guide adult’s
behaviors. As Fivush et al. (2006) wrote: “Children’s lives
are organized such that the activities in which children
are encouraged to engage are those that the culture deems
important, and it is through participation in culturally mediated,
socially structured activities that children learn the skills
necessary to become competent members of their culture.
With time, as children engage in adult-guided activities, they
internalize the skills initially displayed by others and add them
to their own intrapersonal repertoire” (Fivush et al., 2006,
p. 1,568). It is then important to thoroughly investigate this
continuous and circular process where adults narrate their
own experiences and children learn to build their personal
representations: how is the adults’ narrative toward children
organized?
Parents and their children spend many time in joint
picture-book reading. This activity conforms to the turn-
taking structure of conversation and occurs in a repetitive
sequence formerly described by Ninio and Bruner (1978).
Furthermore, it is from the frequent exposure to this format
that children acquire the capacity to create stories. Since
picture-book reading is characterized by a unique three-way
intersection of narration, face-to-face interaction and self-
reference, it provides an optimal setting for exploring the
processes of self-construction (Lonigan and Whitehurst, 1998).
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TABLE 4 | Mean percentages of mental state terms referred to mother, child, mother and child (dyad), context and others, as a function of children’s age.
References of mothers’ MSL Children’s age in years F(2,27) P
4.05 (N = 10) 5.05 (N = 10) 5.11 (N = 10)
Mother 4.5 (6.37) 13.22 (14.88) 11.41 (13.73) 1.3 0.29
Child 24.45 (13.59) 30.35 (16.35) 35.39 (16.61) 1.19 0.32
Mother and child 2.00 (2.92) 9.68 (11.46) 3.22 (4.96) 3.11 0.061
Context 57.31 (17.38) 30.22 (21.35) 36.45 (26.24) 4.02 0.030
Other 11.72 (8.23) 14.62 (11.29) 13.51 (12.87) 0.235 0.79
Statistics and p-values (MANOVA) are reported in the last two columns.
Indeed, numerous studies have investigated the relationship
between maternal mental lexicon during picture-book reading
and their children’s ToM (Ontai and Thompson, 2008).
These studies examined both the variations in maternal styles
and the consequences on children’s understanding of mind.
Although the results have highlighted a close association between
maternal mental lexicon and the development of children’s
social comprehension, it is not yet clear which aspects of
maternal language are essential to the establishment of this
relation.
Within this broad context, the present study focused on
maternal talk to 4- to 6-year-old children, to investigate: (a)
whether narrative styles changed as a function of children’s
age; and (b) whether different narrative styles were associated
to quantitative differences in the use of mental state terms,
including their referents. First, we wondered whether it
was possible to discriminate between mothers who utilized
Narrative versus Paradigmatic styles. Within our relatively
small sample, we found mothers who, during the task of
picture-book reading, were highly consistent in referring to
the autobiographical experiences of their children and the
mental states of the book characters, and mothers who were
primarily focused on specifying the properties of objects
and their relations. In this respect, the results of our study
confirm the distinctions illustrated in the literature between
elaborative versus repetitive styles (Fivush and Fromhoff, 1988),
narrative versus paradigmatic styles (Tessler, 1986, Unpublished;
Tessler and Nelson, 1994), or expressive versus referential
styles (Nelson, 1973). Clearly, these categories should be
considered as the extremes of a continuum, since all the
mothers produced utterances of both types. More interestingly,
we found that the mothers’ use of narrative styles varied as
a function of children’s age, although the direction of this
difference did not replicate the results reported by Reese
et al. (1993). In facts, our data indicate that the mothers
of 4-year-old children used primarily an expressive/narrative
speech, more centered on interactions and shared experiences,
whereas the mothers of 5- and 6-year-old children were more
likely to adopt a referential/paradigmatic speech, more focused
on objects. This modification parallels what happens during
early child development. As children develop and refine their
interaction skills, they move from a narrative to a paradigmatic
way of systematizing the reality around them (Rollo, 2003,
Unpublished); likewise, mothers change their way of conversing
with their children.
The second aim of the present study was to identify the
internal state words used by mothers during the picture-
book reading. To this purpose, the transcripts were coded
using a scheme illustrated by Camaioni et al. (1998),
which differentiates between eight different MSL categories
(physiological, perceptual, emotional negative, emotional
positive, cognitive, volitional, communicative, and moral).
Confirming previous studies that examined the MSL addressed
to 24-month-old children (Longobardi et al., 2016a), we found
that perceptual terms were used with the highest frequency,
followed by emotional positive, cognitive, and volitional terms.
Importantly, communicative terms were produced with the
same frequency of perceptual terms, suggesting that their use
might be particularly relevant for the creation of a narrative
frame in which children begin to build mature representations of
themselves and other people (Nelson and Fivush, 2004). Indeed,
the terms “to say,” “to tell,” and “to call” were frequently used by
the mothers of 4.05-year-old children.
Statistical analyses revealed that the mothers’ use of
communicative terms varied as a function of children’s age,
being more frequent in the mothers of younger than older
children. No other difference reached the significance level,
although the general trend was well in line with the available
literature. For example, the use of perceptual terms was quite
frequent with 4-year-old children but decreased sharply in the
mothers of older children; in contrast, the use of cognitive and
volitional terms was relatively limited during the interactions
with the youngest group of children, but exhibited a strong
increase in the mothers of 5- and 6-year-old children. These
results nicely mirror the results observed in previous studies
which focused on children’s production and comprehension of
internal state terms (Bretherton and Beeghly, 1982; Shatz et al.,
1983; Tardif and Wellman, 2000; Wellman and Liu, 2004; Kristen
et al., 2012; Longobardi et al., 2014), and therefore confirm the
causal role of maternal language (Meins et al., 2002; Ruffman
et al., 2002; de Rosnay et al., 2004; Slaughter et al., 2007; Ornaghi
et al., 2011). Furthermore, the mothers in our sample used
emotional terms more frequently with girls than with boys –
a finding which has been already observed in the literature
(Lagattuta and Wellman, 2002).
A central aim of our research was to verify whether
mothers classified as Paradigmatic or Narrative differed with
respect to the use of MSL. In contrast with our original
hypotheses, the present findings suggest that conversational
styles and MSL are rather independent: indeed, Narrative and
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Paradigmatic mothers used the eight categories of MSL to the
same degree, with one noteworthy exception: that Narrative
mothers produced communicative terms more frequently than
Paradigmatic mothers. This is interesting because the frequent
use of verbs such as “tell” and “say” might facilitate children’s
understanding of tensed complements, which in turn “is a
precursor and possible prerequisite of successful false-belief
performance” (e.g., de Villiers and Pyers, 2002, p. 1,037). In
agreement, studies have suggested that mothers’ production of
communicative (and more generally, cognitive) verbs might
be closely related to children’s understanding of false belief,
representational change and the appearance-reality distinction
(Le Sourn-Bissaoui and Deleau, 2001; Adrián et al., 2007).
Finally, we wanted to verify whether mothers referred internal
state words to “others” (including their children and the book
characters) more than to themselves. In this respect, correlational
analyses showed that the more the mothers referred mental
state lexicon to the book characters, the less they referred it
to the children or to themselves, indicating a dialog between
two different entities: the fictional characters of the story and
real persons – the mothers and their children. Assuming that
during the book-reading interaction there is a “match” among
these three components (Reese et al., 2003; Fletcher and Reese,
2005), the social interaction established between these elements
seems to move from the book and its “concrete characters” to
the children and the mothers. This was confirmed by the results
of the MANOVA, which showed that the attributions of MSL to
the book characters were predominant in 4.05-year-old children;
this suggests that mothers can tailor their mentalistic input to the
abilities of younger children: in facts, the book characters provide
a concrete anchoring to verbally expressed mentalistic content.
In other words, the mothers of younger children use the book to
objectify an internal reality, which later will be directly attributed
to the child. Moreover, they adapt the language produced in
shared narrative contexts to the age of their children, in order
to guide them toward a gradual awareness of their inner world
(Rollo, 2003, Unpublished).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
In summary, the present study examined the characteristics of
maternal talk during narrative interactions with their children,
with a particular focus on the different use of MSL by Narrative
and Paradigmatic mothers. We learned that: (a) maternal
narrative styles changed as a function of children’s age, such that
the mothers of 4-year-old children were more Narrative than
Paradigmatic, whereas the mothers of 5- and 6-year-old children
exhibited the opposite pattern (i.e., they were more Paradigmatic
than Narrative); (b) the use of communicative terms decreased
with children’s age, and was more frequent in Narrative than in
Paradigmatic mothers; and (c) mothers adapted the referents of
their MSL to the children’s age, such that internal state terms were
first referred to the book characters, then to the child themselves,
and lastly to the dyad.
These conclusions should be evaluated with caution, because
the present study has several limitations. First, the sample size was
relatively small, and this factor limited the possibility to observe
significant differences between the three groups of children.
A second limitation was that we focused on mothers’ speech, and
therefore no data about children’s language was collected. This
means that we could not assess whether changes in maternal MSL
were partially due to simultaneous changes in the internal and
non-internal language produced by children. Finally, no attempt
was made to investigate children’s performance in false belief
tasks, although previous research indicates a close link between
children’s ToM and mothers’ MSL (Furrow et al., 1992; Jenkins
et al., 2003; Rudek and Haden, 2005; Symons et al., 2006; Pearson
and Pillow, 2016). Even with these limitations in mind, we believe
that our results may represent a starting point for future research.
Longitudinal studies should be conducted to delineate any
parallel change in children’s social and emotional development.
Moreover, interventions can be planned in cases in which the
narrative interactions between mothers and children are limited
in frequency or dysfunctional (Tompkins and Farrar, 2011). In
this respect, the use of language intervention practices is now
well established in a variety of conditions, including children
with language impairments (Cirrin and Gillam, 2008), children
coming from economically disadvantaged families (Cain et al.,
2005), and bilingual/immigrant children (Pirchio et al., 2015,
2017). This growing body of research has begun to document
the fact that training mothers to talk elaboratively about past
events can have positive effects on children’s understanding
of mind (Peterson et al., 1999; Reese and Newcombe, 2007;
Reese et al., 2010a,b; Taumoepeau and Reese, 2013). More
generally, interventions that induced caregivers, teachers, and
educators to increase the frequency of book-reading interactions
have reported significant benefits to children’s oral language
and their emergent psychological lexicon (Whitehurst et al.,
1999; Aram and Biron, 2004; Aram et al., 2013; Grazzani
et al., 2016). The present study adds to this literature by
suggesting that, in addition to enhancing the overall quantity
of elaborations produced by caregivers, training interventions
should also focus on fostering the use of specific categories of
mental state terms (communicative, volitional, and cognitive)
and increasing the references to agents other than the book
characters.
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What makes unique and unrepeatable individuals is their ability to write their own story
attributing meaning, sharing it through narration, giving coherence to the information
related to the interpersonal motivational systems, and creating alternative hierarchies
to those biologically provided by the genetic code. Through clinical narratives and
narrative literature, we can observe the recurrence of specific topics, across time
and different cultures. Hence, we wondered whether there are some evolutionary
suggestions that guide us in the construction of the narrative-autobiographical contents.
In this article we proposed a theoretical-clinical hypothesis about the existence of a
biological disposition to identify as fundamental six Life Themes (LTs) that contribute to
defining the image of the self and the world: Love, Personal Value, Power, Justice, Truth,
and Freedom. Besides the innumerable narratives dependent upon context, there may
be many ways of telling stories that, instead, would be reported to these few essential
themes. A narrative review of the literature about these concepts follows the systematic
explanation of the perspective about the LTs as attractors of meaning. The manuscript
considers also the process of co-construction of meanings within the interpersonal
relationships and the influences of these on the narratives. In particular, we focused
on the importance of episodic and autobiographical memory related to the attachment
and significant figures, in the construction of the personal story and the LTs. We also
explained the possible clinical implications of the theoretical hypothesis of LTs. Within
clinical conversations, the LTs could be expressed rigidly or, otherwise, in a confused
way. The lack of narrative integration may lead to the dominance of chaos or rigidity that
generates suffering. A better comprehension of the LTs in patients’ narrations could be
useful to identify a narrative profile about the areas of greatest suffering related to the
idea of self and the world, as well as to construct an adequate care plan.
Keywords: narration, life stories, narrative themes, interpersonal motivational systems, meaning-making,
theoretical model
FUNCTIONS OF NARRATION AND THE SEARCH FOR
MEANING
A complex innate perceptive and motor network drives human behavior from the earliest moments
of life (Lambruschi et al., 2004) to generate a series of representations that regulate, select
and process perceptual information and social actions (Liotti, 1996). These representations are
adaptive suggestions called interpersonal motivational systems (IMSs) (Liotti and Gilbert, 2011).
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Caregiving, attachment as wells as competitive/ranking, sexual-
mating, and co-operative systems are specific for each critical
situation that can be addressed through an appropriate
interpersonal position and are activated and deactivated based
on whether their goal is met (Liotti and Monticelli, 2008).
In the history of human development, alongside the more
archaic “reptilian” motivations (related to the regulation of basic
homeostatic systems, survival and reproduction) and to the
“limbic” social motivations (MacLean, 1984; Liotti, 1994), there
are motivations associated with the neocortical brain (related to
the intersubjective meaning system) which allow the organism to
carry out an evolutionary passage (Veglia, 1999).
Liotti and Monticelli (2008) identified the most recent
epistemic motivational systems (EMSs) supported by the activity
of neocortical circuits and neural networks that mediate
interhemispheric connectivity. These systems involve the ability
to share and co-construct personal meanings and mental states.
The new evolutionary goal directs an individual to attribute
meaning to his/her life by giving order, consistency and
unity to the knowledge possessed and incarnated through the
activation of the oldest limbic and non-social motivational
systems to harmoniously organize his/her vision of self, others
and the world. This evolutionary innovation, integrated with
the purposes and advantages of previous goals, introduces the
need to link elements of reality, perceived through logical and
causal links, and to ask questions about the world (Figure 1). The
individual makes meanings and creates new ways of conceiving
and inventing reality (Bruner, 1997). In addition, in interpreting
human action in terms of intentional states, he/she tends to
tell a story that assigns a plausible meaning to the self and
others (Feldman, 1997). Thus, the tools provided to carry
out this new evolutionary mandate include the sense of time,
integration of semantic and episodic memories, construction
of mental images, languages, and metacognitive functions. The
sense of time and the ability to link events distant from
one another in space and time has been suggested to be
closely related to the ability to tell stories and, in turn, to the
development of communication based on the language (Ferretti,
2016).
The narration hypotheses, supported by Bruner (1990, 2003),
have been demonstrated by neurobiological studies based on
neuroimaging (Young and Saver, 2001; Mar, 2004, 2011; Spreng
and Mar, 2012). Young and Saver (2001) identified four types
of “dysnarrativia” (narrative impairments following focal lesions
in different regions of the neural network that mediates the
creation of narrative). These types of autobiographic experiences
include “arrested narratives,” “unbounded narratives,” “under
narration,” “denarration,” and involve the networks responsible
for the encoding of autobiographical memories, language, and
organization of information in narrative frames (the amygdalo-
hippocampal system, the left peri-Sylvian region, and the frontal
cortices and their subcortical connections). These defects in
narrative construction destabilize the individual’s personality.
The story comprehension has been found connected to a
network of frontal, temporal and cingulate areas that are
related to working-memory and theory-of-mind processes (Mar,
2004).
Other authors suggested that the roots of narrative are closely
related to human sensorimotor intelligence; thus, meaning-
making would be embodied and linked to the organization of the
purposeful movement (Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, 2015).
THEMATIC CONTENT OF NARRATIVES
What makes individuals unique and unrepeatable is their ability
to write their own story by attributing meaning to external and
internal reality, giving order and cohesion to information and
knowledge related to the work of interpersonal motivational
systems, and building alternative hierarchies to biological goals
provided by the genetic code (Veglia, 1999). The opportunity
to make stories contributes to creating that space of self-
determination for which biological constraints do not constitute
inviolable limits, but resources to draw what is possible. The
peculiarity of a personal story also involves the specificity of
the development of some narrative themes that are shaped like
the expression of neocortical motivational systems. Along the
gradual and progressive definition of the image of the self and the
world in historical and narrative form (Damasio, 1999, 2010), the
individual confronts himself/herself with the particular thematic
constraints, which act as organizers of meaning in the experience
and manifest themselves across cultures and organizations of
personality (Guidano, 1987). These themes are constraints, but
also opportunities, for the development of the narrative plot
as they guide the attribution of meaning to experience, leaving
creative freedom to choose from countless variations (Veglia,
1999, 2013).
McAdams (1996, 2001) identified some “nuclear” and
constant themes that permeate life stories. He distinguished
two main critical themes around which individuals extend
the accounts of their existence: agency and communion. The
agency is based on self-identification and affirmation. Concepts
such as strength, power, mastery, autonomy, separation and
independence are included. Life stories are organized around a
central nucleus that sees the individual protagonist and master
of his/her life. Inside agency it is distinguished as: self-mastery;
status/victory, namely the recognition of a prestigious position
within interpersonal relationships; achievement/responsibility,
related to the realization, achievement of goals and assumption
of responsibility; empowerment, which is growth and self-
strengthening.
Communion, on the other hand, is indicative of the processes
of sharing within interpersonal relationships. It is linked to
experiences of affiliation, union and intimacy. Communion
includes love/friendship, or erotic love or friendship with
another person; dialog, which concerns forms of mutual and
non-instrumental communication; caring/help, which concerns
care, assistance, physical, material, social or emotional support;
unity/togetherness, which refers to the feeling of union, harmony,
intimacy, synchrony, loyalty, closeness, and solidarity with a
group of people, community, or any other type of aggregation of
individuals.
Within constructionism, Ugazio (2013) identified some
semantic polarities (i.e., meaning dimensions and the antagonists
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FIGURE 1 | The scheme summarizes the evolutionary steps according to the Triune Brain theory (MacLean, 1984). The development of epistemic motivational
systems allows man to attribute and co-construct meanings to the world and the activity of the older motivational systems. On the bottom the figure illustrates the
different trajectories that the thematic narrative can follow in the constant attempt to interpret the flow of incoming information. The bi-directionality of the arrows
indicates the individual’s ability to move in both directions along the continuum that connects the three evolutionary steps.
among them) around which each family organizes their
conversations. Such “meaning organizers” identify what is
relevant to a group, and articulates their experiences. Four
sets of semantic polarities have been identified, nourished by
specific emotions, called the semantic of freedom, goodness,
power, and belonging. What is particularly salient is the reciprocal
placements that the subject and meaningful people take in the
family dialog with respect to the critical theme (Castiglioni et al.,
2013).
THE THEORETICAL–CLINICAL
HYPOTHESIS: CROSS-CULTURAL LIFE
THEMES (LTs)
The existence of a biological disposition to identify as
fundamental some LTs within which it is possible to carry
out all our main biological goals in a structured and coherent
manner has been hypothesized (Veglia, 1999). When IMS
(Lichtenberg, 1989; Lichtenberg et al., 1992; Liotti, 2001) work,
they follow in interdependence an evolutionary stage that
involves the building of a coherent vision of the self and the
world through which men/women can think and tell in a
wide space of time (Guidano, 1987): LTs arise at this level.
Reptilian and limbic motivations are lived by people as the
primary needs to satisfy. Neocortical motivations are felt not
only as a necessity but as something that allows us to approach
what we consider the “true” purpose: the ultimate goal of
life. In fact, neocortical motivations could be understood as
a genetic invitation to carry out some LTs (Veglia, 1999).
They are created on the basis of the significant life events,
of individuals’ interpretation, of the consequences they have
derived. They contribute to defining the image of the self and the
world.
Life themes can be considered as frameworks of common
meaning to the human species and transversal to different
cultures. Bruner (1990) described the “narrative genres” which
impose thematic constraints on how to tell themselves and
the world, but also allow for creative and personal variations.
Narrative themes, therefore, should be considered not like
scripts, but the primary, irreducible, and generative scenarios of
countless, unique and unrepeatable texts narrated by individuals.
While imposing thematic limits, the development of the
neocortex offered the individual the freedom to create infinite
variations on the subject that are as flexible as they allow the
dialog between the different parts of the self.
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Veglia (1999), in the first formulation of his theoretical
hypothesis, tried to identify the primary thematic nuclei.
Such systematization, in accordance with McAdams (1996,
2001) studies, included two thematic areas: control/power
and semantics/sharing. The two thematic areas, through the
formation of Me/You (sharing) and I/It (control) (Buber, 1923)
relationships, contribute to the development of their own story
and the achievement of increasingly complex goals. The area
of control/power concerns issues that involve the possibility of
having control over the survival, mating and maintenance of the
wellbeing for self and offspring through automatic and partially
intentional actions. The themes of the semantic/sharing thematic
area underline the importance of interpersonal relationships and
the influence they have on the attribution of meaning. These
areas allow us to develop more themes and form the plot of our
knowledge and our story. Each theme has intrinsic and optional
development lines, each of which, through their continuous
interconnections, influence in different ways the perception of
self, behaviors, future design, cognitive styles, relational styles,
articulation of knowledge, as well as the construction of organized
social systems, cultures, and stories.
In a second formulation of the theoretical hypothesis,
Veglia (2013) identified six recurring, transcultural, and trans-
organizing LTs, within the previous two thematic areas,
that would be expressed as the attractors of meaning and
would be delineated through phylogenetic evolution and
ontogenetic development of the various relational positions,
and interpersonal motivational systems, such as attachment,
caregiving, competitive/rank, sexual-mating, cooperation and
belonging.
Narrative themes have been identified with reference to
the analysis of mythology, narrative literature, anthropological,
philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific essays as well as
the analysis of hundreds of clinical stories (see Figure 2).
The analysis, carried out over several years by a research group
within the Department of Psychology of the University of Turin
and a clinical group within the Crocetta Clinical Center in Turin,
both led by Fabio Veglia, developed by applying focus-group and
consensus-conference methods. After a broad brainstorming,
constraints were created for generating conceptual maps using
five main criteria.
The first criterion was the theme’s irreducibility (i.e., the
inability to consider the narrative content as part of another
theme, regardless of the possibility to combine several themes
to generate stories). The second criterion was the utmost
independence from contextual characteristics (i.e., the inability
to bring about the existence of the narrative content under
consideration to a peculiar feature of a single, historical,
geographical, or anthropological context by its nature not being
necessarily recurring or non-generalizable). The third criterion
was the presence of the theme in every culture and every
historical period examined, regardless of the innumerable modes
and possible recombination of its development. The fourth
criterion was the intrinsic structural capacity of the theme (also
called the “semantic attractor” or “narrative theme” or “life
theme”) to attract and generate meaning both in the form of
expressions (even non-linguistic) and in the construction of
the self and the dialog between parts of the self. The final
criterion was not meeting the inclusion criterion of the simple
high occurrence of arguments, contents, mechanisms, processes,
mental states, attributes, meaning organizations, life events,
mental representations that are often referred to as “themes.”
The six Life Themes that emerged have been named: Love,
Personal Value, Power, Freedom, Truth and Justice.
Subsequently, the six themes were subjected to qualitative
analysis using the transcripts of the Adult Attachment Interview
(AAI, George et al., 1985, unpublished). This strategy was
in accordance with the hypothesis of continuity between the
expression of the limbic/relational attachment/caregiving system
and the neocortical system related to the attribution of meaning
to the self and the world through the memory of significant
interactions. This study highlighted the presence of the LTs
in the AAI transcripts even though they were not the subject
of the questions. Furthermore, these LTs were linked to the
different states of mind with respect to the attachment. It allowed
dissolving reservations on the theme of Justice which, according
to the first hypothesis, seemed to be a derivative of the narrative
of other themes, not respecting the criterion of irreducibility
(Di Fini, unpublished doctoral dissertation).
An exploratory study of psychological literature was
conducted on the six attractors of meaning identified by the
theoretical–clinical hypothesis of Veglia (1999, 2013). With
regard to the nationality of the authors of identified articles,
most of the studies were conducted by Americans, followed by
Canadians, Israelis, Dutch, English, Germans, and Australians.
With respect to the historical trend of scientific articles from
1950 to the present day, frequency analysis showed a strong
growth since the 1970s. This upward trend seems to be steady
until today.
Referring to the content of the articles, there was great
heterogeneity in the areas in which each theme was investigated:
from the area of general psychology, to the discipline of
psychotherapy, to social and developmental psychology.
The narrative review of the literature about each construct
follows the systematic explanation of the perspective about the
LTs as attractors of meaning. Instead, for the description of the
axes, along which LTs may position themselves, see the section
“The theoretical–clinical hypothesis: cross-cultural axes.”
Love
In terms of evolution, the Love theme is in direct continuity of
the experience of caring (caregiving), the search for proximity
(attachment), sexual intimacy (sexual-mating system), friendship
(co-operation) and is supported by neocortical motivations that
allow men/women to be conscious and free.
The analysis of the substance of the love experience is beyond
the boundaries of this work and of this discipline. This object of
study has been always immense, mysterious, and irreducible for
everyone who has approached it. However, the need to live and
tell love by different expressions, interests, moves and guides all
human beings.
Love, so different in its forms, but unique in something of
its essence, is more than the proximity and protection by a
safe base. Love is philia, agape, caritas, eros, friendship, shared
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FIGURE 2 | Life themes and their different meanings along the continuum of evolution. The six themes meanings along the two-way arrows represent the tools that
allow the narration to move through the three evolutionary steps.
and incarnated attribution of meanings through the body, its
signs, emotions, and also (but not necessarily) through the word
(Veglia, 1999). In this article, we refer to all these ways of love and
its countless other possible manifestations.
We can hypothesize three narrative positions used to describe
love: to be loved, or the object of someone’s love, regardless of the
quality of that love; to be loving, as a subject of love, though not
necessarily in a relationship based on reciprocity; to be lovable, as
perception, representation, and self-narrative.
Obviously in terms of presence/absence there may be those
who have not been loved, disliked, and not recognized as a lovable
person.
The positive/negative quality of the narration involves the
position of having been badly loved, or having expressed his/her
own love toward others in the form of control and possession, or
having obsessively doubted even in the absence of well-founded
motives of his/her own amiability.
The most complete expression of love narrative is based on
the human capacity to generate and share the meaning of new
tales and the high integrative abilities of the neocortex. It involves
unconditional love, able to recognize others, be devoted to others,
and be respectful of their boundaries, inexhaustible, manifest, and
proactive. Hence, potentially, this is the love of parents, friends,
and, in some cases, of partners.
The experiences of love based on emotional co-regulation are
more conditioned, but still beneficial. These put an “I love you if
you love me” constraint by reducing mutual freedom, but also the
serious risks of suffering related to unconditional love.
Conversely, in its less integrated and more controllable
expressions, love can be a semantically negative experience.
A person who invades, uses, constrains, limits, confuses, scares,
threatens, or humiliates the object of his/her love turns narrative
into a toxic and traumatic experience for each person, but
ultimately for himself/herself. Many wounds of the body
and spirit are suffered in the name of love. The graphical
representation of this Theme is reported in Figure 3.
In literature Love seems to be considered among the
most intense feelings of human beings and among the most
investigated ones. In fact, most of the articles considered for this
topic tried to explain what love is by offering a wide variety of
models and approaches.
Maslow (1962) made a distinction between Deficiency love (D-
love), which emerges from the insecurity and lesser emotional
need of an individual, and Being love (B-love), which emerges
from a high emotional need of an individual. Livingston (1980)
considered love to be a process of reducing uncertainty. The
definition proposed by Pope (1980) seemed to proffer a great
deal of agreement and seemed to capture the many affections and
cognitions associated with love.
Rubin (1970, 1973) developed a “Love Scale” based on three
theoretical components: the “Affiliative and dependent need,” the
“Predisposition to help,” and the “Exclusiveness and absorption.”
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FIGURE 3 | Narration of Love theme and its different meanings according to its position in the areas between axes.
A scale of love measurement based on a different theory was
proposed by Steffen et al. (1984). It is based on Tennov’s (1979)
theory of limerence, which defines it in terms of an intrusive
cognitive activity, acute desire, addiction, and physical sensations
in response to a loved one, painting it as an extreme romantic
attachment to another person. Lee (1973) built a typology of styles
of loving by analyzing the literature. This typology distinguishes
six types of love (three primary and three secondary): Eros
(romantic and passionate love); Ludus (love as interpersonal play
between different partners); Storge (an inclination to fusion and
friendship, without passion); Mania (a dependent and possessive
love); Pragma (a rational calculation with focuses on the desirable
attributes of the partner); Agape (a disinterested and unselfish
love). Secondary styles are conceived as chemical compounds of
the primary elements, and although all styles are interrelated,
each one has qualitative independent properties.
Fehr (1988) identified a set of 68 characteristics of love, such
as “love,” “in love,” and “liking,” which seem to have a clear
prototypic structure in the sense that some features are good
examples of the concept. In psychotherapy, Natterson (2003)
observed that love is a fundamentally dynamic element of the
therapeutic process as any intimate relationship. Our article
portrays therapy as a process of mutual love subject to the many
vicissitudes to which love is concerned.
Value
The neocortex appears to push into estimating personal value and
to consider it as a property of the self, hoping to see it recognized
by others and thus shared. This theme is in continuity of
the immediate evaluation of survival and reproduction capacity
(R-complex) and the subsequent evaluation attributed by our
conspecifics to our strengths, abilities, and competencies through
the typical activation of interpersonal motivational systems
(limbic system).
It involves types of value (considered to be a system of
personal features that qualify an individual) that differ from
each other according to the ways of assignment and attribution
within interpersonal relationships. We distinguish, on the one
hand, a criterion value if its attribution is based on external and
quantifiable criteria and, on the other hand, an ontological value if
its recognition describes the person’s mode of being, according to
internal parameters. The first one leads to a permanence problem
because it will be attributed to the person until the criteria are
respected. The second one will not be exhausted because it will
not be contingent or tied to specific conditions, but will represent
the essence of the individual, which persists even after a total
disregard of all his/her properties.
As shown in Figure 4, in some cases, the concept of value
assumes a relational connotation: we must seek dialog and
relationship with others to continue to confirm and retain the
feeling of having a value. Within interpersonal relationships,
the value can be attributed, and generates for the individual
a condition of expectation and dependence on the assignment
and judgment imposed externally. On the contrary, it can
be recognized in a climate of sharing and co-construction of
the meaning. For a signal of personal value to be recognized
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FIGURE 4 | Narration of Value theme and its different meanings according to its position in the areas between axes.
as effective requires a negotiation and sharing of meanings.
The estimating indicators do not necessarily have to coincide
with the rank indicators produced by the expression of the
competitive/ranking system (Veglia, 1999).
With respect to Value, it seems that scientific research
focuses on self-esteem as an operationalization of the Value
theme. In particular, this construct is present in the literature
in the dual meaning of self-esteem and self-worth. The
concept of self-esteem means self-evaluation by the subject if
the criteria for estimation are externally decided; self-worth
means self-evaluation by the subject if the criteria are internal.
Developmental psychologists (Erikson, 1963; Sroufe, 1978) gave
great emphasis to the role of the early emotional experiences
in determining the sense of emotional wellbeing, personal
value and self-esteem. Children, presumably, learn whether their
environment is loving and satisfying or hostile and frustrating,
before the development of a complex cognitive system capable of
evaluating specific beliefs about the self.
Drawing on the theory of self-determination, Pyszczynski et al.
(2003) argued that people seem to feel better if their self-esteem
is based on abstract and unique features rather than if it is based
on more superficial aspects. However, according to Crocker et al.
(2003), self-esteem is partly based on receiving the approval and
liking of others (Mead, 1934; Coopersmith, 1967). In fact, self-
esteem is generally correlated with the positivity of what people
think others think of them (Coopersmith, 1967; Bowlby, 1982).
Furthermore, religious belief is also moderately associated
with self-esteem and other aspects of psychological wellbeing
(Baker and Gorusch, 1984; Bergin et al., 1987; Nelson, 1989).
Religion can have positive effects on self-esteem through the
belief that a person is loved, esteemed and unique in God’s eyes.
Another potential contingency for self-esteem is the morality or
virtue of a person (Coopersmith, 1967; Benson and Lyons, 1991),
because adherence to a moral code can lead to judgment that a
person is good, moral and worthy.
Power
At the limbic motivational level, the competitive/ranking system
(Liotti, 2001) regulates the ability to compete with others to
defend privileges and gain new benefits by defining social
ranks and resource-regulated access. At the neocortical level,
the Power theme is a narrative framework within which there
is thinking and telling of the stories of competitions. It also
refers to the personal sense of control of oneself, others, and
events, accompanied by the individual’s awareness of being an
active author of a project. Humans are obliged, for survival, to
keep control of the physical and social environment to make
more effective interactions with other conspecifics. Through
metacognition, individuals make understandable to others the
relationships and forms of control. The position of each of us
with respect to control and being controlled contributes to the
construction of the self and defines the perception of personal
power (see Figure 5).
Power, because it not always involves shared possibilities, can
include multiple effects within interpersonal relationships. Power
over others is often synonymous with abuse and submission, and
rarely is managed for the benefit of the group; it can become risky
if its management represents a source of value. The power for
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FIGURE 5 | Narration of Power theme and its different meanings according to its position in the areas between axes.
others is exercised in favor of a single person or a group (power is
a service). Power with others involves solidarity and co-operation
among people who share it in collaboration for a common goal.
The most meaningful power is, ultimately, the ability of being
freely and authentically yourself with every part of the self. It
involves the ability to become accomplished without having to
adapt to the desires of others. However, “in order to be me” it
is necessary for the existence of a grateful and respectful “you.”
This particular sense of power is similar to the concept of mastery
(Semerari et al., 2003): management of individual mental states
also in relation to the elaborated theory of the mental states of
others.
In the literature, the Power theme seems to play a key part.
The most frequently encountered perceptions for this Theme
are “Power of” and “Power on,” which is otherwise called
control.
Decades of research in sociology and psychology have shown
that the perception of control is a strong predictor of physical
and mental wellbeing (Rodin, 1986; Bandura, 1989; Fiske and
Taylor, 1991; Thompson and Spacapan, 1991; Lachman and
Burack, 1993). According to Wong (1992), life is an unstoppable
search for control: much of our time is spent in the effort to
reach the sense of control. Conversely, aggression and conflict,
submission and domination, negotiation, and cooperation are
just some of the ways people try to solve control issues. Another
interesting development in this area was the discovery that
people have beliefs about how they can control their behaviors,
emotions and attitudes in the sense of modifying or regulating
them (Baltes and Baltes, 1990; Brandtstadter et al., 1993; Skinner
and Wellborn, 1994). In this case, beliefs about control contain
perceptions of the degree to which individuals can produce the
desired results or prevent unwanted ones within themselves. The
need for expertise is closely related to other control constructs;
nevertheless, the notion of a psychological need of effectiveness as
a source of motivation is distinct from subjective, objective, and
experiential control. The need for competence is often confused
with the need for autonomy or self-determination and, therefore,
the constructions of perceived control are often confused with
the belief system resulting from autonomy experiences, such as
the locus of causal attribution (Rodin, 1990). Hegarty (2007)
reported that psychologists seem to have largely ignored the
way power works in real communities: who exercises it, where
it derives, and how it is used to influence the attitudes and
behaviors of community members. Considerable attention has
been paid to these important issues by sociologists and political
scientists.
In their revision of the literature on power, Keltner et al. (2003)
suggested that power activates a general tendency to approach,
whereas lack of power activates a general tendency to inhibition.
If this were true, power-loving individuals should exhibit greater
orientation to action than those without power, regardless of the
social consequences of their actions. However, other researchers
showed that power not always leads to antisocial consequences,
but may be the catalyst for achieving prosocial results that might
not be realized otherwise. In addition, those studies demonstrated
that power can be conceived not only as an aspect of social
structure, but also as a cognitive structure that can be triggered
by appropriate environmental stimuli.
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Galinsky et al. (2003, 2006) defined power as the ability to
control one’s own or others’ resources without social interference
(Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Keltner et al., 2003). In many
conceptualizations of power, the ability to influence and control
the behavior of others is of primary importance (French et al.,
1959; Manz and Gioia, 1983; Oshiaki Imai, 1993; Copeland,
1994). This type of power has been called “social power” because
it derives from an individual’s relationships with others (Fiske,
1993; Overbeck and Park, 2001). For Winter (1973), “power
motive” designates the need to be authoritative, effective and have
an impact on the surrounding world. Submitting to power is
also a strong motivation to increase personal status or prestige.
The Power theme in the sense of human possibility, and self-
realization as the full affirmation of the most intimate essence of
the person was taken up by McClelland (1975) in describing two
tendencies of the individual: achievement and power motives.
The first one is a type of personal achievement that uses
feedback mechanisms to control one’s own success; the second
one includes a form of decline in personal power, or in the shade
of power over others, or in institutional (or even social) power.
In a clinical setting, De Varis (1994) stated that power in the
therapeutic relationship is like a double-edged sword which can
either release the patient from the chains of psychopathology or,
unknowingly, reduce the patient’s empowerment.
The process of effective therapy provides considerable power
and respect to the patient; it activates the patient’s ability
to cure himself/herself and his/her active participation in the
change process. This strengthens the patient, reduces his/her
arbitrary sense of authority, and strengthens mutuality; it also
increases, clarifies and reveals the patient’s personal power to
himself/herself. In this process, the therapist, who was initially
idealized, is finally recognized for his/her humanity, fallacy, and
internal conflicts.
Freedom
This theme refers to the possibility of free choice, which
probably belongs only to humans. Freedom emerges with partial
evolutionary discontinuity and along with the new narrative
possibilities that bring us into our cognitive horizons and greatly
increases the risks associated with choices and decisions. Hence,
it also takes shape in our stories in relation to the limits
and boundaries necessary to stifle the experiences of anguish,
confusion and disorientation that would result from its tendency
to infinity (Castiglioni et al., 2014).
The share of freedom in an individual’s life is indispensable
for dealing with ethical issues and should be in balance with
that portion of protective constraints that enables us to outline
action plans in our life story. The limit of every personal
freedom is the freedom of all other persons, so we must
limit ourselves to receive mutual assurances. The notion of
responsibility as the ability to guarantee safety within social
relationships derives from this narrative theme. The Freedom
theme is, simultaneously, the content and framework of the
other themes, as well as the requirement for the existence of
ontological value, of being yourself and of unconditional love.
The freedom to act, express, and speak represents the different
forms freedom can assume in the world of an individual’s
meanings and to make sense, especially within meaningful
relationships.
Apart from the freedom to express, choose and decide,
we can conquer, with the process of individual growth, the
partial freedom from our inner constraints, which we normally
perceive as irreplaceable and which dramatically limit needs.
Adults who take care of us, accompany us during childhood and
adolescence, must support us in the struggle for liberation from
the irrepressible impulse to immediately satisfy our needs. The
inner discipline resulting from it can give us new wide spaces of
semantic and procedural freedom.
Finally, we distinguish the concept of free will, in which
the general possibility of choosing anything, regardless of its
ethical value, and the idea of freedom as an opportunity to
choose from the infinite opportunities to preach the “good”
(Saint Augustine, 5th century AD). The problem in this case is
not to opt for socially negative behaviors, but to assess whether
this option is self-narrative without triggering internal conflicts.
In other words, the condition for freedom is represented by
the possibility of telling one’s actions, as well as guaranteeing
access to the sharing and negotiation of their meaning. The
increase in the degree of freedom and, simultaneously, of
the flexibility with which it attributes meaning to experience,
is the minimum requirement for any possibility of change.
The graphical representation of this Theme is reported in
Figure 6.
The basic problem pursued by psychologists who deal with
Freedom comes from observing a broad belief in individual
freedom and the indeterminacy of human action. It is important
to recognize the distinction between freedom as a formal
assumption of a psychological theory and personal conviction
(Mandler and Kessen, 1974; Mandler, 1994).
Steiner (1970) introduced the concept of “perceived freedom.”
His conceptual analysis distinguished between two aspects
of perceived freedom: “Outcome Freedom” and “Decision
Freedom.” The first is the estimated likelihood that the goal of
each alternative course of action can be reached. The second is
the degree to which the actor is seen as the critical determinant
of the action, and not constrained by external conditions such as
differences in the costs or benefits associated with the different
rates of action. Once a value has been established for freedom of
decision, Outcome Freedom influences the value of alternatives
and changes the value of Decision Freedom.
In a 1997 publication, O’Connor et al. (1997) said that it
is usually the negative aspect of freedom that leads people to
approach psychotherapy: the desire to be rid of the weight
of thoughts and emotions that reduce their freedom and act
according to their wishes. In the course of psychotherapy, the
positive aspect of freedom is cultivated in a context conducive
to autonomy and self-regulation as desirable goals. However,
the transition from the notion of “self-liberation” to that of
“self-control” implies the exploration of the complex interaction
between the subjective sensations of freedom and the objective
limits placed upon it. People can become anxious and fearful in
the face of what they perceive as too much freedom in the absence
of significant boundaries for choices and behavior (Fromm,
1942).
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FIGURE 6 | Narration of Freedom theme and its different meanings according to its position in the areas between axes.
Truth
In terms of evolution, the topic of truth is linked to the need for
living organisms to predict events as exact or probable in relation
to the factual world. Unknowingly, the most archaic part of our
central nervous system learns from experience, with reasonable
chances of exercising sufficient control over the context despite
the risk of developing superstitious behaviors.
Then, with the emergence of conscious awareness and
intentionality, following the problem of prediction, there is the
need to recognize and distinguish the true from false, or from
deception and relational traps, or to pretend to gain relational
benefits.
In its most recent semantic developments, however, this
theme embraces and supports others as it directly represents the
fulfillment of the third evolutionary mandate for the search for
meaning. Here, truth is understood as the foundation for building
meaning. The investigation of the truth within narrative plots
means referring to its own way of telling the experience and
explaining the continuous flow of time (Guidano, 1987).
However, if a person, in contact with his/her narrative truth,
fails to accept it and coherently integrate it into his/her own
story, he/she can create a sort of self-deception, “accommodation
and adjustment of the truth,” that makes it more compatible
with the rest of the plot storytelling. It follows that there
may be internal dissonances between the will to genuinely
deepen meanings and the disturbance that derives from their
examination. The Truth theme (see Figure 7) is carried out in
full agreement with the constructivist view of knowledge as an
incessant building-up based on experience, reflective reflection of
one’s own experience, on personal experimentation, and not on
the search for an absolute truth that is alien to the subject’s point
of observation (Armezzani, 2004). It involves the search for the
meaning created through the immediate comprehension of self-
in-world, in which the other represents the necessary condition
for validating and confirming our own perspective about the
experience.
Justice
The Justice theme is extremely complex in its semantics, narrative
forms, historical and cultural differences, and even more in
precarious attempts for good administration. For a long time, we
were hesitant about its inclusion among LTs.
In fact, it is closely related to Value, still in tune with merciful
Love (severe punishment or forgiveness?), and employed
constantly in trying to moderate the narration and arbitrary
exercise of Power, Freedom, and Truth. It could, therefore, be
traced back to the narratives of the other five themes and depend
on them in their semantics without respecting the criterion of
irreducibility. In fact, the research that we have conducted on AAI
transcripts would show an autonomous structure of this narrative
theme.
The most critical and perhaps more archaic positions in the
narrative of Justice are related to the indifference to injustice,
inability to assume responsibility for the damage or suffering
caused to others, lack of guilt and to disposition toward repair
and reconciliation. The poor integration of the semantics related
to justice, the strong push to have control over others with
every means at the expense of others and the experience of
serious and protracted suffered injustices expose individuals and
communities to serious psychopathological risks.
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FIGURE 7 | Narration of Truth theme and its different meanings according to its position in the areas between axes.
FIGURE 8 | Narration of Justice theme and its different meanings according to its position in the areas between axes.
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Conversely, questioning the foundations of justice, the
commitment to build it through a system of laws based on shared
values, as well as combating injustice by mutual recognition of the
same rights and duties protect us from semantic relational trauma
and participate in the construction of a cohesive self-rooted in
belonging to one’s own community (see Figure 8).
At the evolutionary level, the narrative of the need for justice
and the protest for injustice appears during childhood. However,
its application is, for a long time, regulated by the outside and
often, during adolescence, is perceived as a form of violence in a
sometimes dramatic way of framing.
According to Colquitt (2001) Justice is involved in the
field of organizational sciences. Justice is considered a social
construction: consequently, an action is considered right if most
individuals perceive it to be right. In particular, organizational
justice can be described by focusing on the antecedents
and consequences of two types of subjective perceptions: the
correctness of the results of the distribution processes and the
correctness of the procedures used to determine such distribution
results. These forms of justice are typically referred to as
“distributive justice” (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal,
1976) and “procedural justice” (Thibaut and Walker, 1975;
Leventhal et al., 1980). Efforts to understand the impact of
justice on effective organizational functioning are included in the
category of research on organizational justice (Greenberg, 1990).
Dzuka and Dalbert (2007) claimed that workplace justice
matters to employees because these experiences meet the
fundamental need to believe in a just world; on the contrary,
experience of injustice can threaten this need by providing
evidence of its infallibility (Cubela Adoric and Kvartuc, 2007).
There are also empirical and theoretical reasons for considering
belief in a fair world as a relatively stable conviction but, as
Cubela Adoric and Kvartuc suggested, it is also conceivable that
under certain conditions it may be weakened. A strong belief
that the world is right will be linked to better mental health
and wellbeing due to its association with the knowledge that
helps us to function in everyday life, such as the confidence
that we will be treated fairly by others and the perception of
the significance of life events. According to many theorists of
social justice, evaluations of fairness or iniquity are closely related
to peoples’ merits (Lerner and Whitehead, 1980; Lerner, 1987;
Major, 1994; Feather, 1999). Moreover, these attributes strongly
preach the impressions of justice and congruent emotions such as
anger and rancor. There is, thus, the possibility of defining justice
explicitly and largely in terms of what is deserved. According
to Ellard and Skarlicki (2002), the factors affecting the merits of
victims and observers and, therefore, judgments on equity, may
differ.
In summary, the large number of articles confirmed the
importance of LTs as powerful motifs of meaning from which
individual and social narratives unfold. These Life Themes, in
fact, are also present in a wide range of disciplines.
The first evidence emerging from qualitative analyses is that
psychological research tends to fragment themes (as they are
considered according to this hypothesis) in multiple dimensions
and constructs. Moreover, because of this fragmentation, it is not
always easy to attribute a construct to one topic or another.
Faced with the vastness of the results in many fields of interest
in psychology, there are few studies on LTs in the purely narrative
context. Thus, the “limbic” motivations are often confused with
the higher “neocortical” motivations related to the attribution of
meaning. Instead, the theoretical–clinical hypothesis of Veglia
(1999, 2013) refers to conceiving these narrative themes as
powerful organizational predispositions of narratives.
It might be interesting to repeat investigation of the literature
at a deeper level of complexity and specificity to detail more
clearly how these attractors of meaning are referred to.
THE THEORETICAL–CLINICAL
HYPOTHESIS: CROSS-CULTURAL AXES
The narrative, conversational and relational nature of the LTs
makes it necessary to locate the narrator’s position and the
direction of the “movement” associated with attributing meaning.
Each person may alternatively be the object of attributing
meaning to someone else, and the subject who attributes it to
others and the world. Simultaneously, the individual can be the
subject and the object of this action when he/she reflects on
himself/herself. In Figure 9, we observe the six narrative themes
studied in the three different positions and in the relational
movements generated by them.
Study of the LTs has been formalized using three polarized
axes. Each of these polarized axes describes a continuum of
possible positions: starting from their common intersection at
point 0, these axes identify areas of wellbeing and narrative
suffering with all possible intermediate positions. Each of the
areas is placed in connection with the four states of mind related
to the AAI (Free, Dismissing, Entangled, and Unresolved).
At point 0, which generates the polarized directions of the
three axes, early attachment/caregiving experiences and the
related states of mind are represented. The three axes are
described below.
Basic Control vs. Co-regulation vs.
Sharing of the Theme
The prevalence and alternation of top–down and bottom–up
activation related to the different life stories and to the flow
of energy and information (Siegel, 2001, 2008, 2015) require
a constant interpretation by the neocortex (especially in the
left hemisphere) to maintain the consistency and continuity
of consciousness and personal narrative (Gazzaniga, 2012).
The brain continues to try to attribute meaning to automatic,
unconscious and involuntary responses (responsiveness) and is
modulated by older motivational systems and oriented toward
the monitoring of context. Often, the subsequent narration is
poor on relational and semantic levels, but effective in returning
a sense of events and coherence with internal states. Conscious
attempts (consciousness) to attribute sense and meaning to
the thematic narrative are more evolved and effective if there
are sufficiently good relational occasions. These attempts act
through interpersonal co-regulation, based on the activation
of polyvagal prosocial systems (Porges, 2001), interpersonal
motivations (Liotti and Gilbert, 2011), and affective systems
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FIGURE 9 | Meanings of the themes according to the interpersonal positions and movements.
sustained by the activity of the right hemisphere (Schore, 2009).
However, the greatest narrative effectiveness is expressed through
the semantic sharing in both its linguistic (storytelling) and
expressive extralinguistic forms. The evolving advantages of the
shared narrative of Life Themes also expose individuals to higher
risks of interpersonal accidents and failures, and thus to top–
down semantic traumas with consequent severe dysregulation of
IMS activation and arousal.
Absent/Negative Narration vs.
Present/Positive Narration of the Theme
The narrative of one or more LTs may have been excluded
from experience due to the total lack of significant interpersonal
occasions related to the semantic content expressed by the Life
Theme. It may generate a serious narrative deficit and preclude
the possibility of constructing an integrated and harmonic self
(van der Hart et al., 2006; Lanius et al., 2010). In other cases,
it may be inaccessible to memory because it is associated with
severely and repeatedly traumatic relational experiences. It may
have been removed to reduce access to excessively painful or
disorganized mental or somatic states. It can be systematically
avoided not to reactivate conscious traumatic memories. It can
be easily accessible but negatively characterized so as to create
dysregulated internal states or painful conflicts between parts of
the self.
Conversely, it can be derived from rich interpersonal
experiences, which are often positive and useful for building
a wide and coherent self-concept and world-concept at the
semantic level. The narrative of the Life Theme cannot be absent
and positive (for a logical constraint) but can be present and
negative. In this case it is placed in the axis portion with negative
polarity.
Narration with Low Integration vs.
Narrative with High Integration of the
Theme
A narration with high integration is rich, coherent, extensive,
extended in time, and continuous. It involves an articulated use
of semantic, episodic and autobiographical memory. It highlights
effective inter-hemispherical communication as well as good
connections among cognitive, emotional, arousal, and action
levels. It is normally associated with an excellent level of reflective
function and Theory of Mind and, in a virtuous recursive process,
generates and is supported by a good integration between the
parts of the self.
The intersections between the three axes generate four
different narrative areas within which the different themes can
occupy all the positions arising from the different recombination.
Therefore, each individual may have one or more themes located
in each different area.
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High presence and positivity of narration of the theme, high
sharing, and high integration describe the area of wellbeing and
resources.
Absence or negativity of narration of the theme, absence of
integration, and lack of sharing describe the area of semantic
trauma.
Absence or negation of the narration of the theme, but with
sufficient integration and sharing describe the area of lack or loss
of meaning.
Presence or positivity of the narration of the theme, but poor
sharing and integration, describe the area of the chronic semantic
alarm. For a graphical representation see Figure 10.
LIFE THEMES, INTERPERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS, AND ATTACHMENT
SYSTEM
Narrative processes are not only responsible for the
harmonization of different selves within the same person,
but also of interpersonal integration (Siegel, 2001, 2008, 2015).
As social processes, the narration, contents and tone of the
story are affected by the influence of those who listen and thus
contribute to the building of shared and collective meanings. In
the construction of a personal story, attachment stories have a
great importance (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980, 1982). These stories
are created within the relationship with the parents who, in turn,
have a previous story and create a new one with us, laying the
foundations for the realization of the goals in a unique way. The
first are figures we relate to, the environment they offer us, as well
as the cultural context we are part of, which are effective tools to
differentiate and create our own personal story (Veglia, 1999).
Some studies (Oppenheim and Waters, 1995; Gini et al., 2007;
Vetere and Dallos, 2008) have focused on the link between
attachment and narrative based on the narrative assessment that
evaluates both the content and structure of stories in childhood.
Those studies were guided by the assertion that the particular way
of interaction between mother and child is represented in the
Internal Working Model of the relationship which will depend,
on the one hand, on the flexibility in telling the experiences
of attachment and, on the other hand, by the themes and
consistency of these tales.
Thus, it was noted that as early as 6 years of age, children
with a secure attachment elaborate narratives whose themes
reflect the constant presence of parents, accompanied by
rich and collaborative interactions and the representation of
a good ability to face stressful situations (Oppenheim and
Waters, 1995). Moreover, we can find a realistic description
of oneself associated with the expression of both positive
and negative emotions related to relationships, presented in
terms of reflection and negotiation and without excessive
anxiety with regard to communication processes (Farrar et al.,
1997; Vetere and Dallos, 2008). Story processing by children
classified as “insecure” is characterized by the disruption of
relationship descriptions, inconsistent responses, or a reduced
reflection on resolution strategies for the interpersonal problems.
Other studies (Fivush et al., 2006; Fivush, 2008; Haden et al.,
2009) identified different forms of mother–child conversation
supported by many different elaborative styles with which
mothers involve children of pre-school age in dialogs related
to the past. The quality of attachment, therefore, can be a
predisposing factor in the emergence of psychological disorders
if we consider the various styles as meaning dimensions that can
be elaborated on different levels of flexibility and generativity
(Lambruschi et al., 2004). In disorganized attachment and
consequent traumatic development (Liotti and Farina, 2011),
self-depiction and autobiographical reconstruction of a person’s
experience of painful and fearful situations from which he/she
felt overwhelmed may be fragmented and compromised (van der
Hart et al., 2006; Dutra et al., 2009).
THE MEANING OF LTs IN CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY
In recent decades, the literature agrees that a narrative approach
is a useful clinical tool. In fact, a narrative approach based
on the life stories of patients has become the focus of clinical
practice (Veglia, 1999; Singer et al., 2008). This approach
to psychotherapy focuses on the patient’s life story as an
opportunity to co-construct new meanings and readings of
past experiences (White and Epston, 1990; Veglia, 1999, 2013;
Goncalves et al., 2000; Angus and McLeod, 2004; Singer et al.,
2008). This co-construction process, which also involves the
sharing of emotionally relevant personal experiences, becomes
the foundation for building a “therapeutic alliance” (Adler and
McAdams, 2007). According to the authors who adhere to this
approach, in the therapeutic work it is important to identify
those repetitive patterns of emotions, representations of oneself
and others, as well as positive and negative cognitions within
autobiographical stories (Angus et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2008).
The development of LTs is the key to feeling like other
individuals but, simultaneously, special beings with a specific
identity. The individual has the ability and freedom to develop
the themes in an original and particular way, but sometimes
he/she is restrained by his/her own story, by life events, and
the narrative structure of his/her tale. In therapy, in fact, stories
that are carried out rigidly and stereotypically represent mostly
an adaptation to dominant thinking. A static narrative, devoid
of ideas and originality, imposes on the individual limits and
constraints that cause a sense of confusion and suffering (Veglia,
1999, 2013). Thus, the therapist’s work involves a re-reading
of the patient’s dominant story to offer him/her new narrative
alternatives and the opportunity to continue his/her story around
more centralized, self-centered themes.
Love, Value, Power, Freedom, Truth and Justice would,
therefore, serve as attractors and semantic organizers by
returning, on the basis of the occasions and limits that
relationships and events offered to the patient, frames of
meaning, identity, belongings and a unique and unrepeatable way
of being himself/herself.
Unfortunately, autobiographical memory and personal
narratives describe the main sources of mental suffering
expressed in all its forms.
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FIGURE 10 | Lines of development of thematic narration. This graphic illustrates the different axes, each of which describes a continuum of possible positions.
Within the areas are also placed the connected four states of mind with respect to attachment (F, Ds, E, U). At point 0, attachment representations and the
interpersonal motivational systems are represented.
Using the three axes proposed in this article, namely
presence/absence of positive or negative narrative occasions,
high/low integration, and control/sharing, it is possible to identify
areas of greatest suffering, areas where it appeared (lack/loss,
trauma, chronic alarm) and the predominant nature of the
deficits and dysregulations of the narrative structure related to
the idea of self and the world (see Figure 11).
By placing the weighed position of each narrative theme in
relation to the three axes in a single map, a configuration of
the areas of suffering, available resources and their connections,
is useful for narrative understanding (diagnostics) and for the
construction of the care plan.
For example, a graphic representation of the suffering and
thematic resources of a patient with a psychiatric diagnosis
of panic-attack disorders with agoraphobia, mild dissociative
symptoms and severe deficiency of self-efficacy is shown in
Figure 12.
It is clearly shown that self-representation with others with
respect to the Love theme corresponds to a significant resource
both in terms of love as well as the ability to give and receive
love. Personal value is more uncertain; it suffers from more
control, but still lies in an area of wellbeing. Instead, the meaning
attributed alternately to Freedom is extremely distressing in
terms of dysregulation of narrative control and integration. On
the one hand, it is experienced as a strong push to the exploration
and rejection of every constraint boundary; on the other hand,
it is experienced as irreparable loss if he/she moves away from
an attachment figure. This narrative mode is typical of patients
with phobic disorders. The theme of personal Power is critical
because of a narrative deficit in self-representation within a
family narrative and poorly integrated with the strong sense
of amiability described previously. From here, the lack of self-
efficacy emerges. The traumatic nucleus, which is more difficult
to access but is detected by mild dissociative symptoms, is related
to the narration of the maternal and inaccessible truth theme,
which hides the intriguing dramatic secrets of a patient with great
confusion, loss and an overwhelming sense of helplessness.
The final thematic profile shown in Figure 12 derives, in this
case, from the analysis of the therapist’s notes about a therapeutic
session. The LT were identified through a coding process (which
is already under construction by the Authors) that detects the
occurrence of each LT within narrative units through general
rules for the analysis. The different axes along which LTs are
positioned are therefore considered as Likert scales.
In this case the narrative rereading of the six LTs placed on the
three axes and on the consequent map according to the different
positions allows to significantly increase the knowledge provided
by anamnesis and psychiatric diagnosis, to more structurally and
dynamically understand expressive suffering and build a more
calibrated and targeted care plan.
In the vast majority of cases, most meaningful content does
not emerge from narrative personal stories. However, through
conversation, as well as the alternation of active listening to
empathic and floating attention, the therapist can approach the
most incarnate aspects and even very painful and traumatic
contents that cannot be narrated. What matters is attempting
to capture the unique way of “making stories” of the patient
according to his/her personal interpretation of the reality and
in his/her way of telling the cause of his/her suffering. The
therapist should, therefore, seek meaningful historical events
(i.e., the subjective experience built by selecting meaningful
data, arranged in sequence and placed in the flow of subjective
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FIGURE 11 | Critical areas in the thematic narration. The schematic shows the deficit or dysregulation areas between the axes.
FIGURE 12 | Example of the critical areas in a patient’s thematic narration. The patient suffers from panic attacks with agoraphobia, little sense of self-efficacy, and
mild dissociative symptoms. The scheme reassumes the positions of the themes along the axes and within the areas between them.
time) that are somehow accessible and rebuildable through the
memory. Historical consciousness can, therefore, be considered
as a tool for re-reading events in another perspective and for
building another possible future, because it offers the possibility
to rearrange a plot that is very confused and a source of psychic
suffering or to rewrite another. Often, whole stories are forgotten,
deleted or “normalized” to maintain a coherent narrative plot.
In therapy, traces of historical consciousness emerge in the form
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of discomfort and symptoms; in these cases, the therapist must
help the patient to falsify previous apparently probable theories,
events, and the world. This strategy provides a second viewpoint
to lay the groundwork for negotiating a third meaning and
creating a new theory, more coherent with the self, that can orient
and support change.
Therefore, the analysis of Life Themes was proposed as a
method for entering into the specificity of the patient’s history so
that it can be re-read from a new viewpoint (Veglia, 1999, 2013).
For example, identifying the various ways in which the patient
interprets the theme of love allows the therapist to understand
what specific aspect of love generates suffering. In fact, the patient
may have problems with his/her lovable-self, loving-self, or loved-
self. A person who has never been loved or loved by a “toxic”
love may feel loved and contented by the therapist and at each
session experience contentment and wonder in seeing him/her
again because he/she will have an extra piece of the story to
tell (Amanzio and Veglia, 2009). If, instead, the theme of Value
becomes a critical topic, the therapist should favor the process
of subtracting the critical attributes so that the ontological value
of the patient can emerge in an act of self-recognition. Being
lovable, with a value and through the power of being oneself, are
dynamic and constantly moving conditions that need continuous
confirmation from others. The criticality of the Power theme is
expressed mainly in the sense of impotence and inability to act, up
to the sense of alienation. The Freedom theme also has important
clinical implications because each therapeutic act implies the
possibility of change and is, therefore, geared to increasing the
individual’s degree of freedom.
In the light of these considerations, the work with LTs
in psychotherapy allows treatment to go beyond symptomatic
resolution to effectively prevent any subsequent side effects
because of its ability to affect the patient’s deep existential
meaning. The perspective of Veglia (1999, 2013) focuses on this
work, which considers clinically the thematic register as one that
guides the therapist in collecting the patient’s life story.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
In recent decades, most of the studies focusing on the role
of narration in the clinical field decomposed this concept in
more descriptive and phenomenological dimensions that can be
operationalized. However, what seems to be missing today is a
study on the narrative development of specific thematic contents
in the clinical field. Little is known about how to empirically
translate knowledge on the existence of LTs (Veglia, 1999, 2013),
the essential and irreducible organizers of meaning around which
the individual builds his/her interpersonal stories and shares
them by telling them, for research purposes and the clinical
process.
In the cognitive–evolutionary perspective (MacLean, 1984), it
is believed that the presented LTs are in continuity with the work
of IMS and their representations (Liotti, 2001). In the light of
these considerations, a research group within the Department
of Psychology at the University of Turin is focusing on
systematization of a theoretical model that operationally defines
thematic constructs within clinical narratives. The starting point
of this empirical study in this sense was the attachment system,
that is, the system that primarily contributes to determining
self-referential meanings and generating a specific sense of self
(Guidano, 1987; Siegel, 2001). The adult narratives of past
attachment experiences are the main vehicle for investigating
not only the narrative coherence processes, but also structured
thematic contents in reference to internal working models.
The nature of LTs is supposed to be relational for the basic
function of the narration to share meaning; it is equally true
that early attachment experiences represent the first interpersonal
relationships within which to develop autobiographical narrative
processes, autonoetic consciousness and integration mechanisms
associated with the attainment of new levels of consistency of
the mind (Siegel, 2001). A first step in the exploration of these
thematic contents, organized in particular around specific LTs
(Veglia, 1999, 2013), took place within the attachment stories
(through the use of the adult attachment interview – George et al.,
1985, unpublished) to cast a bridge of conjunction between the
study of the narrative coherence and semantic investigation. The
literature on which LTs hypothesis is based is very broad and
heterogeneous with references to various areas of psychology.
This can represent a limit but also a challenge for the future to
study the model proposed through the analysis of the roots of
narration and its contents.
In the literature, there are several tools for assessment
of the thematic contents of memories and narratives. They
focus mainly on the analysis of specific dimensions of
narrative themes, omitting both the multiple facets of the same
theme and the holistic view of the thematic content of a
narration that takes place around more semantics. A further
development of research, that is already a work in progress,
is the construction of a reliable system for identifying and
coding LTs in therapeutic-session transcripts or semi-structured
clinical interviews. The Authors are working to systematize
and standardize a reliable coding manual for LTs’ identification,
through the definition of general rules for the analysis of their
occurrence in narrative units and their positioning along the
axes proposed within the theoretical and clinical hypothesis.
The identification of LTs presence/absence, the assignment of
different degrees of intensity and their location on high/low
integration and control/sharing axes could reveal thematic profiles
from narrations, that are useful in understanding the patient’s
suffering.
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INTRODUCTION
Self-images are “I am” statements (such as “I am an optimist”). They are frequently used in
psychological research as a measure of identity, as primes in experimental tasks, and as cues to elicit
autobiographical memories. Typically, participants are simply asked to answer the question “Who
am I?,” such as in the 20 Statements Test (Kuhn and McPartland, 1954) which asks participants
to generate up to 20 sentences starting with the words “I am.” A more recent modification of this
approach (the IAM Task; Rathbone et al., 2008) asks participants for between 4 and 10 “I am”
statements and then uses these as autobiographical memory cues. Self-images can include traits
(e.g., I am happy), roles (e.g., I am a nurse), hobbies (e.g., I am a tennis player), hopes (e.g., I am
keen to work with animals), and fears (e.g., I am scared of being lonely). They comprise semantic
facts about the self which help to scaffold narrative continuity and reflect themulti-faceted nature of
the self (Kuhn and McPartland, 1954; Markus, 1977), allowing researchers to tap into the multiple
identities people possess. One important benefit of self-image generation tasks is their open-ended
nature. Tasks involving the completion of “I am” statements allow people to describe their identity
using their own words. As a result, they are a powerful tool for examining differences in how
identity is constructed across different groups.
Studies from a range of psychological disciplines have analyzed “I am” statements. From a
social perspective, researchers have analyzed differences in self-images across age (McCrae and
Costa, 1988), gender (Grace and Cramer, 2002), profession (Kuhn, 1960), and culture (Rhee et al.,
1995; Wang, 2001). Within cognitive psychology, self-images have been used in experiments, both
to prime a particular cultural identity (Wang, 2008) and to measure self-concept following an
experimental memory manipulation (Charlesworth et al., 2015; Çili and Stopa, 2015). They have
also been used as autobiographical memory cues (Rathbone et al., 2008, 2015). With clinical
relevance, self-images have been explored in relation to psychopathological disorders including
PTSD (Abdollahi et al., 2012) and schizophrenia (Bennouna-Greene et al., 2012). Self-images have
also been studied in neuropsychological patients with amnesia (Rathbone et al., 2009; Grilli and
Verfaellie, 2015) and Alzheimer’s disease (Addis and Tippett, 2004), in an effort to understand the
impact of memory loss on the self. As is evident from this brief review, self-images are relevant to a
wide range of disciplines and have been utilized in a variety of paradigms.
The purpose of this paper is to present a database of self-image norms. At present, to the authors’
knowledge, there is no publicly available resource for collating or depositing self-image data.
That also means, that aside of attempts to classify the statements generated [e.g., into consensual
and non-consensual (Kuhn and McPartland, 1954); concrete or abstract (Rathbone et al., 2008);
psychological, social, and physical (Charlesworth et al., 2015)], there has been little consideration
of the content of people’s identity statements. Whilst coding schemes have been developed in the
past to classify responses (Cousins, 1989; Rhee et al., 1995), these have been limited to a relatively
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small number of categories (e.g., a maximum of 45 categories
and subcategories; Rhee et al., 1995) and thus do not provide
information on the frequency of specific self-images (e.g., being
logical). Furthermore, previous studies have not reported the
gender ratio or mean age of categories of self-images. Having a
database of normative responses, coded by age and gender, will
mean we will be better able to consider the content in people’s
identity statements.
The norms presented here represent the coding of 2,412
self-images. However, the main aim here is for this number to
increase as other researchers add their data to the database. These
norms can be used in a variety of ways. For example, if self-images
have been collected from a case study (as is common in memory
impairment) or a specific group of participants and the aim is to
examine the way these participants have defined themselves, then
the norms in the database can provide an age and gender indexed
comparison. This will provide some information on whether a
particular group of participants have described their identity in a
way that is typical or atypical for their age and gender. This would
be particularly relevant to studying possible changes to the self in
clinical groups or patient case studies. At present, open-ended
measures of self are limited to probing the number of self-images
a person can generate, or the abstract/specific nature of these
self-images (Addis and Tippett, 2004).
In addition to its utility in clinical groups, these norms
will also be of use for researchers who want to use them as
experimental primes or cues. Having identified which self-images
are most commonly generated in young adults, for example,
these could be used as standardized memory cues or primes
in cognitive tasks, in the same way that it is common to
control for word frequency or concreteness when using words
as stimuli. As such, this database will provide a useful resource
for cognitive and social psychologists, as well as sociologists and
anthropologists. Finally, by tagging the year and country of data
collection, as the database grows it will be possible to track
changes in identity descriptions over time and across different
nationalities.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
Participants
The data come from five studies, all of which required
participants to generate self-images. Studies 1 and 2 are reported
in Rathbone et al. (2008). Study 1 had an age range of 47–66
(N = 16 [11 Female], Mean age 54.56, SD = 4.95) and Study
2 had an age range of 39–88 (N = 125 [81 Female], Mean age
52.94, SD = 10.19). Note that for Study 2 the sample size in the
database is higher than in Study 2 of Rathbone et al. (2008) as we
only reported data from participants who completed the online
questionnaire. In the database we include self-images for all
participants who generated at least one self-image, leading to the
discrepancy between sample sizes. Study 3 (reported in Rathbone
and Moulin, 2014) had an age range of 17–50 (N = 40 [33
Female], Mean age 19.63, SD = 5.01). Studies 4 and 5 (Rathbone
and Moulin, 2017) had respective age ranges of 19–61 (N = 40
[30 Female], Mean age 24.2, SD = 8.63) and 19–34 (N = 17 [12
Female], Mean age 20.56, SD = 3.65). These data were collected
between 2004 and 2008, using an online questionnaire (Study 2)
and paper questionnaires/tasks completed in participants’ own
homes (Study 1) or in the lab (Studies 3, 4, and 5). The data from
studies employing paper questionnaires was collected in the UK
whilst the online questionnaire data had potential for worldwide
geographical coverage (details of participant nationality were not
collected but the online questionnaire was advertised in both the
UK and USA).
Task
All participants were asked to generate a set of between 4 and 20
“I am” statements to describe long-term and enduring aspects of
their identity (for the full protocol see Rathbone et al., 2008). In
Study 5 (N = 17), the instructions differed slightly as participants
were asked to generate five self-images associated with being at
home, and five associated with being at university. In all other
cases, participants were free to generate whichever statements
they felt best defined their identity.
Coding
All 2,412 self-images were coded by CJR and CJAM. This
generated a set of 271 categories (including “Unclassified” which
referred to any category indexing only one self-image). All 270
categories which indexed two or more self-images were then
listed as norms (see Supplementary Material), accompanied by
the number of self-images in the category, the full-text of each
self-image generated, and the mean age and gender ratio of
the participants that generated self-images in that category. For
example, “Planner” had a count of three (two cases of “a planner”
and one case of “able to plan ahead”), a mean age 28.67, and
was only generated by female participants. Due to the way in
which data was processed it is possible in a few cases that
there is a discrepancy between the age given in the self-image
and the participant’s noted age. In one case this is due to a
participant reporting an age which is actually different from
their chronological age. For other cases it is due to how the
data was processed by calculating the participant’s age from a
given year of birth. If a participant generated a self-image that
covered more than one category then only the first category was
coded (e.g., “Caring and sensitive” was coded as “Caring,” “a
daughter and sister” was coded as “Daughter,” and “Independent,
intelligent, adaptable, love travel” was coded as “Independent”).
Our decision to code the first self-image in cases where two or
more were generated was empirically grounded and based on
previous work which shows that the self-images people generate
first are generally rated as more personally significant (Rathbone
and Moulin, 2014).
Database Websites
The fixed data set is publicly available in the UK Data
Service ReShare Repository under Collection A of “Memory
and the self in ageing” (Rathbone, 2017) at: https://dx.doi.
org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-852127. The data set includes a data
description document which explains the variables in the excel
spreadsheet. There is also a publicly accessible database website
hosted by Oxford Brookes University (http://psych.brookes.ac.
uk/selfimage) which provides an introduction to the database,
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a description of its potential uses, a search function, and the
option to request a downloadable excel version of the database.
One of the primary aims of the website is to form a long-term,
growing resource for researchers who wish to deposit their self-
image data. Thus, whilst the original data set, as reported in this
paper, is fixed, there is also the option for this database to grow
via the self-image website. Instructions are provided online for
those who wish to upload data to the database. All uploaded
data will be checked before being made publically available in the
database.
Ethics Statement
All studies through which data was collected were approved by
the University of Leeds School of Psychology Ethics Committee
and were conducted according to the principles expressed in
the Declaration of Helsinki. Any identifying information (such
as participants’ own names or the names of their friends, and
of places) was removed during the preparation of the database.
Written informed consent was obtained from participants in
studies 3, 4, and 5. One participant in Study 3 was aged 17, but
was deemed able to give informed consent without the need for
additional consent from a next of kin, caretaker, or guardian. This
was because the participant was enrolled as an undergraduate on
a university degree course and because the British Psychological
Society Code of Human Research Ethics classes participants
aged 17 and over as a non-vulnerable group in terms of age.
As studies 1 and 2 were solely questionnaire-based, participants
were informed that submitting their data for analysis was taken
as their consent to participate. Any new data submitted to the
database will only be uploaded once ethical information has been
provided.
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
Full details of self-image norms are provided in the
Supplementary Material. By examining the frequency counts
we can see which categories are most often used when people
describe their identities. The most commonly generated category
of self-image was Friend (count = 77), followed by Student
(count = 70), Sports player (count = 70), and Occupation
(count = 68). Thus, specific social roles are the most commonly
generated single categories across the database. The highest
frequency traits were Happy (count = 43), Optimistic (count =
41), and Friendly (count = 38). In line with previous research
showing that people tend to define themselves in broadly
positive terms (e.g., Baumeister, 1998), the highest frequency
categories of self-image traits are generally positive in valence.
However, several negative self-images were also generated
multiple times (e.g., Lazy = 19; Worry = 15; Pessimistic = 10).
In terms of mean age of participants, the youngest self-image
category generated was Maths (e.g., ok at maths; Mean age
= 18) and the oldest was Serious (e.g., serious minded; Mean
age= 67.5).
By probing the database as a whole, it is possible to identify
the most frequently cited self-images for people in given age
ranges or for specific genders. For example, within females aged
60–70 the most commonly cited category of self-image was
Mother (n = 9). As well as providing a useful resource for
researchers interested in the lifespan development of identity (by
showing which identities are most relevant at different ages),
these age-specific norms may have particular utility for matching
to specific clinical samples. Furthermore, this database may
provide a useful resource for researchers who study cultural
life scripts: representations of the timing of major transitional
life events within a specific culture (Rubin and Berntsen,
2003; Berntsen and Rubin, 2004). Studies have shown that
these normative life events are typically positive and reflect
social landmarks such as graduation, marriage, and parenthood
(Berntsen and Rubin, 2004). This database allows investigation
of the age of participants who identify with particular life script
categories, such as being a mother (mean age 51.79). Thus, whilst
parenthood is a life script event that typically occurs in young
adulthood, it nevertheless remains a salient self-image for adults
across the lifespan.
One issue with the database, as it stands, is that some self-
image categories feature relatively low counts. For example,
Articulate is only generated twice, so the mean age for this
category is not as meaningful as that for Caring (with a count
of 21). Furthermore, at present, the participants in the database
are mostly female younger adults. This must be borne in mind
when making comparisons by age and gender. For example,
the fact that Sister was generated 65 times and Brother only
12 does not necessarily indicate that males are less likely than
females to frame their identity around their siblings—rather, this
is probably a reflection of the gender ratio in the database. What
is more informative is the within-category gender ratio data. For
example, Travel had a relatively even split of 12 males and 13
females, whereas Worry was generated by 14 females and only
1 male.
These norms can be used as the basis for further studies
on the salience of specific self-images. For example, one could
investigate what proportion of people who are brothers actually
generate brother as a self-image. This could be achieved by
asking participants to complete an open-ended 20 statements
task first, followed by responding yes/no to a standardized set
of self-images based on the norms reported here. In this way
it will be possible to explore which self-images are most salient
for different groups, whilst also being able to account for which
self-images are objectively present.
As with any self-reported data on personal identity, it is
important to acknowledge the impact of environmental cues
and social expectations on generation of self-images (see Markus
and Kunda, 1986). Whilst this database cannot address the issue
of how true (as opposed to confabulatory) or stable these self-
images are, they nevertheless reflect an accurate snapshot of
our participants’ views of themselves at a given moment in
time.
In conclusion, this database and table of norms represents
the self-images that are most salient for a group of adults at
the start of the twenty-first century. It provides an indication of
which self-images are most relevant to participants of different
ages and genders, and will provide a lasting resource for
other researchers who wish to use these data or contribute
their own.
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Memory-Modulation:
Self-Improvement or Self-Depletion?
Andrea Lavazza*
Neuroethics, Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy
Autobiographical memory is fundamental to the process of self-construction.
Therefore, the possibility of modifying autobiographical memories, in particular with
memory-modulation and memory-erasing, is a very important topic both from the
theoretical and from the practical point of view. The aim of this paper is to illustrate
the state of the art of some of the most promising areas of memory-modulation and
memory-erasing, considering how they can affect the self and the overall balance of
the “self and autobiographical memory” system. Indeed, different conceptualizations
of the self and of personal identity in relation to autobiographical memory are what
makes memory-modulation and memory-erasing more or less desirable. Because of
the current limitations (both practical and ethical) to interventions on memory, I can
only sketch some hypotheses. However, it can be argued that the choice to mitigate
painful memories (or edit memories for other reasons) is somehow problematic, from an
ethical point of view, according to some of the theories of the self and personal identity
in relation to autobiographical memory, in particular for the so-called narrative theories
of personal identity, chosen here as the main case of study. Other conceptualizations of
the “self and autobiographical memory” system, namely the constructivist theories, do
not have this sort of critical concerns. However, many theories rely on normative (and not
empirical) conceptions of the self: for them, the actions aimed at mitigating or removing
specific (negative) memories can be seen either as an improvement or as a depletion or
impairment of the self.
Keywords: memory-erasing, propanolol, autobiographical memory, regulative conceptions of self, rigid identity,
extended identity
FORGETTING ON DEMAND, THE SELF, AND THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
The human being has always tried to have control over his memory. In ancient times, when
there were no external media to preserve data in an easily accessible manner, what today we
call “declarative memory” was crucial for scholars or those exercising intellectual professions.
The enhancement of that type of memory was sought with techniques like the loci, namely the
association of information to well-known places and objects (Yates, 1966). But already then it was
clear that memory was not a mere instrument, regardless of how it is used and accessed. Plato, for
example, questioned writing as a way to preserve thought: in Phaedrus, Socrates says that writing is
fixed and therefore “encloses” the contents of the message.
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Autobiographical memory, on the other hand, has always
been ambivalent: usually people want it to be precise and always
available, but it can also be a curse. Remembering events and
feelings of our lives, for many philosophers and most people,
is conceived of as the essence or basis of personal identity.
So, diseases such as Alzheimer’s, which damage memory, are
considered one of the worst possible tragedies. On the other hand,
being able to forget unpleasant facts and negative emotions would
inmany cases appear to be a liberation, enabling one to live better
without the weight of painful or disturbing memories.
Even the Odyssey, one of the founding works of Western
culture, mentions the idea of oblivion through pharmacological
interventions. Classical writers such as Cicero and Petrarch
narrate that the Athenian leader Themistocles, having learnt the
art of remembering taught by Simonides, said that he rather
would have learnt the art of forgetting.Ars oblivionalis has always
been an unreachable goal and yet it has been evoked and desired
throughout the centuries.
On the one hand, we are aware—and contemporary
psychological and neuroscientific research confirm this—that
there is a constant process of acquisition of sensory data
and information in general, most of which, despite passing
through the filter of conscious attention, is soon forgotten
(Baddeley et al., 2014). This is due to a principle of energetic
economy embedded in the evolution of our body, but it is
also an unconscious selection that relieves us of a mnemonic
load that would be otherwise unbearable, both cognitively and
emotionally. Consider the difficulties experienced by those who
suffer—the term is appropriate both in the clinical and in the
existential sense—from hypermnesia (Ally et al., 2013).
On the other hand, the drastic mnemonic selection of
incoming data, the progressive loss of precision of memory over
time and the fatigue entailed by storing a complete set of new
data oftenmake us wish for a larger and better accessible memory
(supposing that the failed recollection of memories is due to an
access problem rather than to the loss of the mnemonic trace). At
the same time, the persistence of somememories clashes with our
will to not have them in our consciousness. Hence the paradox
by which the more you seek to ignore a given object or event,
the more it comes to consciousness, alone or in association with
other thoughts (Wegner et al., 1987).
The fact that an effective psychological forgetting technique
is almost impossible, despite the attempts made, has discouraged
neither the desire to forget nor the research on the cerebral bases
of memory. The hypotheses of chemically-induced oblivion have
long been a matter of science fiction—except for the massive
memory damage caused by the unwanted side-effects of alcohol,
psychoactive substances, and electroconvulsive therapy—so
the reflection on the consequences of this “forgetfulness on
demand” has not been very specific. However, recently, several
neuroethicists have addressed the use of new possible tools
to erase or mitigate negative personal memories (President’s
Council on Bioethics, 2003; Liao and Sandberg, 2008; Lavazza,
2015).
It is well-known that a huge amount of human and financial
resources is being invested in trying to block memory loss
caused by neurodegenerative diseases. And there is an ongoing
ethical debate on the condition of those who have lost all or
part of their autobiographical memories. In this condition, is
one still a “person” and should one be treated as such? How
much autonomy can one have? Does one still have authentic
preferences and wishes? Now, consider new tools to modify or
adjust memories, provided they are ever available: would they
lead to a similar set of questions? Or would this be a different level
of philosophical, neuroethical and psychological investigation
compared to the one that focuses on the consequences of
Alzheimer’s? (Dworkin, 1986; Dresser, 1992; Jaworska, 1999;
Strohminger and Nichols, 2015).
The common idea underlying these considerations is that
autobiographical memory is strongly linked to the self and
the identity of the individual, and this view is neither new
nor original. However, in this paper I want to introduce an
interpretative framework linked to the recent discovery of
molecules that seem to be able, for the first time, to effectively
modulate autobiographical memory by reducing the emotional
reach of salient, negative and painful memories, according to
the studies that have been carried out so far. The opportunity
to intervene on memory “by subtraction” raises questions and
perplexities. This seems to be due to the fact that we have certain
ideas of the self and of personal identity, as well as of their
relationship with memory.
The first point I would like to address is that attempts to
give an axiological evaluation of memory modulation-removal
interventions are based on conceptions and models of personal
identity and the self that act as reference points also for a wider set
of values. The ethical discussion on the chemical modulation of
memories can thus be helpful to clarify and assess the relationship
between self and autobiographical memory especially from a
normative point of view (Selimbegovic´ et al., 2016).
But there is a second point that seems to deserve greater
attention, because perhaps it has not been sufficiently emphasized
in the literature. Some conceptions and models of the self are
based on empirical research, and others are essentially normative:
that is, they are the direct result of scholarly reflection or the
result of social and cultural processes due to the convergence
of various elements. All of these conceptions and models of the
self work as references for the evaluation of autobiographical
memory interventions. So, potential judgments on memory
modulation-removal can show that the relationship between
self and autobiographical memory is extremely complex. In
fact, there are competing empirical models and also normative
concepts that have a significant persistence and play an important
role in guiding both judgment and behavior. In this paper, I
especially focus on narrative theories of personal identity and
related normative issues about memory-modulation.
HOW TO MODULATE MEMORIES
As has been said, it is only recently that external tools have shown
the potential to modulate memory in living things, specifically to
modify memories. This is not the place to describe the specific
action modes of the various techniques tested. In animal models,
it was possible to achieve the deletion of specific mnestic traits
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 46996
Lavazza Memory-Modulation: Self-Improvement or Self-Depletion?
(at least in their behavioral manifestation) and to modify the
salience of individual memories (evaluated by the search for or
avoidance of behaviors that they arouse).
In human beings, because of the centrality and importance
that memory has for the individual, it has of course been more
complicated to make experiments. The most promising way, in
the current state of research, seems to be related to molecules
able, at least in many cases, to attenuate the emotional reach
of autobiographical memories, making them less salient to the
subject. I will not enter into the detail of the neuroscientific and
clinical debate on the safety and efficacy of the treatment, since
the focus of the paper is what the possible availability of such a
treatment, presumably considered effective, can tell us about the
relationship between autobiographical memory, self and personal
identity. In this sense, it is useful to start with a definition.
(Def1) “Memory-editing is a psychological (modification of the
associative processes related to memories) or neurobiological
(pharmacological and/or optogenetic) intervention in order
to weaken or change the subjective negative valence of
autobiographical memories or completely remove the memory
trace of an autobiographical event” (Lavazza, 2017).
The memory-editing technique to which I will refer is that
based on the administration of a particular molecule in certain
temporal windows related to the memory on which it is intended
to act: propranolol. As noted by JamesMcGaugh, this molecule—
normally used as a beta-blocker in hypertension treatments—
can be helpful in diminishing the emotional effect of a given
memory (Cahill et al., 1994). Situations of emotional turmoil
are normally connected to the production of adrenaline and
cortisol (the so-called “stress hormones”), which in turn lead to
a significant increase in the neurotransmitter norepinephrine.
The latter has a dual function: it connects the given memories
to the fear circuit and causes anxiety, with symptoms such as
tachycardia, tremor, or sweating. β-adrenergic receptors of the
basolateral amygdala (β1 and β2), which norepinephrine binds
to, produce a stream of molecules signaling the codification
of the memory to the brain. This is a simplified description,
shared by only some scientists. However, according to this
view, propranolol blocks the activation of the receptors, thus
preventing the (re)consolidation of a given memory.
According to early research, there is a connection between
stress hormones and declarative memory: if an event causes
emotional arousal, it is likely to produce a stronger and longer-
lasting memory (Pitman et al., 2002). Propranolol only acts in
such cases, if taken during or shortly after the stressful event,
but is inefficacious on emotionally “bland” memories. This shows
that if the adrenaline and noradrenaline produced by the adrenal
glands are inhibited, as a consequence, the mnemonic process
loses its emotional component: the subject thus preserves his or
her declarative memory without the strong (negative) emotional
component that would otherwise come with it, affecting given
vital signs (respiration, heart rate, blood pressure) and arousing
feelings of distress, fear or anxiety.
According to several findings related to experiments with
propranolol, the molecule appears to work if taken shortly after
the emotionally stressful event. For examples, victims of car
accidents have shown to have less intense memories of the
traumatic event if they take propranolol, which is the more
efficacious the earlier it is taken (Brunet et al., 2011). Also,
subjects suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
generally showed no benefit from the molecule (Muravieva and
Alberini, 2010). Nevertheless, on healthy subject propranolol is
known to be effective in weakening fear responses (Kindt et al.,
2009), more than what usually happens according to Pavlov’s
paradigm.
To make one example, subjects suffering from arachnophobia
have been able to overcome it by weakening the sensation of fear
produced by seeing a spider, despite being still conscious of the
potential danger it may cause. In addition to working on the
immediate fear response, as previously mentioned, propranolol
can affect the subsequent memories of a stressful event. This can
happen both if taken shortly after the event, and by working
on the reconsolidation of old memories. Reconsolidation is a
mechanism by which recalling a memory activates a complex
molecular process in the subject’s nervous system, as a result
of which the memory is biologically malleable (Nader et al.,
2000; Nader and Hardt, 2009). This is the reason why often
recalled episodes slowly change in time. Based on the fact that
reconsolidation makes memories malleable, propranolol can be
used to weaken traumatic memories even some time after the
stressful event (Brunet et al., 2011; Soeter and Kindt, 2011; Elsey
and Kindt, 2016).
Therefore, if taken during the recollection of a stressful
event, propranolol will weaken the emotional component of the
memory attached to it, while leaving the declarative memory
of it untouched. For example, the subject may still remember
being attacked one night when coming back home, but without
the negative emotional burden and the related activation of the
autonomic system, which can lead up to PTSD. Propranolol is
effective for a short time period (a few hours) following the
traumatic event and acts in a preventive way if taken during that
period of time. When the traumatic event has already fixated
in memory, one can try to intervene by explicitly recalling
the memory in question while taking propranolol: in this case,
the latter acts by exploiting the malleability of memory in the
reconsolidation phase.
The effect of the intake of propranolol—immediately
after the traumatic event or while explicitly recalling it to
consciousness, when the biochemical processes lead to its
cerebral reconsolidation—is that the memory will probably
become less painful, if not emotionally neutral. As a consequence,
it will be less able to motivate the subject by influencing her
preferences, intentions and choices. This aspect is what I want
to address now.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH “DELETING” A
MEMORY?
Since it is possible to intervene on memories, the question has
arisen whether to act on memory is ethically permissible or
recommendable. An example that can help tackle this point was
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offered by Erler (2011). There are two friends, Elisabeth and
Sonya, who have both been bullied in high school. Despite this,
they managed to finish school and lead a rather satisfactory life.
However, later on Elisabeth starts experiencing the consequences
of her past: when the former classmates invite the girls to parties
and various activities, Sonya joins in with full ease and peace
of mind, whereas Elisabeth cannot. She demands an apology
first, as she thinks they have acted immorally, in a way that has
scarred her deeply. On the other hand, Elisabeth wishes she were
like Sonya, so that she could forget the past and not be stuck
in painful memories. So she chooses to take propranolol: the
negative memories of school fade, their emotional component
almost disappears. Elisabeth remembers the facts, but with no
pain or resentment. Now she can see her former classmates as
if she had truly forgiven them, even though they never said sorry.
Her life seems happier and more carefree: she no longer thinks of
bullism, and her wellbeing has apparently increased.
However, the question arises whether Elisabeth’s choice was
authentic, in line with her “true” self. Of course, the very idea of
a “true self ” can be questioned, but it is undeniable that people
have personality traits (partly genetic) and long-term personal
preferences and aversions (such as sexual orientation, a given
lifestyle, a religious belief etc.). These characteristics make up (at
least partly) a person’s identity or self, guiding him in his behavior
and in his reactions. If a long-term choice (say, veganism) is
perceived as defining, we often publicly declare it and stay loyal
to it even when the given situation might induce us to make an
exception (say, an important business meeting where they only
serve meat).
In this sense, autobiographical memory has to be coherent,
functioning as a tool to limit or guide the fundamental
orientations underlying the self. According to Erler (2011), the
chemical alteration of one’s memory might lead to non-authentic
choices. In Elisabeth’s case, for example, she ends up “forgiving”
her schoolmates without them apologizing, as would have been
the demand of her “true” self. Indeed, Elisabeth’s convictions—
her self—would not have allowed her to make this choice, as it
would have contradicted her general beliefs. The modification of
part of her autobiographical memory, especially the emotional
salience of some events, has made it so that the latter lost the
motivating power they had before.
It could be objected that someone with good cognitive skills
and a solid moral orientation would still judge an evil deed
negatively. This would probably hold true for—say—rape, but
bullism is a set of many little acts that, taken one by one, may
be considered relatively harmless “pranks.” Therefore, it is likely
that bullism would arouse retrospective pain in the victim only
if accompanied by the negative emotional component of its
memories. A well-functioning autobiographical memory would
be needed to this effect. So does it mean that Elisabeth “betrayed”
her true self? And what about Sonya? Perhaps she doesn’t
share Elisabeth’s moral inclination, or perhaps her memories are
“naturally” less strong and distressing. Or else, she finds it easier
to move on and leave the past behind.
Either way, it seems that without propranolol Elisabeth would
not have forgiven her classmates without them acknowledging
their wrongdoing. Also, her morality drives her to fight bullism
publicly precisely because she has undergone it herself. But if the
motivational aspect of the memory fades, her commitment might
also become weaker (victims of abuse or discrimination are often
the best candidates to fight such things). However, one cannot
overlook a possible objection to Erler’s argument, namely that
the equivalence between the act of forgiving, which is a process
and an experience with a relevant social dimension, and the
individual experience of forgetting is far from obvious. If there
may be a cause-effect link between the assumption of propranolol
and “forgiveness,” it is still true that forgiveness, as it is generally
understood, is a conscious process that takes into consideration
the fact in question and elaborates it consciously, overcoming it
in relation to its interpersonal effects without forgetting it on a
personal level.
In this sense, it is important to recall the already mentioned
concept of authenticity. It might be defined as follows:
(Def2) “Authenticity is the consistency (and the second order
identification of one’s own desires, a la Frankfurt) of the choices
made by the individual—obvious choices or ones with potentially
observable effects—with the individual’s identity (at any given
time), or at least with some of the relevant identity components
for the choice in question” (Lavazza, 2017).
This concept is based on what may be called rigid identity, that
is, something given, tied to a self that tends to remain stable
over time. This definition incorporates a normative component:
not only is the self-stable, but it should be maintained such. Of
course, the definition that I propose cannot be exhaustive of all
theories of authenticity throughout history. In this sense, one
should also consider the existential-phenomenological literature,
which at least partially originated, especially with Heidegger
(1927-1962), the very concept of authenticity. For Jaspers (1919),
authenticity is what is most profound as opposed to what is
more superficial; for example, what affects the core of every
psychic existence as opposed to what only touches the surface,
what lasts as opposed what is momentary, what has grown and
developed with the person as opposed to what the person has
accepted or imitated. In the same vein, Heidegger and Sartre
have a “strong” conception of authenticity not as something true
to a pre-given self but as fidelity to the true self. It should be
understood as a construction that takes place in a relationship,
and this relationship has the purpose of a whole life project
which, from time to time, incorporates elements of the present
situation. And this ideal of authenticity is connected to being
a person of a particular sort with the virtues of integrity and
perseverance. In a “weak” form this view can be connected to the
contemporary theories of identity as a narrative rather than to the
idea of rigid identity, which however recalls a widespread idea of
authenticity as coherence with something given in the person.
(Def3) The notion of rigid identity in the modern age originates
from the idea of an “original entity” in the metaphysical sense
(following Descartes) which was later considered to be of a
psychological nature (following Locke), but dates back to ancient
and widespread intuitions and concepts developed in many
cultures; it is conceived of as the self-consciousness of a thinking
self, rather than of an extended body—an identity core of the
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subject that has ideal more than real value. This identity may
partly change over time, but always maintaining a stable core,
namely something that characterizes the person and that can be
discovered by different means, because it is sometimes concealed
by external influences. It is what we think makes us unique and
therefore must be preserved and not sacrificed.
The notion of rigid identity is an extremization and an
idealization of the unsophisticated intuition of “core self,” which
is not a metaphysical substance, but a persistent set of consistent
psychological traits and features (whose origin may be genetic or
due to parental and environmental influences during childhood).
There is evidence supporting this notion both from the empirical
(Klein, 2013) and from the philosophical standpoint. Consider,
for example, Rawls’ theory of justice. Rawls presupposes an
original position in which, thanks to a “veil of ignorance,” the
subjects are unaware of their personal characteristics and of the
sociohistorical context. The implication is that, even without a
rich biography, human beings preserve a (non-lockean) identity
by which to make meaningful decisions in a consistent way.
Another example is that described by Damasio of a severely
amnesic patient, David, who had an autobiographical memory
span of less than a minute (Damasio, 1999. chs. 2, 4). In this
case, we are faced with a person who, due to an encephalitis,
can neither live in the past nor project himself consistently in
the future, nor evaluate the consequences of his actions. This
individual therefore does not have a personal identity in the sense
of psychological continuity, according to the classic Lockean
criterion1. Yet, based on the description of his behavior, we
can infer that his present self and his short-term goals are vital
and adequately related to reality. Moreover, thanks to mnestic
traces present at an implicit level of which he is not conscious,
David manages to be coherent with himself, with his tastes and
behavioral choices. And for this reason, thanks to this minimal
core of rigid identity, he can be fully considered a person, even
if he has lost the explicit mnemonic continuity that for many
constitutes the basic criterion of personal identity (cf. Meini,
2017).
Some claims that personal identity is not logically
presupposed by memory (cf. Bernecker, 2010) and hence
they can deny that there are circularity objections to accounts
of personal identity based on memory. But it is likewise argued
that memory presuppose personal identity (Schechtman, 2011).
So I will not delve into this debate, even though it is doubtlessly
relevant (cf. Bernecker and Michelian, 2017).
If there is something like the core self, then it is clear why
authenticity should be considered a value or at least something to
bear in mind. Choices that go against inclinations that logically
and rationally follow from one’s identity are a sort of “betrayal”
of one’s core self, to which one should rather be loyal—as this
1Animalism is one of the theories that, like Lockeanism, seek to explain what
human beings are. According to it, human beings are biological organisms, that
is, human (i.e., thinking) animals. Animalism falls under the physical approach to
personal identity (together with bodily theory and brain theory), and argues that
our identity consists in being the same biological organism over time. This theory
seems to give less importance to memory in relation to personal identity, and I will
not deal with it here.
is, indeed, personal authenticity (e.g., President’s Council on
Bioethics, 2003). There are also social aspects that encourage a
person to respect authenticity: the self we have manifested thus
far generates expectations of consistency in those who interact
with us. If we violate authenticity thus defined, we become
unreliable (qua unpredictable) and risk getting away from reality,
which has consequences over our lives.
In this respect, consider the example made by Glannon (2011)
on memory editing. Imagine a scholar at the beginning of his
career, who fails at his first major conference due to excessive
nervousness: he might be so traumatized by this experience
that he will be haunted by it at all future public speaking
occasions. Therefore, he might resort to propranolol to weaken
the emotional charge of the memory and start over without the
weight of the past, so to speak. But if the next conference were
also a failure, and the scholar resorted again to memory editing,
this would lead to him not feeling anxious even though, in a way,
he should, as his colleagues would still form a negative opinion
of him. In other words, the scholar would risk being detached
from reality, failing to understand his limits (which instead would
be very clear to others). This could be seen as a case of non-
authenticity, as the scholar would end up betraying the scientific
standards he hoped to respect (as a full part of his core self),
erasing his failures and not facing them (cf. Lavazza, 2016).
NARRATIVE IDENTITY AND
MEMORY-MODULATION
Underlying the concepts of personal identity seen so far, there
is the classic philosophical “question of characterization,” that is,
the issue of “what makes a person the person that she is” (e.g.,
Kind, 2015). The concept of rigid identity can be seen as the
extreme point of an ideal continuum, the other end of which can
be the notion of extended identity. The latter seems to have a
weaker normative value than rigid identity, and is supported by
the current scientific data on the matter.
(Def4) Extended identity is based on the feeling of the bodily
self, which is its core. The extended identity lies in interpersonal
relationships, because it is not something original or innate, but
something that emerges in the interactions of the individual
(who has an innate instinctual endowment, which limits what
can emerge from the interaction) and from social and cultural
elements. The psychological dimension and the temporally
distributed self, made of events and relationships, give rise to a
more or less coherent narrative subject to rewriting (which, for
some, does not reflect a self as a true entity).
This notion of identity is more consistent with the recent research
in developmental psychology and psychology of personality,
according to which consciousness is a purely relational concept
(neither innate nor primordial) and emotions are first felt in
the body and then internalized in the psychological world (cf.
Neisser, 1995; Gergely and Watson, 1999; Habermas and de
Silveira, 2008; Marraffa and Meini, 2016). In this vein, one
may also consider Damasio’s hypothesis (2010) that there is a
hierarchy of selves, starting from the proto self (generated by
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homeostatic alterations of the body in front of environmental
stimuli) to the autobiographical self.
The concept of extended identity can include both a
naturalistic vision of the self and of identity, like Carruthers’s, and
a more psychologistic one, like that proposed by Schechtman.
Carruthers (2011, 2015) does not commit himself to an ontology
of the self and of identity, but argues in favor of an epistemology
of the mind that in any case subverts the notions underlying the
Cartesian notion of rigid identity. Without going into the detail
of his complex view, it can be said that for Carruthers we can only
know our thoughts (which are mainly opaque to us, as we cannot
access them directly and introspectively) in the third person,
thanks to the mindreading we also use with others. Indeed, first
we access the mental states of others and then, thanks to this,
we are able to use mindreading on ourselves. Our access to our
mental states is interpretative:
“For present purposes, an interpretative process (...) is one that
accesses information about the subject’s current circumstances,
or the subject’s current or recent behavior, as well as any other
information about the subject’s current or recent mental life.
For this is the sort of information that we must rely on when
attributing mental states to other people” (Carruthers, 2009,
p. 123).
Furthermore, Carruthers (2015) emphasizes the role of working
memory and the neuronal activations that produce attention as
opposed to the mentalistic conception based on beliefs, desires,
objectives, and preferences. In other words, for him, when
making our choices we do not have conscious access to a non-
sensorial repertoire of contents (that is, the self), but we can only
focus on what is present in our working memory.
In philosophical debates, the “question of characterization”
about personal identity and the self has beenmainly framed in the
context of the so-called narrative identity. According to the latter,
the characteristics and the events that make up an individual’s
identity are those that are connected in a more or less coherent
way in a narrative structure. Here one can distinguish a line of
philosophical reflection and a line of psychological investigation.
I will first deal with the former and then with the latter.
In a useful example, Kind (2015, p. 127) notes that we can
draw much information from the box score of a basketball game,
including the final score and the players’ performances. However,
a reporter describing that same event may start her article from
the last part of the match or even from many hours before
the match (for example to say that one of the best players of
a team was slightly injured in the warm-up). Therefore, the
reporter will provide a narrative and not just information. For
this reason, it may be particularly important to evaluate the use of
memory-modulation interventions within the frame of narrative
identity.
The idea of a narrative self and personal identity has been
recently and persuasively defended by Schechtman (1996).
“The difference between persons and other individuals (...) lies
in how they organize their experience, and hence their lives. At
the core of this view is the assertion that individuals constitute
themselves as persons by coming to think of themselves as
persisting subjects who have had experience in the past and
will continue to have experience in the future, taking certain
experiences as theirs. Some, but not all, individuals weave stories
of their lives, and it is their doing so which makes them persons”
(Schechtman, 1996, p. 94).
In other words, an individual constitutes herself as a person by
forming and operating with autobiographical narratives, which
are shaped as the story of a person’s life. The unity of a person
is therefore the unity of an autobiographical narrative. The
narratives are mainly implicit, have to be rather precise, can be
accessed locally and need to have a correct relation to external
facts.
But, in general, “facts about the literal identity of beings
like us are inherently connected to practical considerations”
(Schechtman, 2014, p. 10). And this practical unity revolves
around the concept of personal life, mainly characterized by
“the attributes of the individual—the physical and psychological
capacities and internal structures that she possesses”; ”the kinds
of activities and interactions that make up the individual’s daily
life“; and ”the social and cultural infrastructure of personhood—
the set of practices and institutions that provides the backdrop
within which the kinds of activities that make up the form
of life of personhood become possible“ (Schechtman, 2014,
p. 112–113).
Schechtman’s notion of narrative identity can directly impact
the evaluation of the processes of memory editing. In fact,
Schechtman (2010) has made remarks on the Deep Brain
Stimulation (DBS) used for Parkinson’s that can be easily applied
to interventions on memory. As known, neurosurgery can cause
changes in the patient’s character and inclinations. Schechtman
believes that DBS can threaten personal identity because it can
change—partly or fully—the subject’s personality traits, aims and
interests. According to her, if, after undergoing DBS, a patient
shows a very different behavior, it can be said that she is, in a
way, “a different person.” What matters is how the patient has
changed: not as a result of what she has seen, learned or thought
about, but through the direct effect of a passively undergone deep
brain stimulation.
Schechtman sets two constraints to her idea of narrative
identity. The first is the “reality constraint,” according to which
the narrative of the self making up a person’s identity should
“fundamentally cohere with reality” (Schechtman, 1996, p. 119;
a similar point to that made in Glannon’s example). Obviously, a
story may contain small factual errors or minor inconsistencies,
but it cannot include clearly false claims or views of reality
that are very different from those held by other people one
interacts with. In this sense, it should not be possible to ”remove“
important memories, be it in a literal or metaphorical sense. De
Grazia (2005) also supports a narrative theory of personal identity
similar to Schechtman’s, for which the narration must be made
from the first-person standpoint but must also be realistic.
The second is the “articulation constraint,” according to which
the self-narrative should be constructed by the subject in a
way that justifies her choices and behavior, a person “should
be able to explain why he does what he does, believes what
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he believes, and feels what he feels (Schechtman, 1996, p. 114);
a similar point to that made in Erler’s example). Schechtman
claims that “the mechanism of personality change is important to
its effect on forensic personhood and identity.” In fact, if a patient
treated with DBS were to show a personality change, one would
“have to acknowledge that his current passions and interests—
the things he takes as reasons—were caused by manipulation
of his brain.” As a consequence, this change would have to be
considered “disruptive to his forensic personhood and identity in
a way that natural personal development would not have been”
(Schechtman, 2010).
It might be useful here to evaluate in terms of authenticity the
alternative ways of modulating the mind/brain, that is, between
classical psychotherapeutic techniques and chemical means. The
memory-modulation techniques I am talking about seem to
lack an active self-determination, as what matters is to achieve
the goal (the removal of suffering) and reach success (see the
examples made by Erler and Glannon). The subject’s choice and
personal path are less important, even if the subject consciously
and voluntarily decides to take, for example, propranolol. In
this case, we can say that the patient is passive, undergoing an
external intervention, while in psychotherapy there is an active
participation, an internal process that takes place over time.
The two methods of intervention may have different degrees of
effectiveness and sometimes drugs take less time. However, in
psychotherapy there is a gradual change which one is aware of
and agrees to one step at a time—one does not suddenly leap into
another personal dimension.
Of course, this distinction may sometimes be less clear,
because the therapist’s guidance can lead the patient in directions
toward which she would not otherwise go. In other words,
the patient, who has to deal with traumatic memories, can
find himself in a situation of emotional dependence (due to
his situation), and cognitive dependence, on the therapist (due
to the latter’s expertise). In this sense, the patient’s autonomy
may be reduced, because he follows a path established by the
therapist rather than his own. Unusual cases of unreal memories
of abuse or multiple personality structures emerging during
psychotherapy show the possibility of this risk (cf Hacking, 1995).
However, pharmacological treatment and psychotherapy seem to
still differ in terms of margins of autonomy of the self, because
the conscious agency is less likely to evaluate and counter the
”directive“ effects of pharmacological treatment compared to
psychotherapy, for the reasons set out above.
The individual should retain a certain ability to intervene
to at least partially modify certain traits of his character that
create discomfort or that he reflectively does not like, and this
progressive construction should achieve a sense of unity: the
various elements should be progressively integrated so that they
can be subjectively recognized as one’s own and the individual
can actually identify himself in them. In other words, the
pill treats the symptom, but does not build a character that
will allow one to face other similar situations in the future.
Furthermore, the ability to govern oneself is seen as a complex
and stratified characteristic of personality (and as a value), which
does not depend unequivocally on the biochemical balance of
neurotransmitters.
However, it cannot be ignored in this regard that the most
recent acquisitions of empirical psychology and cognitive science
seem to point to a weak and fragmented ego, in which much
of mental functioning and routine decisions take place within
the cognitive unconscious. According to this perspective, there is
no conscious active monitoring, if not when unexpected events
happen, while environmental signals we are unaware of are
continuously working to direct our behavior (e.g., Bargh, 2017).
All this, as already seen, seems to contrast with the idea of
authenticity as the reflection of a “rigid” ego, which remains
largely stable over time.
In light of what has been said so far, the framework of narrative
identity is particularly relevant because it is the main answer
to the long-standing ”question of characterization.“ Within it,
memory is crucial, because it allows us to construct the narrative
according to the constraints of reality and articulation. Having
truthful, reliable, and coherent memories (within the limits
of a cerebral and psychological faculty of which we know
all the “sins”; Schacter, 2003) causes our narrative identity to
be functional to our subjective continuity. This way we can
construct a self we can be conscious of and identify with.
But respecting the constraints also means building a narration
that is coherent with the environment and the social context
in which we live, allowing us to have adequate interpersonal
relationships. In fact, if we edit our memory at will, erasing
for example unpleasant episodes, we could disregard our moral
responsibility for some events or, say, the duty to remember
a crime in order to testify against the culprit. Furthermore,
weakening the emotional impact of a memory, which is crucial in
remembering salient facts, can make the whole of our existential
narrative less coherent, making us less able to explain some
crucial developments of our life.
It has been claimed (Müller et al., 2017) that Schechtman’s
objection to DBS (and implicitly, therefore, to memory-
modulation) is a case of naturalistic fallacy, entailing confusion
between the property of being natural and that of being good.
However, the matter seems to be more complicated than that
and this, indeed, is why it is interesting to analyse memory
editing procedures. In fact, Schechtman certainly wishes to
preserve the narrative self and personal identity, but she doesn’t
present a naturalistic picture as opposed to a value judgment.
The idea of “forensic personhood” has a normative aspect due
to which some change processes are preferred to others. On
the one hand, narrative identity is certainly extended identity,
on the other it is also a prescriptive identity. In this sense,
autobiographical memory is not a “natural” neutral element, to
which one may associate a potentially negative judgment: it is
part of the construction of the self and personal identity in a
normative sense, and therefore has the same constraints.
In general, theories of narrative identity (cf. Lindemann, 2001)
can be descriptive or normative. In the first case, the theories
limit themselves to explaining how conceiving of one’s life in
terms of a narrative plays an important role in building one’s
personal identity, explaining the most relevant aspects of this way
of constructing identity. In the second case, theories claim that
we should conceive our life in terms of a narrative structure and
that this can be relevant to achieve an ethically good life (cf. Kind,
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2015). The main exponent of this normative approach is Taylor
(1989), according to whom thinking of one’s life as a coherent
narrative is part of our attempt to reach goodness.
The development of narrative theories of identity has
generally comprised an interweaving of descriptive and
normative elements. In this sense, chemical interventions on
memory are to be considered problematic precisely because
they affect the truthfulness and coherence of one’s existential
narrative in a way that is not fully achieved by the subject,
but thanks to an external intervention. A narrative deprived
of relevant events is in fact equivalent to a false narrative—
something that Schechtman and DeGrazia, among others,
consider dysfunctional.
An influential line of psychological investigation is that of
Jerome Bruner, who explicitly speaks of a narrative model
of self-construction (Bruner, 1991, 1997, 2002). For Bruner
there is no evident and essential self. We are the ones who
continually construct and reconstruct a self according to the
situations we find ourselves in, guided by the memories of the
past and by the emotions and goals aimed at the future. The
narrative mechanism, similar to that of literature, accumulates
and stratifies stories, so that it does not start from scratch
every time. But their link with the objective memory of events,
according to Bruner, is quite weak. Rather, the narrative acts that
construct the self are guided by the expectations of others and by
implicit cultural models that suggest, if not impose, what the self
should or should not be.
The creation-narration of the self, for Bruner, uses selective
memory to adapt the past to the needs of the present and to the
expectations of the future. Furthermore, it expands to adopt new
beliefs and values, even though it maintains a degree of continuity
over time despite the considerable changes it goes through.
Identity can therefore be conceived as a verbalized meta-event
which gives coherence and continuity to one’s confused and
chaotic experience. There is no “real” autobiography: ours is just
one of the possible versions, a way of achieving coherence—a
characteristic that both we and society tend to appreciate.
Bruner’s essentially constructivist approach—that is, the idea
that we create and recreate our identity through narrative—
is not just a theoretical-normative view, but is based, in his
opinion, on precise psychological mechanisms. Without the
ability to tell stories we would not have an identity: this is
shown by dysnarrativia, a neurological pathology, associated with
syndromes such as Korsakoff or Alzheimer’s, which involves
serious damage to this capacity, canceling not only the memory
of the past but the very sense of the self and of the other (Castelli
et al., 2011; Baglio et al., 2012). The construction of the self
therefore implies the precondition of good psychological and
cerebral functioning. However, Bruner also insists on the cultural
dimension of the construction of the self, which is not something
innate, if not in its basic characteristics.
The narrative process of construction and reconstruction also
involves a component of invention with respect to the past. As
Bruner notes, this is due to both the normative component of the
creation of identity, which often follows the indications of one’s
culture, and a naturalistic fact, that is, the fact that the human
mind can never completely and faithfully recover what happened
and was experienced in the past. In this vein, the unreliable and
necessarily subjective character of memory can be combined with
Bruner’s constructivism to provide a narrative model in which
the constraints posed by Schechtman have a lesser—or no—
role, allowing one to say that pharmacological interventions on
memory would not be a source of particular concern, especially if
inserted into an appropriate narrative.
Contrary to narrative theories, the naturalistic idea of the self
a’ la Carruthers doesn’t seem to incorporate explicitly normative
elements, but rests on interpretation in the form of inference to
the best explanation of the available empirical data (Chudnoff,
2016). A selective intervention on autobiographical memory only
affects the integrity of the self insofar as a single memory is
particularly relevant to the (largely subconscious and automatic)
functioning of the mind. However, this is only the case with
extreme PTSD patients, where a clinical intervention aimed at
weakening the emotional salience of the givenmemory is the very
condition for the person’s recovery of autonomy. But this does
not mean that there may not be a regulative component also in
the naturalistic conception of the self.
MEMORY-MODULATION AND THE BATTLE
OF THE SELF
The definition of rigid identity as such should imply an
acceptance of memory modulation, as the very idea of a fixed
and stable core entails that single memories cannot modify the
self. However, the idea of rigid identity also entails the notion
of authenticity, with its normativity. It implies the respect and
acceptance of what nature and life have given every person
(Sandel, 2009). The purpose is not to change an anthropological
perspective that refers to an (implied) idea of the self as a real, self-
conscious, free entity capable of managing its autobiographical
memory as a storage of memories. The latter—positive and
negative—are considered something given and valuable qua
experience, which cannot be changed at will.
A very different view is offered by the psychoanalytic
perspective, which is not part of the main focus of this article,
but which deserves at least a mention at this point because
it attributes a special role to memory with regard to self-
development and self-transformation. Simply put, according to
Freud, the patient’s problems arise from secrets and memory
lapses which concern the unconscious, by definition inaccessible
directly. Free associations provide the analyst with the tools to
unveil those secrets, to reconstruct those memories, and to reveal
and modify the patient’s internal resistance to knowledge and
remembering. Treatment implies a definitive renunciation of the
conflicting childish desires thus revealed (Mitchell and Black,
1995).
It can be affirmed that the purpose of this treatment is
not to erase memories but to bring them to consciousness, in
order to integrate them in the fabric of the other conscious
psychic contents. In general, the memory of the traumatic
experience is removed and delivered to oblivion, from where,
however, it continues to act on the subject causing an uneasiness
that she cannot deal with. The psychoanalytic perspective
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therefore does not seek the “dampening” memories—something
that it considers impossible—but rather the reestablishment of
associative links and the reintegration in the self of something
that has been removed. The therapeutic act lies in the ability to
narrate the self in a coherent and understandable way. It is a
matter of reconstructing the continuity of one’s representations
of the self and of the world, which were interrupted by an event
to which one has not been able to give meaning within one’s life
story.
Winnicott’s idea of True and False Self goes in the same
direction of memory recovery as an act of disclosure of the False
Self, while erasing dysfunctional memories or a mitigation of
their emotional capacity would probably end up preventing a
recovery of the True Self. Indeed, when the infant lacks a good
enough parenting, she takes shelter in fiction and, through the
False Self, she “builds up a false set of relationships, and [...] even
attains a show of being real” (Winnicott, 1960). But the False
Self is a defensive structure that is cloaked with objectivity and
elements of the external world to protect the more fragile True
Self, in order to protect the individual from being crushed by
emptiness and inauthenticity.
However, in Western culture there has been a passage
from a psychological view of the human being to a view that
progressively relates to the body, and to the brain in particular
(Rose, 2007 ch. 7). Ultimately, the idea is that we are biochemical
selves, in which the functional (mental) elements converge into
the cerebral aspects. The truth about our Self, provided it exists,
comes from scientific research with its experimental models and
diagnoses that attempt to categorize it objectively. And science
only works with the brain and its potential modifications, the
implementation of which requires drugs that are molecules as
much as those contained in the brain itself. According to Rose,
if the mind is just brain activity and psychic disorders are
biochemical imbalances, then we are faced with a new ontology
that inevitably bears more general consequences.
This point is very important. That psychiatric diagnosis is
now done at a molecular level, by recognizing an ever closer link
between neurochemistry and behavior can only be considered
a form of progress, as better knowledge allows for the cure of
disorders that were previously untreatable. Too low or too high
levels of a given neurotransmitter as well as inadequate neuronal
transmission mechanisms cause variations from a “normal”
or “functional” to a “dysfunctional” state for the subject. The
scientific idea that now subjects can be treated chemically also
contributes to the creation of a cultural metaphor.
For example, Rose writes, Prozac is a drug that only affects
serotonin reuptake, selectively acting on the subject’s mood. On
the one hand, it does not have any significant side effects, but on
the other hand, it promotes the view that there are single isolated
systems producing identifiable diseases that are not associated
with other causes. The disorder is only organic, society does
not matter, nor do personal relationships and social interactions.
There is only one clear target, which is within us. We are made of
many small pieces that can mostly be cured.
In general, says Rose (2007), it appears that new psychiatric
drugs cure somewhat vaguely defined diseases, whose very
existence is sometimes questioned. They do not cure a specific
pathology—in the classic sense—but modify the ways in which
salient events (emotionally or objectively significant) of life are
experienced and understood by people. These drugs appear to be
targeted at the so-called “biovalue,” that is, the conception of what
human beings are or should be, which is internalized in the idea
underlying these drugs as norms, values, and opinions. There is
an ethics inscribed in the molecular composition of these drugs:
they carry and stimulate particular forms of life in which the “true
self ” is both “natural” and to be constructed. These drugs have
important effects not only in terms of how they treat patients but
also because they affect the way in which we see, interpret and
describe ourselves and the world.
If autobiographical memory can be modulated at will, without
getting to ”cosmetic neurology“ (Chatterjee, 2004), then what
follows is the idea that the individual can be adjusted to be more
”functional“ (to society, to consumerism, to production etc.).
This is not, of course, a direct and enforced form of control.
However, the choice to take psychotropic drugs (including
propranolol, in the future) may be due to a strong social pressure
or a cultural climate, also because the mindset promoted is that
the cure will restore the person’s true self. The neurochemical
coordinates of a “normal” or ”efficient“ self are in fact established
by science considering the average brain physiology, regardless
of all other variables. Once the neurochemical self is identified,
it needs to be restored whenever it loses its balance. But whether
this self is desirable is open to discussion.
Nevertheless, the consideration above should not lead to
an anti-psychiatric stance that completely discards science and
its findings. Consider the mentioned topic of dysfunctional
memories: on the one hand, they can lead to the stigma of
mental illness in relation to PTSD; on the other hand, they can
create pressure for treatment by means of memory-modulation,
with a change of autobiographical memory. Modulating a painful
autobiographical memory (or canceling it altogether, which
may be possible in the future) has undeniable personal and
social consequences that go beyond the objective clinical (and
mostly beneficial) intervention on the disorder identified as the
hyperactivation of the circuits described in paragraph 2. The
decision to intervene on one’s autobiographical memory—and
potentially on one’s self—also implies value decisions involving
the subject’s autonomy and identity, as well as implicit social
values (materialism, efficiency, and scientific humanitarianism
being in favor of the cure; classical humanistic and religious
values being against it).
One should also consider Michel Foucault’s remark that
medicalization—linked to the naturalization of the biochemical
self—implies a passage from the legal regulation of society to its
normalization, with the application on the social body of a set
of knowledge, institutions, and controls that structure the life of
the population according to binary criteria (normal-pathological,
legal-devious, healthy-sick). Medicalization can take on a
disciplinary function: it can structure, and control individual
and collective physiology in order to qualify it normatively
in educational, productive, and consumerist institutions (cf.
Pandolfi, 2006).
In general, it is interesting to note that, according to Foucault,
self-care and ethics as practices concerning the most important
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aspects of freedom have become the most advanced fronts of
political struggle in our societies, where those in power try
to limit and influence the choices of everyone else. Self-care
and ethics bring into play the idea of human nature as the
target of all manifestations of social power. Human practice is
losing its traditional center identified with the self, consciousness,
or other aspects of personal identity. The Multiple Personality
Disorder/Dissociative Identity Disorder (MPD/DID) debate is
linked to this scenario and involves what Hacking (1995) refers
to as politics of memory. In his view, the new memory sciences,
developed since the late nineteenth century, have taken the
soul away from religion and handed it over to science. In this
way, “moral struggles” have become objective and impersonal.
For example, as suggested (albeit in a different sense) by
Herman (1992), the new knowledge and theories about memory
functioning have contributed to the development of feminism, a
political movement that also exploits traumas connected to MPD
as a tool to show the subordinate condition of women and pursue
their emancipation.
According to Braude (1991) multiple personalities give rise
to distinct autobiographical memories which, however, are not
indexical, being described in the third person. They would,
therefore, be based on a unifying self or mind: “It seems
compelling to appeal to an underlying synthesizing subject who
simply evolves into a multiple as a complex and creative response
to various life situations” (Braude, 1991, p. 173). In fact, the
primary awareness seems to be continuous and unified also
in subjects diagnosed with MPD, which therefore could be an
extreme dissociative disorder. But what’s at stake here, regardless
of the several different diagnoses and scholarly opinions on the
phenomenon, is above all the subjectivity of the descriptions,
both on the part of the patient and on the part of the therapist.
Therefore, the “battle of self ” linked to autobiographical memory
can be traced back to purely normative models, because there is
no scientific consensus either on the disorder or on the way in
which the traumatic memory should be treated.
In accord to Foucault, even the organic unity of the body
tends to fragment itself, so as to be reduced to its genetic bases.
And if genetic foundations can be changed, natural inequalities—
once considered irremediable—can be easily modified. In a
sense, there is nothing natural left and this may mean that
there is no longer a structured and precise self that stays
stable over time, since everything becomes fluid and malleable
at will. Genetic susceptibility to PTSD could thus be treated
in ways similar to memory modulation, with a preemptive
intervention that would prevent negative and painful memories
from causing discomfort to the individual. The underlying idea
is that of self-construction, by which the self is an open field for
experimentation. Think of the attempt to contain the response
of the immune system after a transplant, a response that is
completely natural and adaptive, but has to be countered to
allow the organism to welcome a new part. Something similar
can happen with memory: the chemical modulation of memory
goes against its biological functioning, which tends to emphasize
memories that may be important to our survival in a certain
environment, although they may be painful for the individual
experiencing them.
Autonomy, a fundamental value of modernity that implies
freedom of choice and ability to act independently of others,
may thus give way to a new normativity: that of “appropriated
affirmation” (Ehrenberg, 2010). Now that social bonds are
weaker, people must be able to rely on their interiority and
subjectivity, which must be functional. However, the traditional
ban against being oneself now turns into the “obligation” to
become oneself—and it remains to be seen what “self ” one
should become. So, biopolitical battles are now fought on an
unsteady ground, with no invariants or hard cores, but only
varying and modifiable physical and social conditions, up to the
post-anthropological and post-humanist hypothesis of machine-
body hybrids, with embedded or uploaded external memories
constructing a blurred self.
CONCLUSION
It is unquestionable that, over time, people change the way they
react to stimuli and events (and these reactions can be objectively
assessed, contrary to the more “fleeting” notion of the self). It
is equally unquestionable that autobiographical memory is an
important component in relation to the subject’s response, as
it contributes to building the subject’s repertoire of reactions
and affects the probability of such responses. Change as such
does not imply a change of identity or self. Unless one adopts
a deconstructionist view of the self (Metzinger, 2009; Strawson,
2009), personal identity and the self are usually taken to be
precisely what persists in a person through change.
However, the possibility of memory editing (which, for now,
is still fairly limited) entails consequences on the self, broadly
understood as the subject responsible for choices and behaviors
(while taking into account the differences related to the various
notions of self on the market). Objections to the modulation
of autobiographical memory are mainly linked to regulative
conceptions of the self, related to descriptive conceptions of the
self (like the “narrative” one).
One of the ideas underlying such objections is that “natural”
change in one’s self is gradual, allowing one to foresee how
one may be after as opposed to before. Instead, the choice
of drug-induced oblivion implies an immediate transition with
no intermediate stages, making such a comparison impossible.
Another view against memory-editing interventions is that
change should be purposeful, that is, it should aim at liberating
the “true” self, developing elements that were already present in
the self since childhood. In this sense, experimental philosophy
has recently shown that people tend to describe positive changes
(for example, acquiring qualities generally seen as desirable, such
as self-control vs. impulsivity) as consistent with their identity,
while judging negative ones (for example, being violent) as a
deviation from their true self (Tobia, 2015).
This intuition, despite being often fallacious qua based on
a prejudice, can lead to an important consideration. Indeed, it
seems that personality changes differ based on the subject’s ability
to account for them. If one can explain how and why one has
changed (albeit with the limitations of a subjective explanation),
it means that probably this change is at least partly consistent with
the self as it was before the change. And yet this criterion seems
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hardly objective. In fact, as we have seen, the ideas of naturalness
and authenticity stem from specific conceptions of the self and its
relation to autobiographical memory—in particular from an idea
of “rigid identity,” as I have called it. This conception of the self
goes against many elements of recent empirical research, whose
results are more aligned with what is termed “extended identity.”
Constructivist conceptions do not regard the self as original
and complete entity but as emergent, fragmented and only
narratively reconstructed as a whole. For these conceptions, the
single (non-systematic) modulation of autobiographical memory
is not a relevant problem, so long as it does not imply detachment
from reality, understood as the set of material and social
conditions in which the person can flourish and from which she
gets feedback on her actions.
There also are conceptions that are predominantly normative,
based on an extremization of the available scientific data. In this
perspective, a so-called “neurochemical self ” is the battlefield of
external influences, and memory modulation can be considered
an invasive tool, extrinsic to the process of personal identity
construction. In this sense, one can speak of self-depletion, as
the self is manipulated and impoverished—for example—due to
an efficientist social pressure relying on a purely brain-based
conception of identity.
On the other hand, a conscious choice to modify one’s
memory to modulate painful and paralyzing memories, within
constructivist self-conceptions, appears as an effective tool that,
however, is not qualitatively different from other narrative
strategies to harmonize one’s identity and make it functional in
specific environmental conditions. In this sense, one can talk
about self-improvement, in a perspective from which memory-
editing is not akin to cosmetic neurology but rather to self-care
and self-enhancement.
But, as we have seen, in the general perspective of
narrative identity, both on a descriptive level and above all
on a normative level, memory-modulation interventions are
problematic because they violate the constraints of a functional
and coherent narrative. Instead, models that adopt a more openly
naturalistic perspective seem to pose fewer normative restrictions
to the partial modification of one’s autobiographical memory, as
these modulations do not seem to concern the functioning and
balance of the autobiographical self-memory system.
It must be repeated here that forgetting traumatic experiences
or generically unpleasant ones represent different sides of the
wider problem of forgetting. Although it is difficult to draw a
clear distinction, as such situations should always be assessed
individually, there are two extreme situations that are more
easily classified along the continuum of possible interventions
on the “self and autobiographical memory” system. On the one
hand, clinical situations related to serious trauma; on the other
hand, pure cosmetic neurology. The first ones are those that
arouse the least concern with respect to their manipulation,
while the latter are those that arouse the highest. However,
the former also present relevant issues, as in the hypothetical
case of witnesses of the Shoah (cf. Lavazza and Inglese,
2013).
The present discussion, which is undoubtedly partial, has
shown that it is difficult to break the strong bond between
descriptive and normative conceptions on the self when it comes
to the potential modulation of autobiographical memory. But
this twine will be more easily “undone” at an analytical level
when neuroscience and psychological research achieve a clearer
understanding of the mechanisms that make up what we call self
and personal identity.
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This study examined whether reduced performance on two neuropsychological tasks,
cognitive flexibility and working memory, were associated with higher levels of trauma
centrality. A growing body of research has shown that trauma centrality, the extent
to which a person believes a potentially traumatic event has become central to
their self-identity and life story, is associated with post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). Furthermore, PTSD is often associated with alterations in neuropsychological
functioning. The relationship between neuropsychological processes and trauma
centrality, however, has yet to be explored. OEF/OIF combat veterans (N = 41)
completed the Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS), the Beck Depression Inventory-II
(BDI-II), the Centrality of Event Scale (CES), and on-line measures of cognitive flexibility
and working memory assessed via WebNeuro. Bivariate Pearson correlations showed
that CES scores were positively correlated with PDS and BDI scores, and negatively
correlated with cognitive flexibility and working memory. Linear regressions revealed that
working memory significantly predicted CES when controlling for depression and PTSD
severity while cognitive flexibility approached significance when controlling for these
same variables. This study employed a cross-sectional design, precluding causality.
The small sample size, entirely male sample, and use of an online neuropsychological
assessment warrant follow-up research. Although numerous studies have found an
association between CES and PTSD, this is the first to suggest that neuropsychological
processes underlie the construct of trauma centrality. Given the importance of
maladaptive cognitive processes underlying the pathogenesis of PTSD, these data
suggest that future studies aimed at examining the link between neuropsychological
processes and maladaptive cognitive processes, such as trauma centrality, may help to
characterize and treat PTSD.
Keywords: PTSD, military, centrality of events, working memory, cognitive flexibility, autobiographical memory
INTRODUCTION
The way in which a person remembers and interprets the impact of a traumatic event appears to
play an important role in the pathogenesis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Horowitz,
1997; Foa et al., 1999; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Dalgleish
et al., 2003; Bryant and Guthrie, 2007). In particular, a growing body of research has shown that
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PTSD symptoms are positively associated with trauma centrality,
the extent to which a traumatic event is viewed as central
to one’s identity and as a turning point in one’s life story
(Berntsen and Rubin, 2006, 2007). Trauma centrality has been
measured with the 20-item (or abridged seven-item) self-report
measure, the Centrality of Event Scale (CES) (Berntsen and
Rubin, 2006, 2007). Numerous studies have shown that higher
scores on the CES are positively correlated with greater PTSD
symptom severity in both clinical and non-clinical populations
including college students (Berntsen and Rubin, 2006, 2007;
Robinaugh and McNally, 2010), combat veterans (Brown et al.,
2010), and adults with a history of childhood sexual abuse
(Robinaugh and McNally, 2011). The relationship between
trauma centrality and PTSD symptom severity has been shown
to be significant even after controlling for stress, anxiety,
depression, dissociation, negative perspective, and emotional
intensity (Berntsen and Rubin, 2007; Schuettler and Boals, 2011).
Most research examining trauma centrality has been cross-
sectional, however, a recent prospective study found that trauma
centrality longitudinally predicted PTSD symptoms (Boals and
Ruggero, 2015). Although the relationship between trauma
centrality and PTSD symptomatology is well-established, the
extent to which neuropsychological processes underlie trauma
centrality has yet to be examined.
Although studies have yet to test the association between
neuropsychological performance and trauma centrality, prior
theories and research suggest that alterations in cognitive
and neuropsychological processes are intertwined with changes
in self-related processes, such as recall for autobiographical
memories. Neuropsychological impairments are related to the
construction of maladaptive self-representations that have been
proposed to underlie the onset and maintenance of PTSD.
For example, there is now a robust body of research showing
a link between PTSD and impairments in recalling specific
autobiographical memories (e.g., Aupperle et al., 2012; Polak
et al., 2012; Scott et al., 2015). Additionally, individuals with
PTSD are more likely to recall trauma-related memories than
trauma-exposed individuals without PTSD (for reviews see,
Moore and Zoellner, 2007; Williams et al., 2007; Lapidow
and Brown, 2015). These impairments in autobiographical
memory may be linked with deficits in neuropsychological
functioning, as overgeneralized memory in depression has
been associated with impairments in working memory, verbal
fluency, and executive functioning (for a review see, Sumner,
2012).
Neuropsychological research aimed at characterizing and
studying healthy and clinical populations suggest that two
executive functioning processes, working memory and cognitive
flexibility, are associated with processes involved with the
capacity to generate autobiographical memories and self-
representations (e.g., Piolino et al., 2009; Prebble et al., 2013).
Working memory, or the ability to process and manipulate
information that is no longer perceptually present (Baddeley
and Hitch, 1994; Smith, 1999), has been proposed to contribute
to the “working self ” in cognitive models of autobiographical
memory (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The working self,
or one’s hierarchy of active personal goals and self-image, has
been suggested to serve as a schema, guiding the accessibility and
content of autobiographical memories. Given that the working-
self has been proposed to be a part of working memory (Conway,
2005), deficits in working memory may alter this top–down
process and impair one’s ability to recall non-trauma related
memories. Similarly, cognitive flexibility refers to the readiness
to switch attentional focus between multiple concept systems
depending on environmental stimuli; one’s ability to think about
multiple concepts simultaneously or to change how one thinks
about concepts (Scott, 1962; Diamond, 2013). As proposed by
Ehlers and Clark (2000), people with persistent PTSD often
have autobiographical disturbances that inhibit their ability to
reorganize previous and future experiences, thus impeding an
established stable view of themselves. Having a deficit in cognitive
flexibility, then, may be related to one’s inability to think of
themselves outside of the context of their trauma.
Theoretical frameworks have posited that maladaptive
personal schemas for traumatic events are in part linked with
neuropsychological impairments, such as deficits in working
memory (Ehlers and Clark, 2000; Dalgleish, 2004). Specifically,
working memory has been proposed to contribute to the
ability to hold multiple self-representations and appraisals
(Dalgleish, 2004). The Schematic, Propositional, Analog, and
Associative Representational Systems (SPAARS) model (Power
and Dalgleish, 1997, 1999; Dalgleish, 1999) proposes that
working memory manipulates schematic (abstracted, generic
knowledge), propositional (referential meaning in verbal
form), and analogical (non-verbal referential information)
formats of mental representation. SPAARS accounts for
cognitive processing and representation, and explains that
while the propositional and analogical levels of processing
involve more basic manipulations of thoughts and mental
images, schematic level representations are constructed and
integrated using the propositional and analogical levels. In other
words, analogical representations, such as sight and smell, and
propositional representations, or thought content, of a particular
autobiographical event combine to create a schematic sense of
the entire experience greater than its component parts (Dalgleish,
2004). Discrepancies between schematic representations and
active information, processed through working memory, are
detectable in the SPAARS model, but a disruption of working
memory could potentially leave schematic representations of
oneself or an autobiographical event unchallenged. Thus, higher
scores on the CES, which may reflect difficulty in generating
non-trauma related self-representations, may be associated with
a reduction in working memory.
The goal of the present study was to assess the relationship
between trauma centrality, neuropsychological functioning, and
PTSD symptomatology in a sample of US military Iraq and
Afghanistan veterans. We hypothesized that neuropsychological
performance, specifically working memory and cognitive
flexibility, would be negatively associated with CES total scores.
Similar to previous findings (Berntsen and Rubin, 2006, 2007), we
hypothesized that CES total scores will be positively correlated
to clinical measures of PTSD and depression. Moreover, we
expected to find that the aforementioned neurocognitive
measures would maintain their negative association with trauma
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centrality when controlling for PTSD symptom severity, thus
linking deficits in working memory and cognitive flexibility
directly to trauma centrality. Because of the known relationship
between executive functioning and depression (see Veiel, 1997;
Harvey et al., 2004), depression will be controlled for in analyses.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) combat veterans (N = 41, MAge = 33.02,
SD = 6.31) with current PTSD (n = 11) and without current
PTSD (n = 30) were recruited from the Mental Health
Services of the Manhattan, Bronx and Brooklyn Veterans
Affairs Medical Centers, other regional VA medical centers,
Veterans Service Organizations, National Guard, reservist
agencies and organizations, and from the general community.
Recruitment methods included flyers, in-person presentations,
media advertisements, internet postings (e.g., Craigslist), and
referrals from clinicians. All study procedures were approved
by NYU’s IRB and all participants provided written, informed
consent. Participants were excluded if they had a lifetime history
of psychosis, bipolar disorder, major depression with psychotic
features, pre-deployment obsessive compulsive disorder, or were
less than 2 months stable on psychiatric medications. Participants
with exposure to trauma within the past month or with active
suicidal ideation were also excluded.
Procedures
All participants involved in this study were enrolled in the Cohen
Veteran Center Study and a Department of Defense funded
project at New York University’s Langone Medical Center. As
part of these studies, participants completed a battery of self-
report assessments and the comprehensive neuropsychological
battery WebNeuro. The self-report assessment included
measures of depression, symptoms of PTSD, and trauma
centrality as well as instruments not used in this particular work.
Similarly, given our specific predictions of executive functioning,
only the variables of cognitive flexibility and working memory
were used from WebNeuro. In full, WebNeuro took participants
roughly 40 min to complete and was administered with the
participant alone in a windowless testing room.
Measures
Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale – Part III (PDS; Foa
et al., 1997)
Part 3 of the Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) is a 17-
item self-report questionnaire used to assess the severity of PTSD
symptoms as related to a single event. Additionally, the PDS
offers a diagnostic status for PTSD, which was used in this study
to determine groups (α= 0.91).
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al.,
1996)
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) is a 21-item self-
report measure of depression that assesses the severity of various
cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms associated
with depression (α= 0.93).
The Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen and
Rubin, 2006)
The Centrality of Event Scale is a 20-item self-report measure that
assesses how central an event is to a person’s self-identity and life
story (e.g., this event was a turning point in my life) (α= 0.96).
Neuropsychological Assessment (WebNeuro, Brain
Resource Company)
Subjects completed two test batteries via WebNeuro, an
abbreviated form of IntegNeuro (Silverstein et al., 2007).
Data from WebNeuro is linked to the standardized and
integrative Brain Resource International database and cognitive
functioning domain outputs were computed via WebNeuro
software algorithms. For this study, norm-referenced sten scores
were used for both variables in analyses.
Working Memory
Working memory was measured by the Digit Span task (forward
and reverse), where the participant observed an increasingly
growing sequence of numerical digits and was asked to recall the
sequence correctly. The length of the longest correctly ordered
sequence entered was recorded as the participant’s digit span.
Cognitive Flexibility
Cognitive flexibility was measured by Switching Attention task, a
computerized adaption of the Trail Making test (Reitan, 1958).
The participant was first presented with 25 numbers in circles
and asked to click them with a mouse in an ascending numerical
sequence with lines automatically drawn between clicked circles.
The second part of the task consisted of the same basic task, but
with a mixture of 13 numbers and 12 letters. The participant
was instructed to switch back and forth between numbers in an
ascending pattern (i.e., 1 A 2 B 3 C : : :). Performance for the
Switching Attention Task was measure time taken to complete
the task and accuracy.
RESULTS
SPSS version 21.0 (Statistics Package for Social Sciences, Inc.
Chicago, IL, United States 2012) was used for all analyses. Group
means and standard deviations for demographic characteristics
and scores for the PDS, BDI, CES, and WebNeuro measures are
presented in Table 1. Among the veterans exposed to traumatic
events, there were significant differences between veterans with
PTSD and veterans without PTSD in BDI, PDS, and CES scores.
They did not significantly differ by age or in neurocognitive
measures.
Bivariate correlations (Table 2) revealed significant (p < 0.05)
relationships between the CES total and BDI total (r= 0.39), PDS
current total (r = 0.53), cognitive flexibility scores (r = −0.33),
and working memory scores (r = −0.36). The PDS total and
BDI total were significantly correlated with each other (r = 0.85).
Cognitive flexibility scores were significantly correlated with
working memory scores (r = 0.54) as well as age (r = −0.38).
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TABLE 1 | Demographic and self-report data for OEF/OIF veterans.
Veterans with PTSD Veterans without PTSD
Variable M SD M SD t
Demographic variable
Age 33.94 6.51 32.38 6.22 0.78
Clinical and self-report measures
PDS 23.94 7.90 6.67 4.90 −7.99∗∗
BDI 16.12 9.82 4.08 4.51 −5.28∗
CES 68.00 18.95 54.08 22.15 −2.10∗
Cognitive measures
Cognitive flexibility 5.59 1.88 5.38 1.94 −0.35
Working memory 5.18 2.42 4.48 2.45 −0.89
OIF/OEF, Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom; PDS, Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; CES, Centrality of Events Scale;
Cognitive measures assessed via WebNeuro, presented as sten scores.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 2 | Correlations among clinical, self-report, and cognitive measures.
Variable PDS BDI CES Cognitive flexibility Working memory
PDS 0.85∗∗ 0.53∗∗ −0.16 −0.09
BDI 0.41∗∗ −0.00 −0.13
CES −0.33∗ −0.36∗
Cognitive flexibility 0.54∗∗
OIF/OEF, Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom; PDS, Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; CES, Centrality of Events Scale;
Cognitive Flexibility and Working Memory assessed via WebNeuro.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
Age was not found to significantly correlate with any additional
measures.
Two linear regressions assessing the effects of cognitive
and clinical measures on centrality were then implemented.
The dependent variable, CES total scores, was found to be
normally distributed (K-S= 0.130, p= 0.079) without significant
issues of kurtosis (−1.01, SE = 0.724) or skewness (−0.413,
SE = 0.369). BDI and PDS scores were centered to account
for multicollinearity (all transformed VIF values were below
4.09). The first regression (F3;37 = 6.36, p < 0.05; R2 = 0.34)
found that CES total scores was not significantly predicted by
cognitive flexibility but was approaching significance (t =−1.72,
p = 0.09) when controlling for PDS total scores (t = 1.93,
p = 0.06) and BDI-II total scores (t = −0.14, p = 0.89). In
this model, there were no significant coefficients (p > 0.05).
A subsequent model dropping BDI total scores (F2;38 = 9.79,
p < 0.001; R2 = 0.34) found that PDS was a significant
predictor of CES scores (t = 3.67, p < 0.05) but cognitive
flexibility was still only approaching significance (t = −1.83,
p= 0.07).
The second linear regression assessing the effects of working
memory on centrality (F3;36 = 7.09, p < 0.05; R2 = 0.37) found
that working memory significantly predicted CES total score
(t = −2.45, p < 0.05) when controlling for the PDS total
scores (t = 2.63, p < 0.05) and BDI-II total scores (t = 0.84,
p > 0.05). A subsequent linear regression using only the
significant predictors of working memory and PDS total scores
revealed similar results (F2;37 = 10.36, p < 0.01; R2 = 0.36), with
both working memory (t = −2.39, p < 0.05) and PDS (t = 3.65,
p < 0.05) as significant coefficients.
DISCUSSION
This study establishes a link between neuropsychological
functioning and trauma centrality. In addition to replicating a
growing body of studies showing a positive correlation between
trauma centrality and PTSD symptom severity, these findings
show that lower levels of working memory and, albeit only
approaching significance, cognitive flexibility are associated with
trauma centrality when controlling for measures of depression
and PTSD severity. This work highlights the need to consider
how changes in neuropsychological processes may be linked to
self-appraisals in the wake of traumatic events.
This work is novel in that it is the first to directly assess the
relationship between trauma centrality and neuropsychological
processes. Our findings are in line with the well-established
phenomenon of overgeneralized autobiographical memory in
PTSD. That is, the inability to successfully retrieve specific
autobiographical memories has been linked to related deficits
in working memory and executive control (e.g., Moore, 2009;
Sumner, 2012). Furthermore, cognitive models of PTSD have
proposed that executive functions, such as working memory,
may underlie one’s ability to process and maintain adaptive self-
representations after a traumatic event (e.g., Dalgleish, 2004).
Deficits to working memory may then be the cause, or a reflection
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of, the inability to maintain and adapt self-representations, thus
being tied to a person’s inability to see themselves and their
autobiography outside of the context of their traumatic event.
Future work would benefit from examining the extent to which
neuropsychological deficits are associated with autobiographical
memory and self-appraisals associated with trauma centrality.
The present study cannot determine whether it is
neuropsychological deficits affecting trauma centrality, or vice
versa, though previous research supports multiple explanations.
Cognitive, clinical, and brain imaging studies have shown
that self-related processes are supported by working memory
and executive functioning, and damage to brain regions that
support these processes often lead to profound alterations
in self-identity (Kelley et al., 2002; Spreng et al., 2009).
These studies suggest that deficits to working memory and
executive functioning caused by trauma could therefore affect
identity and trauma centrality. Alternatively, it is possible
that impairments to self-related processes affect cognitive
performance, where the working-self is biasedly selecting
autobiographical recollections (present in the autobiographical
knowledge base) that protect the self, even when those self-
views may be maladaptive (Conway, 2005; Conway et al., 2005).
While the direction of this relationship remains unknown, our
findings are an important step to understanding how working
memory and cognitive flexibility contribute to, or are affected
by, autobiographical memory and identity following traumatic
events.
Although our findings are promising, this work is limited
in a number of ways. Principally, the direction of this
relationship must be examined to determine whether it is
centrality affecting neuropsychological functioning or vice versa,
which these data cannot support due to the cross-sectional
study design. In addition, although this study points to a link
between neuropsychological functioning and trauma centrality,
future work should aim to assess if lower neuropsychological
functioning is a predisposition to both PTSD and centrality, or
if PTSD is the source of neuropsychological decline. Additional
measures and methods of testing working memory, cognitive
flexibility, and executive functioning should also be employed
to further determine the extent of the relationship between
neuropsychological functioning and trauma centrality. For
this study, a brief online assessment was used; however, in-
person and more thorough assessment could provide additional
insight into the complexity of working memory, cognitive
flexibility, and neuropsychological functioning in general.
An assessment of self-awareness would also be useful to
determine any effects on self-administered measures (CES,
PDS, BDI). In addition, those with PTSD may have had
trouble attending to the on-line tasks. Thus future work would
benefit from exploring these links with neuropsychological
assessments that can better control for this potential artifact.
Finally, this study’s generalizability is limited in that it only
included male combat veterans. Future work should explore
the relationship between centrality and neuropsychological
functioning among diverse populations with varying traumatic
events.
Despite these limitations, these findings begin to shed light
on the potential mechanisms underlying trauma centrality, a
construct strongly associated with PTSD. Such findings provide
initial support for the possibility to the extent to which targeting
working memory and cognitive flexibility in treatment may also
help to promote self-representations that are less dominated by a
traumatic event(s).
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Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a clinical condition that may develop after a person
experienced a traumatic event. PTSD can be considered as a disorder in which a fear conditioned
response fails to extinguish, leading to several symptoms such as re-experiencing of the traumatic
moment with intrusive thoughts, flashbacks, and nightmares, avoidance of situations related to the
trauma, negative alterations in cognitions and mood, and hyper-arousal.
One important feature of PTSD is the re-experiencing of specific aspects of the traumatic
memory. This aspect is related to the fact that, as originally suggested by Van Der Kolk et al.
(1997); Van Der Kolk (1998), traumatic memories are encoded differently than memories of
ordinary events, including several multisensory fragments that cannot be integrated in a structured
meaningful narrative.
At a neurobiological level, memories recorded during extreme stressful situations cause a
maximal potentiation of amygdalar synapses, assumed to temporarily store the events. This
causes the saturation of all amygdalar alpha-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole (AMPA)
receptors-bindings sites, preventing the recorded emotional memory trace to be merged with the
cognitive memory trace from the hippocampus (Corrigan, 2002; Harper et al., 2009). Therefore,
the fragments of emotionally charged memories remain trapped in the limbic system and cannot
be transfered to the cortical areas, where a further processing and integration into already existing
networks should take place.
Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) was initially proposed in the late
80’s by Francine Shapiro (Shapiro, 1989) and it’s now a well-established psychological treatment
for PTSD (Bradley et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2014). EMDR is a complex therapeutic approach
that integrates elements of many traditional psychological orientations, but one of the key
aspects is the use of Alternate Bilateral Stimulations (ABS) such as eye movements (EMs). Over
recent years a large debate has developed whether EMs are an active treatment component and
if the mechanisms responsible for EMDR efficacy differ substantially from those operating in
trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy and standard exposure therapy. The original theory
of Adaptive Information Processing (AIP), which is the basis of EMDR (Shapiro, 2001), posits that
humans have an innate information processing system that assimilates new experiences into already
existing memory networks. Pathology arises when new information is inadequately processed
and then stored in a maladaptive mode in the memory networks, along with associated distorted
thoughts, sensations and emotions. When memories are adequately processed, symptoms can be
alleviated and memories integrated. EMDR seems to facilitate the access to and processing of
the components of traumatic memories bringing them to an adaptive resolution (Shapiro, 2001).
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EMDR therefore aims at re-elaborating non-integratedmemories
and consolidating new memories into already existing semantic
links, promoting the insertion of traumatic but no longer
disturbing memory in a coherent and adaptive autobiography.
In recent years, the crucial role of sleep in memory
consolidation has been highlighted (Stickgold and Walker, 2007;
Rasch and Born, 2013). Physiological normal sleep presents
a cyclic alternated pattern of Rapid Eye Movement (REM)
and non-REM Slow Wave Sleep (SWS). EEG recordings show
synchronous delta wave activity (0.5–4 cycles/sec, i.e., 0.5–4Hz)
during SWS, and synchronous theta waves (4–8Hz) during
REM sleep. The non-REM SWS appears to play a key role in
memory consolidation, as edited memories are transferred from
the hippocampus to the neocortex, and then integrated into
neocortical neuronal networks upon this phase.
During the waking state, new memories are encoded in
a temporarily form in the hippocampal network. Over SWS,
such hippocampal memories are reactivated by slow oscillations
(<1Hz) originating from the cortical networks in which the
encoding originally took place (Born et al., 2006).
The combined activation of hippocampal memories and
cortical synapses favors the transfer back to the neo-cortex, and
during REM sleep the memories might be further consolidated
and integrated in already existing associative links, therefore
promoting a meaningful narrative of the event.
As mentioned above, traumatic memories may cause over-
potentiation of amygdalar synapses, while the recording of the
episodic aspect of the memory in the hippocampus results in a
normal potentiation of hippocampal synapses. This difference
in potentiation between amygdalar and hippocampal synapses
makes impossible to merge the emotional and cognitive aspects
of the traumatic memory, which normally takes place via
the anterior cingulated cortex, then preventing the subsequent
transfer to neocortex (Harper et al., 2009). Therefore, non-
processed emotional memories remain trapped and unchanged at
subcortical level without contextual integration, causing in some
cases PTSD symptoms.
The first who proposed a similarity between EMDR
physiological effects and sleep processes was Stickgold (2002),
focusing mainly on REM sleep. Moving a step forward, one
of the hypothesized mechanism of action of EMDR posits a
parallel between synaptic depotentiation occurring during SWS
and EMDR bilateral stimulation (Harper et al., 2009; Pagani et al.,
2017). During EMDR the client is asked to hold into attention
the fragmented traumatic materials while the therapist performs
the ABS, favoring the reactivation of the traumatic memory
in amygdalar and hippocampal networks. Recent findings have
shown that ABS elicits delta waves in a range (1.5Hz) very similar
to the one registered during SWS (Rétey et al., 2005; Harper et al.,
2009; Pagani et al., 2011, 2012). It is then conceivable that EMDR
bilateral stimulation mimics the low-frequency stimulations
naturally occurring during SWS, causing a depotentation of
AMPA receptors of amygdalar synapses, which in turn facilitates
the merging of the amygdalar emotional and the hippocampal
episodic memories thus creating an associative memory that can
be further transferred and processed by neocortical areas, leading
to the cessation of symptoms.
This hypothesis on EMDR mechanism of action is also
supported by previous neuroimaging findings. Pagani et al.
(2012) showed a shift of cortical activation elicited by
traumatic memories after successful EMDR treatment from an
implicit subcortical to an explicit cortical state suggesting their
integration into existing semantic memory. Herkt et al. (2014)
observed an increased activation in the right amygdala during
auditory ABS upon processing of negative emotional stimuli,
suggesting that an initial enhancement of emotional processing
is a prerequisite for the effective reintegration of traumatic
material.
Other neurobiological findings frequently reported by
neuroimaging studies in PTSD are supporting this hypothesis.
Three main brain areas have been identify to be altered in PTSD:
amygdala, involved in emotional interpretation of incoming
information (Etkin and Wager, 2007; Francati et al., 2007; Patel
et al., 2012), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), implicated in the
processing of emotional materials and in emotion regulation
(Shin et al., 2006; Patel et al., 2012; Nicholson et al., 2017)
and hippocampus, involved in contextual learning and spatial
and episodic memory (Burgess et al., 2002; Liberzon and
Sripada, 2008; Liberzon and Abelson, 2016). The most recurrent
finding is a relative decreased mPFC activity and a parallel
increased amygdalar activation. In light of the SWS hypothesis
such hyperactivation could be considered as the macroscopic
expression of the molecular-level alteration, i.e., the above
described over-potentiation of amygdalar synapses. At the same
time mPFC, despite its tight connection with the limbic system,
doesn’t exert its role of normalizing amygdalar hyperactivity,
probably as a consequence of the remarkable hyper-activation
of the latter. The insufficiency of top-down prefrontal cortex
functioning, coupled with dysregulated bottom-up activity of
limbic structures accounts as well for the impaired autonomic
response and concomitant inadequate emotional regulation
peculiar of PTSD.
Recently, a pathologic bottom up mechanism involving
cerebellum in PTSD has also been proposed (Carletto and
Borsato, 2017). This structure has a key role in associative
learning, fear regulation, attention, and in motor control (Wolf
et al., 2009; Schmahmann, 2010) and it is strongly interconnected
to cerebral cortex (Bergmann, 2008). Growing evidence shows
altered functions of cerebellum in PTSD patients (Osuch et al.,
2001; Anderson et al., 2002; Pissiota et al., 2002), with traumatic
reminders ehnancing its activation (Fernandez et al., 2001;
Driessen et al., 2004). Furthermore, cerebellar volume is smaller
in adults with PTSD than in healthy controls (De Bellis and
Kuchibhatla, 2006; Carrion et al., 2009; Baldaçara et al., 2011),
and this reduction is associated with the magnitude of PTSD
symptoms.
Cerebellum has also an indirect link to PTSD since it is
a key structure in associative learning. In fact, PTSD can be
described as the result of a fear conditioned response where
extinction fails (Milad et al., 2009; VanElzakker et al., 2014). More
specifically it is a conditioning to the context rather than to a
specific stimulus (Davis et al., 2010) and it is well-documented
how cerebellum appears to be involved in both conditioning and
extinction process (Sacchetti et al., 2005; Kim and Jung, 2006).
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In a rodent study, Sacchetti et al. (2007) showed how cerebellum
could be as crucial as amygdala in long term fear memories: when
amygdala is inactivated the fear-conditioning response is carried
out by cerebellum.
Zhu et al. (2006) analyzed the extensive connectivity between
cerebellum and whole brain suggesting that this area is an
essential modulator and coordinator of visceral and behavioral
response through cerebellar-hypothalamic circuit.
Cerebellum has also a central role in the sleep-wake
cycle (Cunchillos and De Andrés, 1982; de Andrés et al.,
2011; DelRosso and Hoque, 2014). There seem to be a
bidirectional interaction between cerebellum and sleep:
malfunction of cerebellum affects quality of sleep but also
quality of sleep affects cerebellum dependent memory formation
and memory consolidation (Canto et al., 2017). Patients with
spinocerebellar ataxia, a degenerating pathology of cerebellum
and its connections, show alterations in sleep stages as well
in non-wakefullness. In this way cerebellum tunes neocortical
forms of sleep related activity (Pedroso et al., 2011; Canto et al.,
2017). On the other hand, sleep improves cerebellar learning
as learning-dependent timing, procedural memory formation,
and spatiotemporal predictions of motor actions (Verweij et al.,
2016).
Fogel et al. (2015) reported that sleep after a procedural task
showed an increment in SWS density, highlighting a putative
cerebellar involvement.
Typically, cerebellar activity decreases during the transition
from pre-sleep wakefulness to SWS (Braun et al., 1997; Hofle
et al., 1997; Kajimura et al., 1999; Hiroki, 2005). During SWS
cerebellar fMRI signals co-occurred with slow waves in neo
cortex, and the level of density of those waves in cerebellum was
correlated with gray matter volume (Dang-Vu et al., 2008; Saletin
et al., 2013).
According to Born et al. (2006) since the synchronization
caused by slow oscillations during SWS is not restricted
to neocortex but spreads to hippocampus, thalamus, and
brainstem, it can be speculated that also cerebellum is involved
in such synchronous activation which in turn might favor
its involvement in processing the procedural aspect of the
psychological trauma, an essential component of therapy
successful outcome.
The role of cerebellum in such process needs further
investigations: cerebellar transcranial Direct Current Stimulation
(tDCS), a form of brain polarization that influences motor
functions and learning processes (Gandiga et al., 2006) could
be a promising tool in understanding this complex relation.
Previous findings have shown that tDCS applied to frontocortical
regions induced an increase in SWS and enhanced consolidation
of hippocampal-dependent declarative memories (Marshall et al.,
2004, 2006). Moreover, a recent study (Ferrucci et al., 2013)
indicated that cerebellar tDCS improves implicit procedural
learning. This technique could be potentially coupled with
Electroencephalography, assessing brain frequencies evoked by
this manipulation, in particular testing if cerebellar electrical field
modulation could lead to a “SWS-like” brain activity.
In conclusion, this opinion article aims at underlining the
role of SWS in the physiological storage of memories and its
participation in putative mechanisms of recover from conditions
in which memory remains pathologically unprocessed, as in
PTSD. This will also stimulate further research, both at
theoretical and experimental levels, on the role of various
structures in formation, consolidation, and reprocessing of
traumatic memories.
In our opinion, there is a need of deepening the current
model of PTSD going beyond the role of top-down processes.
Investigating other brain regions such as cerebellum in bottom-
up processes involved in PTSDwill allow to better understand the
underlying mechanisms of this disorder and to promote effective
and neurobiologically-grounded therapies for trauma treatment.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
MP and TB were responsible for the conception of the hypothesis
outlined. SC wrote the article, that was integrated and critically
revised by MP and TB. All authors have approved the final
manuscript.
REFERENCES
Anderson, C. M., Teicher, M. H., Polcari, A., and Renshaw, P. F. (2002). Abnormal
T2 relaxation time in the cerebellar vermis of adults sexually abused in
childhood: potential role of the vermis in stress-enhanced risk for drug abuse.
Psychoneuroendocrinology 27, 231–244. doi: 10.1016/S0306-4530(01)00047-6
Baldaçara, L., Jackowski, A. P., Schoedl, A., Pupo, M., Andreoli, S. B., Mello, M.
F., et al. (2011). Reduced cerebellar left hemisphere and vermal volume in
adults with PTSD from a community sample. J. Psychiatr. Res. 45, 1627–1633.
doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychires.2011.07.013
Bergmann, U. (2008). The neurobiology of EMDR: exploring the
thalamus and neural integration. J. EMDR Pract. Res. 2, 300–314.
doi: 10.1891/1933-3196.2.4.300
Born, J., Rasch, B., and Gais, S. (2006). Sleep to remember. Neurosci.
Rev. J. Bringing Neurobiol. Neurol. Psychiatry 12, 410–424. doi: 10.1177/
1073858406292647
Bradley, R., Greene, J., Russ, E., Dutra, L., and Westen, D. (2005). A
multidimensional meta-analysis of psychotherapy for PTSD. Am. J. Psychiatry
162, 214–227. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.162.2.214
Braun, A. R., Balkin, T. J., Wesenten, N. J., Carson, R. E., Varga, M., Baldwin,
P., et al. (1997). Regional cerebral blood flow throughout the sleep-wake
cycle. An H2(15)O PET study. Brain J. Neurol. 120 (Pt 7), 1173–1197.
doi: 10.1093/brain/120.7.1173
Burgess, N., Maguire, E. A., and O’Keefe, J. (2002). The human
hippocampus and spatial and episodic memory. Neuron 35, 625–641.
doi: 10.1016/S0896-6273(02)00830-9
Canto, C. B., Onuki, Y., Bruinsma, B., van der Werf, Y. D., and De Zeeuw,
C. I. (2017). The sleeping cerebellum. Trends Neurosci. 40, 309–323.
doi: 10.1016/j.tins.2017.03.001
Carletto, S., and Borsato, T. (2017). Neurobiological correlates
of post-traumatic stress disorder: a focus on cerebellum role.
Eur. J. Trauma Dissociation 1, 153–157. doi: 10.1016/j.ejtd.2017.
03.012
Carrion, V. G., Weems, C. F., Watson, C., Eliez, S., Menon, V., and
Reiss, A. L. (2009). Converging evidence for abnormalities of the
prefrontal cortex and evaluation of midsagittal structures in pediatric
posttraumatic stress disorder: an MRI study. Psychiatry Res. 172, 226–234.
doi: 10.1016/j.pscychresns.2008.07.008
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2050115
Carletto et al. The Role of SWS in Memory
Chen, Y. R., Hung, K. W., Tsai, J. C., Chu, H., Chung, M. H., Chen, S. R., et al.
(2014). Efficacy of eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing for patients
with posttraumatic-stress disorder: a meta-analysis of randomized controlled
trials. PLoS ONE 9:e103676. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0103676
Corrigan, F. M. (2002). Mindfulness, dissociation, emdr and the anterior cingulate
cortex: a hypothesis. Contemp. Hypn. 19, 8–17. doi: 10.1002/ch.235
Cunchillos, J. D., and De Andrés, I. (1982). Participation of the
cerebellum in the regulation of the sleep-wakefulness cycle. Results in
cerebellectomized cats. Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 53, 549–558.
doi: 10.1016/0013-4694(82)90067-0
Dang-Vu, T. T., Schabus, M., Desseilles, M., Albouy, G., Boly, M., Darsaud, A.,
et al. (2008). Spontaneous neural activity during human slow wave sleep. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105, 15160–15165. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0801819105
Davis, M., Walker, D. L., Miles, L., and Grillon, C. (2010). Phasic vs sustained
fear in rats and humans: role of the extended amygdala in fear vs anxiety.
Neuropsychopharmacol. Off. Publ. Am. Coll. Neuropsychopharmacol. 35,
105–135. doi: 10.1038/npp.2009.109
de Andrés, I., Garzón, M., and Reinoso-Suárez, F. (2011). Functional Anatomy of
Non-REM Sleep. Front. Neurol. 2:70. doi: 10.3389/fneur.2011.00070
De Bellis, M. D., and Kuchibhatla, M. (2006). Cerebellar volumes in pediatric
maltreatment-related posttraumatic stress disorder. Biol. Psychiatry 60,
697–703. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2006.04.035
DelRosso, L. M., and Hoque, R. (2014). The cerebellum and sleep.Neurol. Clin. 32,
893–900. doi: 10.1016/j.ncl.2014.07.003
Driessen, M., Beblo, T., Mertens, M., Piefke, M., Rullkoetter, N., Silva-Saavedra,
A., et al. (2004). Posttraumatic stress disorder and fMRI activation patterns
of traumatic memory in patients with borderline personality disorder. Biol.
Psychiatry 55, 603–611. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2003.08.018
Etkin, A., and Wager, T. D. (2007). Functional neuroimaging of anxiety: a
meta-analysis of emotional processing in PTSD, social anxiety disorder, and
specific phobia. Am. J. Psychiatry 164, 1476–1488. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2007.
07030504
Fernandez, M., Pissiota, A., Frans, O., von Knorring, L., Fischer, H., and
Fredrikson, M. (2001). Brain function in a patient with torture related
post-traumatic stress disorder before and after fluoxetine treatment: a
positron emission tomography provocation study.Neurosci. Lett. 297, 101–104.
doi: 10.1016/S0304-3940(00)01674-8
Ferrucci, R., Brunoni, A. R., Parazzini, M., Vergari, M., Rossi, E., Fumagalli,
M., et al. (2013). Modulating human procedural learning by cerebellar
transcranial direct current stimulation. Cerebellum 12, 485–492.
doi: 10.1007/s12311-012-0436-9
Fogel, S. M., Ray, L. B., Binnie, L., and Owen, A. M. (2015). How to become an
expert: a new perspective on the role of sleep in the mastery of procedural skills.
Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 125, 236–248. doi: 10.1016/j.nlm.2015.10.004
Francati, V., Vermetten, E., and Bremner, J. D. (2007). Functional neuroimaging
studies in posttraumatic stress disorder: review of current methods and
findings. Depress. Anxiety 24, 202–218. doi: 10.1002/da.20208
Gandiga, P. C., Hummel, F. C., and Cohen, L. G. (2006). Transcranial DC
stimulation (tDCS): a tool for double-blind sham-controlled clinical studies in
brain stimulation. Clin. Neurophysiol. Off. J. Int. Fed. Clin. Neurophysiol. 117,
845–850. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2005.12.003
Harper, M. L., Rasolkhani-Kalhorn, T., and Drozd, J. F. (2009). On the neural
basis of EMDR therapy: insights from qEEG studies. Traumatology 15, 81–95.
doi: 10.1177/1534765609338498
Herkt, D., Tumani, V., Grön, G., Kammer, T., Hofmann, A., and Abler, B. (2014).
Facilitating access to emotions: neural signature of EMDR stimulation. PLoS
ONE 9:106350. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0106350
Hiroki, M. (2005). Cerebral white matter blood flow is constant during human
non-rapid eye movement sleep: a positron emission tomographic study. J. Appl.
Physiol. 98, 1846–1854. doi: 10.1152/japplphysiol.00653.2004
Hofle, N., Paus, T., Reutens, D., Fiset, P., Gotman, J., Evans, A. C., et al. (1997).
Regional cerebral blood flow changes as a function of delta and spindle activity
during slow wave sleep in humans. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 17,
4800–4808.
Kajimura, N., Uchiyama, M., Takayama, Y., Uchida, S., Uema, T., Kato, M., et al.
(1999). Activity of midbrain reticular formation and neocortex during the
progression of human non-rapid eye movement sleep. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc.
Neurosci. 19, 10065–10073.
Kim, J. J., and Jung, M. W. (2006). Neural circuits and mechanisms involved
in Pavlovian fear conditioning: a critical review. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 30,
188–202. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.06.005
Liberzon, I., and Abelson, J. L. (2016). Context processing and the
neurobiology of post-traumatic stress disorder. Neuron 92, 14–30.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2016.09.039
Liberzon, I., and Sripada, C. S. (2008). The functional neuroanatomy
of PTSD: a critical review. Prog. Brain Res. 167, 151–169.
doi: 10.1016/S0079-6123(07)67011-3
Marshall, L., Helgadóttir, H., Mölle, M., and Born, J. (2006). Boosting
slow oscillations during sleep potentiates memory. Nature 444, 610–613.
doi: 10.1038/nature05278
Marshall, L., Mölle, M., Hallschmid, M., and Born, J. (2004). Transcranial direct
current stimulation during sleep improves declarative memory. J. Neurosci. 24,
9985–9992. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2725-04.2004
Milad, M. R., Pitman, R. K., Ellis, C. B., Gold, A. L., Shin, L. M., Lasko,
N. B., et al. (2009). Neurobiological basis of failure to recall extinction
memory in posttraumatic stress disorder. Biol. Psychiatry 66, 1075–1082.
doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.06.026
Nicholson, A. A., Rabellino, D., Densmore, M., Frewen, P. A., Paret, C., Kluetsch,
R., et al. (2017). The neurobiology of emotion regulation in posttraumatic stress
disorder: amygdala downregulation via real-time fMRI neurofeedback. Hum.
Brain Mapp. 38, 541–560. doi: 10.1002/hbm.23402
Osuch, E. A., Benson, B., Geraci, M., Podell, D., Herscovitch, P., McCann, U. D.,
et al. (2001). Regional cerebral blood flow correlated with flashback intensity
in patients with posttraumatic stress disorder. Biol. Psychiatry 50, 246–253.
doi: 10.1016/S0006-3223(01)01107-6
Pagani, M., Amann, B. L., Landin-Romero, R., and Carletto, S. (2017). Eye
movement desentisization and reprocessing and slow wave sleep: a putative
mechanism of action. Front. Psychol. 8:1935. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01935
Pagani, M., Di Lorenzo, G., Monaco, L., Niolu, C., Siracusano, A., Verardo, A. R.,
et al. (2011). Pretreatment, intratreatment, and posttreatment EEG imaging of
EMDR:methodology and preliminary results from a single case. J. EMDR Pract.
Res. 5, 42–56. doi: 10.1891/1933-3196.5.2.42
Pagani, M., Di Lorenzo, G., Verardo, A. R., Nicolais, G., Monaco, L., Lauretti, G.,
et al. (2012). Neurobiological correlates of EMDR monitoring - an EEG study.
PLoS ONE 7:e45753. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0045753
Patel, R., Spreng, R. N., Shin, L. M., and Girard, T. A. (2012). Neurocircuitry
models of posttraumatic stress disorder and beyond: a meta-analysis of
functional neuroimaging studies. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 36, 2130–2142.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.06.003
Pedroso, J. L., Braga-Neto, P., Felício, A. C., Aquino, C. C., Prado, L. B., Prado, G.
F., et al. (2011). Sleep disorders in cerebellar ataxias. Arq. Neuropsiquiatr. 69,
253–257. doi: 10.1590/S0004-282X2011000200021
Pissiota, A., Frans, O., Fernandez, M., von Knorring, L., Fischer, H., and
Fredrikson, M. (2002). Neurofunctional correlates of posttraumatic stress
disorder: a PET symptom provocation study. Eur. Arch. Psychiatry Clin.
Neurosci. 252, 68–75. doi: 10.1007/s004060200014
Rasch, B., and Born, J. (2013). About sleep’s role in memory. Physiol. Rev. 93,
681–766. doi: 10.1152/physrev.00032.2012
Rétey, J. V., Adam, M., Honegger, E., Khatami, R., Luhmann, U. F., Jung, H. H.,
et al. (2005). A functional genetic variation of adenosine deaminase affects the
duration and intensity of deep sleep in humans. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
102, 15676–15681. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0505414102
Sacchetti, B., Sacco, T., and Strata, P. (2007). Reversible inactivation of
amygdala and cerebellum but not perirhinal cortex impairs reactivated fear
memories. Eur. J. Neurosci. 25, 2875–2884. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2007.
05508.x
Sacchetti, B., Scelfo, B., and Strata, P. (2005). The cerebellum: synaptic changes
and fear conditioning. Neurosci. Rev. J. Bringing Neurobiol. Neurol. Psychiatry
11, 217–227. doi: 10.1177/1073858405276428
Saletin, J. M., van der Helm, E., and Walker, M. P. (2013). Structural
brain correlates of human sleep oscillations. Neuroimage 83, 658–668.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.06.021
Schmahmann, J. D. (2010). The role of the cerebellum in cognition and emotion:
personal reflections since 1982 on the dysmetria of thought hypothesis, and its
historical evolution from theory to therapy. Neuropsychol. Rev. 20, 236–260.
doi: 10.1007/s11065-010-9142-x
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2050116
Carletto et al. The Role of SWS in Memory
Shapiro, F. (1989). Eye movement desensitization: a new treatment for post-
traumatic stress disorder. J. Behav. Ther. Exp. Psychiatry 20, 211–217.
doi: 10.1016/0005-7916(89)90025-6
Shapiro, F. (2001). Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR):
Basic Principles, Protocols, and Procedures, 2nd Edn. New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Shin, L. M., Rauch, S. L., and Pitman, R. K. (2006). Amygdala, medial prefrontal
cortex, and hippocampal function in PTSD. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1071, 67–79.
doi: 10.1196/annals.1364.007
Stickgold, R. (2002). EMDR: a putative neurobiological mechanism of action. J.
Clin. Psychol. 58, 61–75. doi: 10.1002/jclp.1129
Stickgold, R., and Walker, M. P. (2007). Sleep-dependent memory consolidation
and reconsolidation. Sleep Med. 8, 331–343. doi: 10.1016/j.sleep.2007.
03.011
Van Der Kolk, B. A. (1998). Trauma and memory. Psychiatry Clin. Neurosci. 52,
S57–S69. doi: 10.1046/j.1440-1819.1998.0520s5S97.x
Van Der Kolk, B. A., Burbridge, J. A., and Suzuki, J. (1997). The psychobiology
of traumatic memory. Clinical implications of neuroimaging studies.
Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 821, 99–113. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.1997.
tb48272.x
VanElzakker, M. B., Dahlgren, M. K., Davis, F. C., Dubois, S., and Shin, L.
M. (2014). From Pavlov to PTSD: the extinction of conditioned fear in
rodents, humans, and anxiety disorders. Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 113, 3–18.
doi: 10.1016/j.nlm.2013.11.014
Verweij, I. M., Onuki, Y., Van Someren, E. J., and Van der Werf, Y. D. (2016).
Sleep to the beat: a nap favours consolidation of timing. Behav. Neurosci. 130,
298–304. doi: 10.1037/bne0000146
Wolf, U., Rapoport, M. J., and Schweizer, T. A. (2009). Evaluating the affective
component of the cerebellar cognitive affective syndrome. J. Neuropsychiatry
Clin. Neurosci. 21, 245–253. doi: 10.1176/jnp.2009.21.3.245
Zhu, J. N., Yung, W. H., Kwok-Chong Chow, B., Chan, Y. S., and Wang, J. J.
(2006). The cerebellar-hypothalamic circuits: potential pathways underlying
cerebellar involvement in somatic-visceral integration. Brain Res. Rev. 52,
93–106. doi: 10.1016/j.brainresrev.2006.01.003
Conflict of Interest Statement: All authors have been invited as speakers in
national and international EMDR conferences.
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Carletto, Borsato and Pagani. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2050117
fpsyg-09-00581 April 18, 2018 Time: 17:25 # 1
PERSPECTIVE
published: 20 April 2018
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00581
Edited by:
Rossella Guerini,
Università degli Studi Roma Tre, Italy
Reviewed by:
Liliann Manning,
Université de Strasbourg, France
Francisco José Eiroa-Orosa,
Universitat de Barcelona, Spain
*Correspondence:
Alessandra Mancini
mancinialessandra8@gmail.com
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 30 June 2017
Accepted: 05 April 2018
Published: 20 April 2018
Citation:
Mancini A and Mancini F (2018)
Rescripting Memory, Redefining
the Self: A Meta-Emotional
Perspective on the Hypothesized
Mechanism(s) of Imagery Rescripting.
Front. Psychol. 9:581.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00581
Rescripting Memory, Redefining the
Self: A Meta-Emotional Perspective
on the Hypothesized Mechanism(s)
of Imagery Rescripting
Alessandra Mancini1* and Francesco Mancini1,2
1 Scuola di Specializzazione in Psicoterapia Cognitiva S.r.l., Associazione di Psicoterapia Cognitiva, Rome, Italy, 2 Department
of Technology, Communication and Society, Guglielmo Marconi University, Rome, Italy
Imagery Rescripting (ImRs) is a therapeutic technique that aims to reduce the
distress associated with negative memories of early aversive experiences. It consists
of prompting patients to rescript the autobiographical memory in line with their
unmet needs. In recent years, ImRs was found effective in reducing symptoms
of disorders such as depression, social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder,
post-traumatic stress disorder, and personality disorders. However, the cognitive
mechanisms underlying such broad effectiveness are currently an object of debate.
Empirical evidence has shown that ImRs reduces the negative self-belief derived
from aversive memories in different types of mental disorders. However, existing
accounts are not very accurate in explaining how this change in self-belief occurs
and therefore why ImRs is effective across psychopathologies. We propose that ImRs
changes the semantic self-representation encapsulated in the aversive memory by
reducing the meta-emotional problem (i.e., perceiving a negative emotion as problematic
and unacceptable). Empirical evidence implicates the meta-emotional problem or
“secondary problem” in the maintenance of different disorders and has shown that
treating it leads to symptoms reduction. Here we hypothesize that: (i) ImRs as a stand-
alone treatment may lead to a reduction of symptoms; negative self-belief and the
meta-emotional problem; and (ii) the reduction of the meta-emotional problem might
mediate the relation between symptoms and negative self-belief reduction. To test our
hypothesis, we present an experimental procedure that could be used in future studies.
We conclude discussing the existing theoretical frameworks that attempt to unravel the
mechanisms that play a role in ImRs.
Keywords: imagery rescripting, autobiographical memory, self-representation, psychopathology, emotional
invalidation, secondary problem, meta-emotional problem
INTRODUCTION
Early traumatic experiences are considered to increase vulnerability to psychopathology by classical
cognitive models of emotional disorders underlying cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) (Beck,
1976; Beck et al., 1985; Foa and Kozak, 1986; Wells, 1997; Harvey et al., 2004). Childhood aversive
events can be considered traumatic in two ways. In the stronger sense, the trauma corresponds
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to single or repeated episodes of abuse or violence. In the weaker
sense, trauma corresponds to experiences of lower emotional
intensity over a longer time, such as a disorganized/unsure type
of attachment between parents and children. According to both
perspectives, traumatic experiences interfere with the self. For
some authors, traumatic experiences interfere with the self as a
process by disorganizing its structure and eliciting dissociation
(van der Kolk et al., 1996; Liotti, 2004). In contrast, we agree
with those positions that see trauma as interfering with self-
representation (i.e., a form of semantic memory that describes
the quality associated with the self, Brewin, 2006). Specifically,
the type of attachment to primary relational figures plays a
pivotal role in forming “Internal Working Models,” “Internal
Schemas,” or “Early Maladaptive Schemas” which trigger and
maintain psychopathology (Beck, 1964; Lorenzini et al., 1985;
Lorenzini and Sassaroli, 1995; Young et al., 2003). Accordingly,
a vast body of literature indicates that issues in self-concept and
emotional regulation are associated to “emotional invalidation”
during childhood (Drea, 2016; Witkowski, 2017), which consists
of the invalidation, negation, or trivialization of a child’s
emotions and thoughts by caregivers (Linehan, 1993). These
early aversive experiences are often associated with intrusive
imagery and linked to distressing autobiographical memories.
Imagery rescripting (ImRs) is a therapeutic technique, used in the
context of Schema Therapy and CBT, that aims to reduce distress
associated with these memories (Arntz and Weertman, 1999) and
change their meaning (Arntz, 2011).
The classic procedure (Arntz and Weertman, 1999) consists
of three phases. First, the patient is asked to enter a distressing
memory with a similar emotional content of that characterizing
current symptomatology. Ideally, the memory should belong
to an event that occurred during childhood (see Ehlers et al.,
2005 for examples of the procedure used in case of traumatic
events occurred during adulthood). In this phase, the therapist
encourages the patient to talk in the present tense from the child’s
perspective. After the factual details are clear, the therapist asks
the child about his/her emotions and needs. Then, the rescripting
begins and the patient is asked to step into the image as an
adult and to take care of the child-self. This may involve the
prevention of abuse, the creation of a safe environment for the
child, and doing whatever the adult feels is right in that situation
considering the child’s needs. In the third phase, the child can ask
the adult for further intervention until her/his needs are fully met.
A prominent feature of ImRs is its efficacy across
psychopathologies such as: personality disorders (PD), post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), social anxiety disorder (SAD),
body dysmorphic disorder, bulimia nervosa, depression, and
obsessive-compulsive disorder, both as part of a treatment
package (Arntz, 2012) and, more recently, as a stand-alone
treatment (Morina et al., 2017). However, despite these
promising results, the cognitive mechanisms underlying such
broad effectiveness are currently an object of debate.
Several studies support the view that ImRs impacts self-
representation. Specifically, ImRs reduced the strength of
negative self-beliefs encapsulated in aversive memories of
socially anxious participants (Wild et al., 2007, 2008; Lee and
Kwon, 2013). Unfortunately, in these studies, ImRs was always
preceded by cognitive restructuring, making it difficult to derive
conclusions about ImRs’ direct impact. ImRs’ efficacy as a stand-
alone treatment was investigated for SAD, revealing a significant
reduction in participants’ ratings of the validity and accuracy
of their memory-derived core beliefs, as well as in the content
of these beliefs, which was revised following ImRs (Reimer and
Moscovitch, 2015). Similarly, a single session of ImRs diminished
negative self-belief in bulimia patients when compared to a
control condition that consisted of verbally examining the effects
of beliefs on current functioning, including dieting. Emotional
(and rational) negative self-belief reduction was associated with
mood and behavior change, including a decreased urge to binge
(Cooper, 2011). Finally, a recent study assessed the impact
of ImRs on self-structures as measured by state self-esteem;
self-concept clarity; self-description consistency, on memory
characteristics (i.e., vividness and distress) and on affective
measures. At follow-up, participants rated the memory as less
important for their sense of self than at the first ImRs session.
They also reported higher state self-esteem and positive affect,
as well as reduced negative affect and anxiety after recalling
the memory (Çili et al., 2017). Taken together, these results
seem to indicate that ImRs strongly affects what a person
thinks or has learned about him/herself (i.e., self-representation).
A change in self-representation could explain ImRs’ trans-
diagnostic effectiveness, however, how does this change occur?
Here, we propose that ImRs facilitates a change in self-belief by
modifying the appraisal that the patient has learned to make
about his/her own aversive emotions. Indeed, negative beliefs
about aversive emotions may determine a secondary emotional
response that might exacerbate and maintain the primary
reaction and the consequent regulation attempts (Greenberg
and Safran, 1990; Ellis, 1999; Greenberg, 2002; Hayes et al.,
2006; Mennin and Farach, 2007; Clark and Beck, 2010). Indeed,
perceiving an emotion as problematic, aversive, or unacceptable
instead of normal, comprehensible, and acceptable can influence
the way a person regulates the emotional state itself (Gardner
et al., 1988; Hofmann, 2013). This phenomenon, which has been
defined as “secondary problem or meta-emotional problem” (Ellis,
1980, 2003), has been considered by Clark and Beck (2010) as
one of the most relevant factors in psychopathology. Indeed,
the authors claimed that: “the greatest differences between clinical
and non-clinical anxiety are evident in the secondary, strategic
controlled processes responsible for the persistence of anxiety.”
(p. 53).
AUTHORS’ HYPOTHESIS
Traditional ImRs procedure implies: (i) a change in perspective
from that of the child to that of the adult and (ii) the attempt
to meet the child’s unmet needs (Arntz and Weertman, 1999).
Depending on the situation this could result in different types of
actions (e.g., nurturing; protecting, soothing, empowering, etc.),
however, in order to meet the needs of the child-self, the adult-
self must first adopt an empathic disposition and acknowledge
the child’s-self affective state. Indeed, clinical observation suggests
that if the patient does not legitimate his/her own feelings it
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is very unlikely he/she will complete the exercise at all. In our
perspective, this attitude of the adult-self could validate the child-
self ’s suffering. Therefore, the new meaning that could emerge
from ImRs is that child’s suffering was legitimate, adequate, and
deserving of care. In our view, this would be in contrast with the
meaning inferred during childhood in attachment relations (i.e.,
the invalidation of the child negative emotions, Gardner et al.,
1988). Indeed, in a meta-emotional perspective, if an individual
believes that experiencing negative emotions is problematic,
those could become aversive events, which amplify emotional
reactivity (Greenberg and Safran, 1990; Ellis, 1999; Greenberg,
2002; Hayes et al., 2006; Mennin and Farach, 2007; Clark
and Beck, 2010). Therefore it could be hypothesized that the
secondary problem might negatively affect self-representation,
ultimately maintaining psychopathology (Gardner et al., 1988;
Hofmann, 2013).
Consistently, panic disorder is characterized by the
catastrophic assessment of anxiety and its physiological
correlates (i.e., anxiety sensitivity) (Clark, 1986). Similarly, social
phobics often worry about the negative consequences of their
anxiety in social contexts (e.g., being judged as weak or stupid;
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Despite these
observations, currently there is no direct empirical evidence that
the meta-emotional problem is a trans-diagnostic phenomenon,
or that it plays a role in ImRs effectiveness. Indirect support of
the role played by the meta-emotional problem in amplifying
emotional reactivity across different pathologies comes from
research on self-criticism. There is evidence that trait self-
criticism is a trans-diagnostic phenomenon implicated in the
development and maintenance of a range of psychopathologies
(Schanche, 2013) as it triggers, perpetuates, and intensifies
emotional reactivity (Shahar, 2013). However, the key difference
between self-criticism and the meta-emotional problem is
that in the latter patients only criticize themselves for having
a specific emotion, whereas self-criticism refers to all aspects
of a patient’s life (Couyoumdjian et al., 2016). A more direct
relation between the meta-emotional problem and anxiety
symptomatology has been empirically tested by (Wells, 2000)
who applied his Metacognitive Therapy in the context of both
generalized and social anxiety. The author found reductions
in fear of negative evaluation after treatment to such anxiety
disorders (Wells, 2007). Moreover, a recent study directly tested
whether reducing the negative assessment of specific negative
emotions related to phobic stimuli (i.e., secondary problem)
also reduced the experience of the aversive emotion itself (i.e.,
primary problem). Results revealed that participants whose
meta-emotional problem was addressed during therapy also
presented a decrease in autonomic arousal (as observed by
decreased heart rate and increased heart rate variability) during a
second exposure to phobic stimuli (Couyoumdjian et al., 2016).
Furthermore, the meta-emotional problem is considered to play
a role in affective disorders. Indeed, depressive rumination,
a key risk factor for clinical depression, is related to negative
thinking about depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991,
2000) and fear of depressed mood and anxiety was associated
with rumination and emotional avoidance (Trincas et al.,
2016). Strikingly, this study revealed that the tendency to have
a negative secondary reaction to distress, as measured by the
Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulty in Emotion Regulation
Scale (Gratz and Roemer, 2008), was strongly correlated with
higher negative beliefs about emotions (i.e., that emotions are
irrational). Moreover, this idea was associated with feelings
of guilt, shame, embarrassment, and weakness in reaction to
emotional experience (Trincas et al., 2016). In line with this
finding, it has been observed that feeling ashamed and humiliated
for having PTSD or guilty about intrusive thoughts in OCD
are predictors of poor therapy outcomes (Gilbert and Andrews,
1998; Clohessy and Ehlers, 1999) because patients avoid seeking
treatment or engaging in exposure (Leahy, 2007). Finally, it has
been found that negative appraisals of the sensations, emotions,
or intrusive thoughts and images that are experienced are related
to depression, anxiety, PTSD, metacognitive aspects of worry,
alcohol abuse, marital discord, and PD (Leahy, 2001a,b, 2002,
2003; Leahy and Kaplan, 2004). Taken together, this literature
seems to support the notion that the meta-emotional problem
could be a trans-diagnostic phenomenon, whereas, to the best
of our knowledge, there is still a lack of direct evidence that
ImRs reduces the meta-emotional problem. Intriguingly, a pilot
exploration of the use of Compassion-Focused imagery (CFI) in
a group of self-critical people showed a significant improvement
in the reported self-soothing abilities (Gilbert and Irons, 2004).
However, self-criticism has been described as a personality trait
that enhances people’s frustrations and anger toward themselves
in reaction to failures and setbacks (Blatt, 2004; Gilbert et al.,
2004; Gilbert and Irons, 2004) while in the meta-emotional
problem patients only criticize themselves for having negative
emotions. Moreover, CFI is different from ImRs. Thus, our
hypothesis needs further testing.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Future studies could test whether: (i) ImRs as a stand-alone
treatment leads to a reduction of symptoms; negative self-belief
and meta-emotional problem; and (ii) the reduction of the meta-
emotional problem mediates the relation between symptoms
reduction and negative self-belief. Social anxiety patients would
be a good target for several reasons. Firstly, the role of the
meta-emotional experience is commonly acknowledged and
included as part of cognitive treatments for social anxiety (DSM-
5 APA; Wells, 2000, 2007). Therefore, the experimental sample
receiving a session of ImRs could be compared with a control
sample receiving Metacognitive Therapy (Wells, 2000). Secondly,
the strength of negative self-beliefs encapsulated in aversive
memories of socially anxious participants has previously been
tested. A similar procedure could thus be used to extract the
negative self-belief from the memory and assess its strength (Wild
et al., 2007, 2008; Lee and Kwon, 2013). Several measures could be
administered before and after treatments to assess the hypothesis
that ImRs reduces the meta-emotional problem. Specifically,
the Beliefs about Emotions Questionnaire (BAEQ; Manser
et al., 2012) entails six dimensions consisting of beliefs about
emotions such as: overwhelming and uncontrollable, shameful
and irrational, invalid and meaningless, useless, damaging and
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contagious. Furthermore, the Affective Control Scale (ACS;
Williams et al., 1997) was designed to assess fear of losing control
over emotions or fear of behavioral reactions to emotion. The
scale contains four dimensions: fear of anger, depression, anxiety,
and positive emotion. However, since the meta-emotional
problem refers specifically to aversive and problematic emotions,
its nature and intensity can be investigated more directly by
means of a semi-structured interview asking participants to
define what they think about their negative emotional reaction
and how much they believe such an evaluation to be true on
a Likert scale (Couyoumdjian et al., 2016). Moreover, since
previous results have shown that the Non-Acceptance subscale
of the DERS was strongly correlated with higher negative beliefs
about emotions, this scale could be included as a measure
of emotional regulation. Finally, changes in symptoms could
be assessed using measures used in previous studies such
as the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000),
the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987),
and the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson and
Friend, 1969). If the reduction of the meta-emotional problem
plays an active role in ImRs effectiveness, a reduction of SAD
symptoms; negative self-belief and meta-emotional problem
should be expected in the ImRs group. This reduction should be
comparable or greater than that observed in the Metacognitive
Therapy group. In addition, if as we here hypothesize, negative
self-belief is reduced by a reduction of the meta-emotional
problem, the relation between symptoms reduction and the
reduction in the strength of negative self-belief should be
mediated by a reduction in the meta-emotional problem.
DISCUSSION OF EXISTING ACCOUNTS
Here we proposed a meta-emotional perspective on the
mechanism underlying ImRs effectiveness. Specifically, a body
of literature shows ImRs to strongly impact self-representation,
but how? In our view, this question should be considered when
assessing the predictive power of the theories that attempted to
unravel the mechanisms underlying change in ImRs.
According to Arntz and colleagues (Arntz, 2012), ImRs
works by directly changing the valence associated with
an unconditioned stimulus (US) corresponding to the
representation of the aversive event. This theory has been
termed “US-revaluation” (Davey, 1989; Arntz and Weertman,
1999), a process where fear memories are weakened by changing
the meaning of such stimuli. Preliminary evidence in support
of the involvement of “US-revaluation” in ImRs comes from
a study showing that ImRs, added to extinction, reduced the
estimated probability of the occurrence of the “US” and a
reduction of the “US” negative valence (Dibbets et al., 2012). One
critical point of this perspective is that saying that ImRs works
by changing the valence of the memory does not necessarily
imply that the meaning of the self is changed. For instance,
Hagenaars and Arntz (2012) found that ImRs brought about
a reduction in the development of self-blame cognitions along
with a reduction in intrusion development. In our view, the latter
result suggests that what is changed in the patient’s knowledge
system is not just the valence of the memory but a more general
system of learned goals, cognitions, and beliefs of oneself.
However, it appears unclear if, according to the US-revaluation
hypothesis, the reduction of negative self-blame cognition is
epiphenomenal or causal with respect to the change in memory
valence. It has been proposed that the expression of negative
emotions could restore a more general sense of control over
life, increasing self-efficacy (Arntz, 2012). However, concepts
like self-esteem or self-efficacy are rather aspecific and seem
neither sufficient nor necessary to explain the emergency and
maintenance of psychopathology or its remission. Additionally,
it has been suggested that the expression of inhibited emotions
facilitates the integration of the adverse memory within the
autobiographical knowledge base (Dibbets and Arntz, 2016).
Again, even acknowledging the cathartic power of the expression
of emotion, it seems unclear how a better integration of the
adverse memory in the autobiographical knowledge base would
result in the reduction of negative self-belief. Moreover, even
assuming that intrusions of aversive memory, as in PTSD,
are prevented by a higher integration of those memories
into the autobiographical knowledge base, integration seems
unnecessary in PD, where aversive memories seem perfectly
integrated with strong negative beliefs towards the self (i.e.,
schema).
Alternatively, Brewin proposed that rather than schema
change at the core of CBT there is competition for retrieval
between alternative representations (Brewin, 2006). He suggested
that beliefs about the self do not only take the form of
abstract semantic knowledge (e.g., “I am a failure”) but are also
underpinned by episodic memories of specific autobiographical
events. Therefore, an improvement in symptoms could be
expected not only by verbally reappraising negative self-belief
but also preventing the retrieval of episodic memories in
support of the negative semantic knowledge. Consequently, ImRs
may “draw on associative and automatic processes to create
an alternative image in memory that shares similar sensory
features but is accompanied by positive rather than negative
emotions” (Wheatley et al., 2007). Furthermore, ImRs may
add new contextual information to the inflexible but more
salient sensory-bound representation of the aversive event,
making it more likely for the new representation to win the
retrieval competition (Brewin et al., 2010). However, it is
worth noting that the acquisition of new contextual information
relative to external events does not appear to be strictly
necessary in the traditional procedure (Arntz and Weertman,
1999).
In sum, previous accounts suggested that ImRs promotes
the reduction of symptoms and of negative self-belief either by
changing the valence of the aversive autobiographical memory or
by reducing their accessibility. In our view, both approaches offer
a plausible explanation of the observed reduction in negative self-
belief, however, they are not very accurate in clarifying how the
change in self-belief occurs. Additionally, none of the examined
theories considered the role played by emotional appraisal
in connecting the aversive memory to the negative self-belief
encapsulated within. Notably, appraisals concerning emotional
experiences involve individuals’ beliefs about emotions.
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Because working with beliefs about emotions is a fundamental
part of cognitive and behavioral psychotherapies (Linehan, 1993;
Wells, 2008; Clark and Beck, 2009, 2010; Leahy, 2015) we here
propose a link between the change occurring in the beliefs about
one’s own emotion and the change occurring in self-belief.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
AM and FM substantially contributed to the conception of the
work and drafting the manuscript.
FUNDING
The present work was funded by the School of Cognitive
Psychotherapy, Scuola di Psicoterapia Cognitiva S.r.l. (SPC),
Rome, Italy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are thankful to Leah Morano for revising the English
language.
REFERENCES
American Psychiatric Association [APA] (2013). Diagnostic and Statistic Manual
of Mental Disorders, 5th Edn. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association.
doi: 10.1176/appi.books.9780890425596
Arntz, A. (2011). Imagery rescripting for personality disorders. Cogn. Behav. Pract.
18, 466–481. doi: 10.1016/j.cbpra.2011.04.006
Arntz, A. (2012). Imagery rescripting as a therapeutic technique: review of clinical
trials, basic studies, and research agenda. J. Exp. Psychopathol. 3, 189–208.
doi: 10.5127/jep.024211
Arntz, A., and Weertman, A. (1999). Treatment of childhood memories: theory
and practice. Behav. Res. Ther. 37, 715–740. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(98)00
173-9
Beck, A. T. (1964). Thinking and depression: II. Theory and therapy. Arch. Gen.
Psychiatry 10, 561–571. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.1964.01720240015003
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders. New York:
International Universities Press.
Beck, A. T., Emery, G., and Greenberg, R. L. (1985). Anxiety Disorders and Phobias:
A Cognitive Perspective. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Blatt, S. J. (2004). Experiences of Depression: Theoretical, Clinical, and
Research Perspectives. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
doi: 10.1037/10749-000
Brewin, C. R. (2006). Understanding cognitive behaviour therapy: a retrieval
competition account. Behav. Res. Ther. 44, 765–784. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2006.
02.005
Brewin, C. R., Gregory, J. D., Lipton, M., and Burgess, N. (2010). Intrusive images
in psychological disorders: characteristics, neural mechanisms, and treatment
implications. Psychol. Rev. 117, 210–232. doi: 10.1037/a0018113
Çili, S., Pettit, S., and Stopa, L. (2017). Impact of imagery rescripting on adverse
self-defining memories and post-recall working selves in a non-clinical sample:
a pilot study. Cogn. Behav. Ther. 46, 75–89. doi: 10.1080/16506073.2016.
1212396
Clark, D. A., and Beck, A. T. (2010). Cognitive theory and therapy of anxiety and
depression: convergence with neurobiological findings. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14,
418–424. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.007
Clark, D. M. (1986). A cognitive approach to panic. Behav. Res. Ther. 24, 461–470.
doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(86)90011-2
Clark, D. M., and Beck, A. T. (2009). Cognitive Therapy of Anxiety Disorders.
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Clohessy, S., and Ehlers, A. (1999). PTSD symptoms, response to intrusive
memories and coping in ambulance service workers. Br. J. Clin. Psychol. 38,
251–265. doi: 10.1348/014466599162836
Connor, K. M., Davidson, J. R. T., Churchill, L. E., Sherwood, A., Foa, E., and
Weisler, R. H. (2000). Psychometric properties of the Social Phobia Inventory
(SPIN). New self-rating scale. Br. J. Psychiatry 176, 379–386. doi: 10.1192/bjp.
176.4.379
Cooper, M. J. (2011). Working with imagery to modify core beliefs in people
with eating disorders: a clinical protocol. Cogn. Behav. Pract. 18, 454–465.
doi: 10.1016/j.cbpra.2010.08.003
Couyoumdjian, A., Ottaviani, C., Petrocchi, N., Trincas, R., Tenore, K.,
Buonanno, C., et al. (2016). Reducing the meta-emotional problem decreases
physiological fear response during exposure in phobics. Front. Psychol. 7:1105.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01105
Davey, G. C. L. (1989). UCS revaluation and conditioning models of acquired fears.
Behav. Res. Ther. 27, 521–528. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(89)90086-7
Dibbets, P., and Arntz, A. (2016). Imagery rescripting. Is incorporation of the most
aversive scenes necessary? Memory 24, 683–695. doi: 10.1080/09658211.2015.
1043307
Dibbets, P., Poort, H., and Arntz, A. (2012). Adding imagery rescripting during
extinction leads to less ABA renewal. J. Behav. Ther. Exp. Psychiatry 43,
614–624. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2011.08.006
Drea, C. (2016). Self-Disgust in Personality Disorders: The Role of Childhood Abuse
and Trauma, Emotional Invalidation and Shame. Doctoral thesis, University
College London, London.
Ehlers, A., Clark, D. M., Hackmann, A., Mcmanus, F., and Fennell, M.
(2005). Cognitive therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder: development and
evaluation. Behav. Res. Ther. 43, 413–431. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2004.03.006
Ellis, A. (1980). Rational-emotive therapy and cognitive behavior therapy:
similarities and differences. Cognit. Ther. Res. 4, 325–340. doi: 10.1007/
BF01178210
Ellis, A. (1999). Early theories and practices of rational emotive behavior therapy
and how they have been augmented and revised during the last three decades.
J. Ration. Emot. Cogn. Behav. Ther. 17, 69–93. doi: 10.1023/A:1023048830350
Ellis, A. (2003). Early theories and practices of rational emotive behavior theory
and how they have been augmented and revised during the last three decades.
J. Ration. Emot. Cogn. Behav. Ther. 21, 219–243. doi: 10.1023/A:1025890112319
Foa, E. B., and Kozak, M. J. (1986). Emotional processing of fear: exposure to
corrective information. Psychol. Bull. 99, 20–35. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.99.1.20
Gardner, G. G., Mancini, F., and Semerari, A. (1988). “Construction of
psychological disorders as invalidation of self-knowledge,” in Experimenting
with Personal Constructs Psychology, eds F. Fransella and L. F. Thomas
(New York, NY: Routledge), 259–272.
Gilbert, P., and Andrews, B. E. (1998). Shame: Interpersonal Behavior,
Psychopathology and Culture. London: Oxford University Press.
Gilbert, P., Clarke, M., Hempel, S., Miles, J. N. V., and Irons, C. (2004). Criticizing
and reassuring oneself: An exploration of forms, styles and reasons in female
students. Br. J. Clin. Psychol. 43, 31–50. doi: 10.1348/014466504772812959
Gilbert, P., and Irons, C. (2004). A pilot exploration of the use of compassionate
images in a group of self-critical people. Memory 12, 507–516. doi: 10.1080/
09658210444000115
Gratz, K. L., and Roemer, L. (2008). Multidimensional assessment of emotion
regulation and dysregulation: development, factor structure, and initial
validation of the difficulties in emotion regulation scale. J. Psychopathol. Behav.
Assess. 30:315. doi: 10.1080/09658210444000115
Greenberg, L. S. (2002). Emotion Focused Therapy: Coaching Clients to Work
through Their Feelings. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
doi: 10.1037/10447-000
Greenberg, L. S., and Safran, J. D. (1990). Emotion in Psychotherapy. New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Hagenaars, M. A., and Arntz, A. (2012). Reduced intrusion development after
post-trauma imagery rescripting; an experimental study. J. Behav. Ther. Exp.
Psychiatry 43, 808–814. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2011.09.005
Harvey, A. G., Watkins, E. R., Mansell, W., and Shafran, R. (2004). Cognitive
Behavioral Processes Across Psychological Disorders: A Transdiagnostic Approach
to Research and Treatment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/med:
psych/9780198528883.001.0001
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 581122
fpsyg-09-00581 April 18, 2018 Time: 17:25 # 6
Mancini and Mancini Rescripting Memory, Redefining the Self
Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J. B., Bond, F. W., Masuda, A., and Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance
and Commitment Therapy: model, processes and outcomes. Behav. Res. Ther.
44, 1–25. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2005.06.006
Hofmann, S. G. (2013). The pursuit of happiness and its relationship to the meta-
experience of emotions and culture. Aust. Psychol. 48, 94–97. doi: 10.1111/ap.
12004
Leahy, R. L. (2001a). Emotional schemas in cognitive therapy. Paper Presented at
the Association for Advancement of Behavioral Therapy, Philadelphia, PA.
Leahy, R. L. (2001b). Overcoming Resistance in Cognitive Therapy. New York, NY:
The Guilford Press.
Leahy, R. L. (2002). A model of emotional schemas. Cogn. Behav. Pract. 9, 177–190.
doi: 10.1016/S1077-7229(02)80048-7
Leahy, R. L. (2003). Metacognition, emotional schemas and personality
disorders. Paper Presented at the European Association of Cognitive Behavioral
Psychotherapy, Czechia, PR.
Leahy, R. L. (2007). Emotional schemas and resistance to change in anxiety
disorders. Cogn. Behav. Pract. 14, 36–45. doi: 10.1016/j.cbpra.2006.
08.001
Leahy, R. L. (2015). Emotional Schema Therapy. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Leahy, R. L., and Kaplan, D. (2004). Emotional schemas and relationship
adjustment. Paper Presented at the Association for Advancement of Behavior
Therapy, New Orleans, LA.
Lee, S. W., and Kwon, J.-H. (2013). The efficacy of Imagery Rescripting (IR) for
social phobia: a randomized controlled trial. J. Behav. Ther. Exp. Psychiatry 44,
351–360. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2013.03.001
Liebowitz, M. R. (1987). Social phobia. Mod. Probl. Pharmacopsychiatry 22,
141–173. doi: 10.1159/000414022
Linehan, M. (1993). Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment of Borderline Personality
Disorder. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Liotti, G. (2004). Trauma, dissociation, and disorganized attachment: three strands
of a single braid. Psychotherapy 41, 472–486. doi: 10.1037/0033-3204.41.
4.472
Lorenzini, R., Mancini, F., and Sassaroli, S. (1985). “La costruzione
dell’attaccamento,” in La Psicologia dei Costrutti Personali: Saggi Sulla
Teoria di G.A. Kelley, eds F. Mancini and A. Semerari (Milano: Franco Angeli).
Lorenzini, R., and Sassaroli, S. (1995). Attaccamento, Conoscenza e Disturbi di
Personalità. Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore.
Manser, R., Cooper, M., and Trefusis, J. (2012). Beliefs about emotions as a
metacognitive construct: initial development of a self-report questionnaire
measure and preliminary investigation in relation to emotion regulation. Clin.
Psychol. Psychother. 19, 235–246. doi: 10.1002/cpp.745
Mennin, D., and Farach, F. (2007). Emotion and evolving treatments for adult
psychopathology. Clin. Psychol. 14, 329–352. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2850.2007.
00094.x
Morina, N., Lancee, J., and Arntz, A. (2017). Imagery rescripting as a clinical
intervention for aversive memories: a meta-analysis. J. Behav. Ther. Exp.
Psychiatry 55, 6–15. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2016.11.003
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1991). Responses to depression and their effects on the
duration of depressive episodes. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 100, 569–582. doi: 10.1037/
0021-843X.100.4.569
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). The role of rumination in depressive disorders
and mixed anxiety/depressive symptoms. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 109, 504–511.
doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.109.3.504
Reimer, S. G., and Moscovitch, D. A. (2015). The impact of imagery rescripting on
memory appraisals and core beliefs in social anxiety disorder. Behav. Res. Ther.
75, 48–59. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2015.10.007
Schanche, E. (2013). The transdiagnostic phenomenon of self-criticism.
Psychotherapy 50, 316–321. doi: 10.1037/a0032163
Shahar, G. (2013). An integrative psychotherapist’s account of his focus when
treating self-critical patients. Psychotherapy 50, 322–325. doi: 10.1037/a0032033
Trincas, R., Bilotta, E., and Mancini, F. (2016). Specific beliefs about emotions
are associated with different emotion-regulation strategies. Psychology 7,
1682–1699. doi: 10.4236/psych.2016.713159
van der Kolk, B. A., Pelcovitz, D., Roth, S., Mandel, F., Mcfarlane, A., and Herman,
J. L. (1996). Dissociation, somatization, and affect dysregulation: the complexity
of adaptation of trauma. Am. J. Psychiatry 153, 83–93. doi: 10.1176/ajp.153.7.83
Watson, D., and Friend, R. (1969). Measurement of social-evaluative anxiety.
J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 33, 448–457. doi: 10.1037/h0027806
Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive Therapy of Anxiety Disorders: A Practical Guide.
Chirchester: Wiley.
Wells, A. (2000). Emotional Disorders and Metacognition: Innovative Cognitive
Therapy. Chirchester: Wiley.
Wells, A. (2007). Cognition about cognition: metacognitive therapy and change in
generalized anxiety disorder and social phobia. Cogn. Behav. Pract. 14, 18–25.
doi: 10.1016/j.cbpra.2006.01.005
Wells, A. (2008). Metacognitive Therapy for Anxiety and Depression. New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Wheatley, J., Brewin, C. R., Patel, T., Hackmann, A., Wells, A., Fisher, P., et al.
(2007). “I’ll believe it when I can see it”: imagery rescripting of intrusive
sensory memories in depression. J. Behav. Ther. Exp. Psychiatry 38, 371–385.
doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2007.08.005
Wild, J., Hackmann, A., and Clark, D. M. (2007). When the present visits the past:
updating traumatic memories in social phobia. J. Behav. Ther. Exp. Psychiatry
38, 386–401. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2007.07.003
Wild, J., Hackmann, A., and Clark, D. M. (2008). Rescripting early memories
linked to negative images in social phobia: a pilot study. Behav. Ther. 39, 47–56.
doi: 10.1016/j.beth.2007.04.003
Williams, K. E., Chambless, D. L., and Ahrens, A. (1997). Are emotions
frightening? An extension of the fear of fear construct. Behav. Res. Ther. 35,
239–248. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(96)00098-8
Witkowski, G. (2017). The Effect of Emotionally Validating and Invalidating
Responses on Emotional Self-Efficacy. Ph.D. thesis, Walden University,
Minneapolis, MN.
Young, J. E., Klosko, J. S., and Weishaar, M. E. (2003). Schema Therapy: A
Practitioner’s Guide. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2018 Mancini and Mancini. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) and the copyright owner are credited and that the original publication
in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org April 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 581123
MINI REVIEW
published: 07 June 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00927
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 927
Edited by:
Rossella Guerini,
Roma Tre University, Italy
Reviewed by:
Gianluca Serafini,
IRCCS San Martino Hospital,
University of Genoa, Italy
Irene Messina,
University of Padua, Italy
*Correspondence:
Daniela Altavilla
daniela.altavilla@uniroma1.it
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 30 March 2017
Accepted: 19 May 2017
Published: 07 June 2017
Citation:
Kalsi N, Altavilla D, Tambelli R, Aceto P,
Trentini C, Di Giorgio C and Lai C
(2017) Neural Correlates of Outcome
of the Psychotherapy Compared to
Antidepressant Therapy in Anxiety and
Depression Disorders: A
Meta-Analysis. Front. Psychol. 8:927.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00927
Neural Correlates of Outcome of the
Psychotherapy Compared to
Antidepressant Therapy in Anxiety
and Depression Disorders: A
Meta-Analysis
Navkiran Kalsi 1, Daniela Altavilla 1*, Renata Tambelli 1, Paola Aceto 2, Cristina Trentini 1,
Chiara Di Giorgio 1 and Carlo Lai 1
1Department of Dynamic and Clinical Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy, 2Department of
Anaesthesiology and Intensive Care, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Rome, Italy
The most prevalent mental disorders, anxiety and depression, are commonly associated
with structural and functional changes in the fronto-limbic brain areas. The clinical trials
investigating patients with affective disorders showed different outcome to different
treatments such as psychotherapy or pharmacotherapy. It is, however, still unexplored
how these interventions approach affect the functional brain. This meta-analysis aims
to compare the effects of psychotherapy compared to antidepressant therapy on
functional brain activity in anxiety and depression disorders. Twenty-one samples with
psychotherapy and seventeen samples with antidepressant therapy were included. The
main finding showed an inverse effect of the two treatments on the right paracingulate
activity. The patients undergoing psychotherapy showed an increase in the right
paracingulate activity while pharmacological treatment led to a decrease of activation
of this area. This finding seems to support the recent studies that hypothesize how
psychotherapy, through the self-knowledge and the meaning processing, involves a
top-down emotional regulation.
Keywords: psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy, neural correlates, anxiety, depression
INTRODUCTION
A human being is the outcome of a developing process, which depend on a complex interaction
between the genetic information and the environment. A remarkable characteristic of the brain
is that it allows the nervous system to process information from the interacting environment,
modifying itself by experience in measurable ways (Markham and Greenough, 2004). With the
recent advances in neuroimaging techniques, scientists are able to identify neural correlates
not only of mental disorders but also of the changes associated with therapeutic interventions
(Fuchs, 2004). These interventions are broadly categorized into psychotherapy or pharmaceutical
treatments. However, it is very interesting to understand how the outcome of different treatments
affect the functional brain activity and neural circuits (Salone et al., 2016).
The main impairment in affective disorders is related to emotional dysregulation and is
characterized by abnormal brain activity in the cortico-limbic brain networks (Ochsner and Gross,
2008; Wager et al., 2008; Messina et al., 2013). Patients with depression showed hyperactivation
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of “default mode network” (DMN), consisting of the posterior
cingulated, precuneus, inferior parietal lobule, medial prefrontal
cortex, and of the amygdala during resting-state and in response
to emotional stimuli (Greicius et al., 2007; Siegle et al., 2007;
Grimm et al., 2009; Carlson et al., 2017). The patients with anxiety
disorders showed multiple underlying structural abnormalities
within the fear circuit, in particular of the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (Cha et al., 2014; Carlson et al., 2017) and an
increased response in the amygdala, anterior cingulated cortex,
and insula in anticipation of aversive and neutral stimuli (Stein
et al., 2007; Nitschke et al., 2009; Carlson et al., 2011, 2017).
Accordingly, studies on the neurobiological outcomes of the
therapeutic interventions in anxiety and depression disorders
report the changes in neural activity in the cortico-limbic
brain regions implicated in the emotion regulation (Ressler
and Mayberg, 2007; Messina et al., 2013). With respect to
prognosis and improvement of psychopathological symptoms,
both psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy are clinically effective
for treating psychopathological disorders (Cuijpers et al., 2013).
Despite psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy seem to lead to
a final common neurobiological pathway, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that these widely differing treatments might engage
diverse neural mechanisms (DeRubeis et al., 2008; Marano et al.,
2012; Quidé et al., 2012). In according with this hypothesis,
a recent meta-analysis showed that in patients with major
depression the psychotherapy induced modifications in the left
frontal, temporal, lingual gyri and in the cingulate cortex, as
well as in the right frontal and precentral gyri. Otherwise,
pharmacotherapy affected brain activation in the right insula
(Boccia et al., 2016).
The pharmacotherapy is directly oriented to the emotional
reactivity through the balance of neurotransmitter activity that
seems to modify the neural activity in the limbic structures
normalizing the cortical activity through bottom-up approach
(Stahl, 2013). On the other side, the psychotherapy works on to
build and to elaborate meanings that can regulate the attention
and memory systems inducing changes in cortical brain activity
that through top-down approach restores the limbic system
functions reducing the emotional dysregulations (Linden, 2006).
Despite the impressive growth of neuroimaging techniques,
how different treatments affect the functional brain is yet to be
established.
In order to investigate the neural correlate of the outcome of
different treatments used in the anxiety and depression clinical
trials, in the present meta-analysis the therapeutic interventions
were divided into two different categories: psychotherapy and
antidepressant therapy.
The aim of the current meta-analysis was to compare
the neural correlates of pre and post-treatment effects
of psychotherapy and antidepressant therapy in affective
disorders.
METHODS
In order to reach the aim of the meta-analysis, the following
comparisons were performed: (1) pre- vs. post-treatment changes
in the activations of brain regions due to psychotherapy (2) pre-
vs. post-treatment changes in the activations of brain regions
due to antidepressant therapy, and (3) post-treatment changes
in the activations of brain regions due to psychotherapy vs.
antidepressant therapy. Successively, the same contrasts only on
resting state studies were re-performed. The significant effects for
all contrasts were considered in both directions (increased and
decreased effects post-treatment).
Search Criterion
A systematic search strategy was used to identify relevant
neuroimaging studies reporting the changes in functional neural
activity as a treatment outcome of cognitive/psychodynamic
therapies and antidepressant therapy on the anxiety and
depression disorders. For this purpose, PubMed and Scopus
database search was performed by two independent researchers
to find putative studies reporting the treatment for the anxiety
and depression disorders following DSM-IV-TR criteria. The
search was conducted for studies published between 2000 and
2016. The following search terms were used: “imaging,” “fMRI”
(functional MRI), “PET” (positron emission tomography), and
“SPECT” (single photon emission computed tomography) in
combination with the name of the disorder (anxiety, PTSD, panic
disorder, phobias, and depression). Furthermore, the reference
lists of the articles were manually checked for the studies not
identified in earlier literature search. To achieve a high standard
of reporting we have adopted “Preferred Reporting Items for
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses” (PRISMA) guidelines.
Selection Criteria
Studies were included if they met the following criteria: (a) being
original papers in a peer-reviewed journal, (b) involving subjects
with a pre and post-treatment effects, (c) having employed
functional imaging, (d) having reported the brain coordinates in
standard brain atlases, (e) having adult samples (age 18–65).
The studies in which the entire group of patients had received
prior interventions at the time of the start of the treatment study
and the studies which reported a single case study were not
included in the meta-analysis to reduce the possible biases.
Recorded Variables
The variables recorded for articles in the meta-analysis were:
sample size, gender, mean age of participants and peak
coordinates reported along with the software and stereotactic
space of these coordinates. Additionally, we recorded the
statistical significance of the treatment outcomes and the method
employed to correct the results for multiple comparisons.
The studies which compared between two types of treatments
(psychotherapy vs. antidepressant therapy), only the pre to post
brain changes for each treatment separately were considered.
Study Classification
The studies were then classified into two categories based on
the treatment type. The studies that included the cognitive
(CT) and dynamic (DPT) based treatments were categorized
in psychotherapy group, and those including the intake of
antidepressant drugs in antidepressant therapy group (see
Table 1).
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TABLE 1 | Studies included in meta-analysis.
Study Disease Therapy Patients Technique Task Mean age
Farrow et al., 2005 PTSD Psychotherapy 13 fMRI Emotional task 42
Felmingham et al., 2007 PTSD Psychotherapy 8 fMRI Emotional task 36.8
Fu et al., 2008 Depression Psychotherapy 16 fMRI Emotional task 40
Huang et al., 2014 Depression Psychotherapy 23 fMRI Resting state 27.7
Kircher et al., 2013 Panic Psychotherapy 42 fMRI Emotional task 35.42
Paquette et al., 2003 Phobia Psychotherapy 12 fMRI Emotional task 24.8
Ritchey et al., 2011 Depression Psychotherapy 11 fMRI Emotional task 36.1
Sakai et al., 2006 Panic Psychotherapy 11 PET Resting state 29.8
Schienle et al., 2007 Phobia Psychotherapy 14 fMRI Emotional task 27.2
Yoshimura et al., 2014 Depression Psychotherapy 21 fMRI Emotional task 37.3
Aupperle et al., 2013 PTSD Psychotherapy 14 fMRI Emotional task 40.1
Buchheim et al., 2012 Depression Psychotherapy 16 fMRI Emotional task 38.9
Wiswede et al., 2014 Depression Psychotherapy 13 fMRI Emotional task 39.8
Beutel et al., 2010 Panic Psychotherapy 15 fMRI Emotional task 32
Furmark et al., 2002 Social Phobia Psychotherapy; Antidepressant therapy 6; 6 PET Emotional task 35.2
Goldapple et al., 2004 Depression Psychotherapy; Antidepressant therapy 14; 13 PET Resting state 41; 36
Kennedy et al., 2007 Depression Psychotherapy; Antidepressant therapy 7; 9 PET Resting state 32.7; 40.1
Konarski et al., 2009 Depression Psychotherapy; Antidepressant therapy 7; 9 PET Resting state 32.7; 40.1
Prasko et al., 2004 Panic Psychotherapy; Antidepressant therapy 6; 6 PET Resting state 31.8; 32
Brody et al., 2001 Depression Psychotherapy; Antidepressant therapy 14; 10 PET Resting state 40.7; 36.4
Martin et al., 2001 Depression Psychotherapy; Antidepressant therapy 13; 15 SPECT Resting state 38.4; 39.4
Brockmann et al., 2009 Depression Antidepressant therapy 44 SPECT Resting state 47.2
Carey et al., 2004 Anxiety Antidepressant therapy 37 SPECT Resting state 33.5
Kennedy et al., 2001 Depression Antidepressant therapy 13 PET Resting state 36.7
Mayberg et al., 2000 Depression Antidepressant therapy 4 PET Resting state 49
Samson et al., 2011 Depression Antidepressant therapy 10 fMRI Emotional task 41.5
Seedat et al., 2004 PTSD Antidepressant therapy 11 SPECT Resting state 33.6
Vlassenko et al., 2004 Depression Antidepressant therapy 14 SPECT Resting state 42.8
Warwick et al., 2006 Anxiety Antidepressant therapy 31 SPECT Resting state 33
Kilts et al., 2006 Anxiety Antidepressant therapy 12 PET Emotional task 38
Hoehn-Saric et al., 2004 Anxiety Antidepressant therapy 6 fMRI Emotional task 36
In these studies, the brain activity was scanned during the
resting-state, focuses on spontaneous, low frequency fluctuations
in the BOLD signal (Lee et al., 2013), or during an emotional
task, i.e., during emotionally arousing stimuli (Messina et al.,
2013).”
Standard Meta-Analyses of Functional
Changes Post-treatment
Voxel-based meta-analyses of functional brain changes to the
treatment were conducted with the effect-size version of signed
differential mapping (ES-SDM; Radua and Mataix-Cols, 2009,
2012). This technique has been used in meta-analysis studies
on obsessive compulsive disorder, schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder, etc. (Bora et al., 2010, 2011; Palaniyappan et al., 2012).
This method is based on using the peak coordinates to recreate,
for each study, a map of the effect sizes of the differences
between pre and post-treatment changes in patients, and then on
conducting a standard random-effects variance-weighted meta-
analysis in each voxel.
Between group comparison among the two treatments
(psychotherapy vs. antidepressant therapy) was conducted and
significant results were reported after threshold at p < 0.001
uncorrected (equivalent to p < 0.05 corrected for multiple
comparisons (Radua et al., 2010) with an extent threshold of Ke>
10 voxels. Default ES-SDM kernel size and thresholds were used
(FWHM= 20 mm, peak height Z= 1, cluster extent= 10 voxels;
Radua and Mataix-Cols, 2009).
Robustness of the significant results was assessed by means of
exploration of the jack-knife analyses by systematically repeating
the meta-analyses by excluding one study at a time. If a
significant brain region remains significant in all or most of the
combinations of studies it can be concluded that this finding is
highly replicable.
RESULTS
Thirty-one studies met the inclusion criteria. Four-teen studies
tested neural correlate of psychotherapy (eleven using CT,
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three DPT) and ten studies investigated neural correlate
of antidepressant therapy. The remaining seven studies
were performed on two randomized trial (five with CT vs.
antidepressant therapy and two with DPT vs. antidepressant
therapy). Thus, the meta-analysis included 16 samples reporting
treatment outcomes with CT, 5 samples with DPT and 17 samples
with antidepressant therapy. The overall sample was equivalent
to a cohort of 546 individuals undergoing treatment for anxiety
and depression (Mean age, SD = 36.3, 5.46) contributing data to
the meta-analysis.
Comparison of Regional Brain Response:
Psychotherapy and Antidepressant
Therapy
Data for this analysis was obtained from 21 samples of 296
patients undergoing treatment with psychotherapy and 17
samples representing 250 patients undergoing antidepressant
therapy.
As shown in Table 2, both psychotherapy and antidepressant
therapy showed a decreased activation (post vs. pre) of the right
inferior frontal gyrus, bilateral superior frontal gyrus, bilateral
anterior cingulate, and right insula. However, other patterns of
activations varied between these groups. In particular, patients
undergoing psychotherapy showed an increased activation of
right paracingulate gyrus and precuneus, and a decreased
activation of right hippocampus, right parahippocampal gyrus,
right amygdala, right rolandic operculum, right putamen, right
temporal pole, right superior temporal gyrus, and bilateral
anterior cingulate gyrus. Conversely, antidepressant therapy
showed an increased activation (post vs. pre) in the right
middle frontal gyrus, and a decreased activation of the bilateral
supplementary motor area, bilateral paracingulate gyrus and
bilateral caudate nucleus.
Interestingly, an inverse pattern of activation was observed in
right paracingulate gyrus.
In order to control the effect of the task on the difference
between outcome treatment of psychotherapy and antidepressant
therapy, a comparison between the two treatments on only the
resting state studies was conducted. Data for this analysis was
obtained from 15 resting state studies representing 8 samples
with 95 patients undergoing treatment with psychotherapy (25%
anxiety and 75% depression disorders) and 11 samples with 192
patients undergoing antidepressant therapy (36% anxiety and
64% depression disorders). The findings confirm the inverse
pattern of activation observed in right paracingulate gyrus in the
previous analyses (Table 2).
Robustness Analysis
The analysis of robustness (jack-knife sensitivity analyses)
showed that the results were highly replicable with possible
exception of right parahippocampal gyrus, right superior
frontal gyrus and bilateral caudate nucleus in antidepressant
therapy group, and with possible exception of the left middle
frontal activation in psychotherapy trials where this activation
did not remain significant in 10/21 re-sampling combination
trials.
DISCUSSION
This is to our knowledge is the first neuroimaging meta-analysis
which focuses on a comparison between psychotherapy and
antidepressant therapy in patients with anxiety and depression.
The patients undergoing psychotherapeutic and
pharmacological treatments for anxiety and depression showed
an overall decreased activations in right inferior frontal gyrus,
bilateral superior frontal gyrus, bilateral anterior cingulate
and right insula suggesting the relevant role of these areas in
the symptoms reduction. Superior frontal gyrus and anterior
cingulate represent the components of central executive networks
of information processing which is activated when performing a
task requiring focused attention. Furthermore, anterior cingulate
and insula are involved in the Salience Network (Ham et al.,
2013) which is responsible for switching between the default
mode network (the network which is active during the rest
when the brain is not engaged in a specific task) and the central
executive network (Goulden et al., 2014). The intensity of
interactions of default mode and central executive network in
insular salience network activity have been previously associated
with the severity of symptoms in major depressive disorder
(Manoliu et al., 2013). The reduced post-treatment activations of
these areas in anxiety and depression could indicate the restored
activity of the brain.
The main finding of the present study was the inverse
effects of psychotherapy and antidepressant therapy on
the right paracingulate activity. The patients undergoing
psychotherapeutic treatment led to an increased activation of
the right paracingulate activity while those with antidepressant
therapy showed a decrease of this area. The paracingulate cortex
(approximately corresponding to BA32) is often considered
to be part of the anterior cingulate cortex, however the BA32
has been described cytoarchitectonically as a cingulo-frontal
transition area (Devinsky et al., 1995) and therefore anatomically
(and maybe functionally) distinct from the anterior cingulated
cortex (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). Specially, the paracingulate
cortex activity seems to be associated with the mentalizing
ability (Gallagher and Frith, 2003) and with self-monitoring
such as: visual self-recognition (Kircher et al., 2000, 2001),
autobiographical memory (Maguire and Mummery, 1999;
Maguire, 2001), conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Beckmann et al., 2009), verbal self-monitoring (McGuire et al.,
1996b), self-generated thoughts (McGuire et al., 1996a). The
components of these abilities are implicated in initiation and
maintenance of the symptoms of anxiety and depression (Roiser
et al., 2012; Weightman et al., 2014; Anastasides et al., 2015;
Bartczak and Bokus, 2015). Moreover, a study showed that
the paracingulate cortex is active during the “rest” condition
(Gusnard et al., 2001). The authors suggested that this might
indicate a “default” mode of functioning in which “we think
about ourselves” (Gusnard et al., 2001). In light of these findings,
it seems that cingulo-frontal section could be specialized on
internal mental states processing (Gallagher and Frith, 2003).
In a very interesting way, different authors reported that the
anterior cingulated cortex is evolutionally very recent, in fact, it
is present only in humans and in higher primates (Nimchinsky
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et al., 1999). Specifically paracingulate cortex seems to be present
only in 50% of humans (Paus, 2001) and it might be indicative
of a progressive evolution of this region in humans (Zilles et al.,
1988; Gallagher and Frith, 2003), suggesting as its development
could be affected by the environment and by the relative meaning
attribution.
In line with the theoretical aspects of psychotherapies
that emphasize the importance of the internal reality, as the
representations, and the processes of the meaning attribution
and elaboration (Timary et al., 2011), the increase of the right
paracingulate activity might be interpreted as psychotherapy
conditioned increase of the attention to personal inner states and
of the emotions regulation ability (Keune et al., 2012; Messina
et al., 2016).
Moreover, through the introspection and the self-knowledge,
“a subject can construct itself as psychologically self-conscious
(and not only as physically self-conscious) in an interplay
of meta-representational abilities, autobiographical memory,
and socio-communicative capacities” (Guerini et al., 2015).
Conversely, the neurobiological outcome of the antidepressant
therapy showed a decrease of the right paracingulate activity,
which can be explained by the fact that this kind of treatment
is not focused on the elaboration of internal mental states.
An alternative interpretation is that the inverse effect of the
two types of treatment could be due to the different experimental
tasks used during the neurobiological data acquisition (Messina
et al., 2013). The results of the meta-analyses including only
resting state studies, where the inverse effect of psychotherapy vs.
antidepressant therapy on paracingulate activity was maintained,
it falsifies this interpretation.
Limitations
The present meta-analysis entails certain limitations. First,
methodological limitation concerns the data available for
analysis. Several studies had small sample sizes, variable duration,
heterogeneity of techniques and study designs which might affect
the outcome of the therapeutic outcome and thus the quality of
the meta-analysis.
A second limitation is the considerable heterogeneity in
the samples due to the combination of anxiety and depression
together. However, in order to reduce the pathology biases, we
considered homogeneous number of studies for anxiety and
depression in psychotherapy and antidepressant therapy studies.
Another limitation is that this meta-analysis also includes
the studies reporting only the region of interest involving
fronto-limbic brain. Finally, the present meta-analysis did
not compare different types of psychotherapies (cognitive
vs. dynamic). This lack was due to the exiguous number
of clinical samples treated with dynamic psychotherapy.
In order to perform this comparison more studies on
the neurobiological outcome of dynamic treatment are
needed.
CONCLUSIONS
The finding of the present meta-analysis showed a different
neurobiological outcome of the psychotherapy compared
to antidepressant therapy in anxiety and depression. The
psychotherapeutic and pharmacological treatments showed
inverse effects on the right paracingulate activity. This finding
seems to support the recent studies (Linden, 2006) that
hypothesize how psychotherapy, through the self-knowledge
and the meaning processing, involves a top-down emotional
regulation.
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